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Introduction 
Even once we accept that morality has a universal foundation, we should still recognize that the 
particular values, virtues, relationships and obligations that guide our decisions are often 
contingent. We should respect one another, advance happiness, live flourishing live and advance 
justice, but the way in which we should do this will always be specific to our social context. In 
recognizing that much of our form of ethical life is relative to our social world, we do not need to 
think that all of ethics is relative. The ultimate moral ends or principles that ground our pursuits 
and restrict our actions will only have meaning and substance through the particularities of the 
form of life we live. To ignore these particularities will only obscure what the ultimate ground for 
ethics and morality truly is.
 The particular way in which we live together determines much of our particular form of 
ethical life. In living together, we organize, coordinate and understand our actions in accordance 
with social practices. These practices set our expectations of others and give meaning to our 
activities. When our interactions are complex and when we live with large groups, we organize 
our interaction more and more, and our practices become more and more structured. What we 
identify as our social institutions are particularly ordered practices that structure our life together. 
In ordering our lives, these institutions have profound and pervasive effects on the content of 
ethical life. These institutions not only determine the material conditions in our society and the 
distribution of advantages, they also influence the shape of ethical life. Our social practices 
establish new obligations, define our rights, shape our values, and set the terms of our 
relationships. 
 These social institutions are a concern of ethics and morality because the institutions that 
structure our conduct could have been otherwise and we can change them now. Since these 
institutions have profound effects on our form of ethical life, which institutions we choose to have 
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can have a broad impact on the values, virtues, relationships and obligations that define our 
particular ethical life. This makes the question of which institutions we should have a distinct and 
weighty ethical concern.
 Of course, there is the view that our real obligations, values, and virtues are everywhere 
and always the same. To some extent, this must be true if we recognize a universal foundation for 
our moral and ethical claims. Yet, we should not take this view too far. We live particular lives 
with particular concerns and particular ways of interacting. If ethics is to property treat us as 
particular persons, it needs to be sensitive to the differences in our ways of living. What ends we 
set, what makes us happy, and what we rely on others to do will also be specific to our social 
context, and a complete identification of our values, virtues, relationships and obligations should 
be sensitive to these particular features of our lives. 
 This dissertation is about how moral and political philosophy should proceed after 
recognizing the profound influence of our social institutions on the content of ethical life. I argue 
that there is a distinct and unified set of institutions that have a kind of moral primacy. The 
institutions establish moral rights, obligations and powers for individuals as members of society. 
They establish a background for living our life together. The central role that these institutions 
play in determining that which is particular to our form of ethical life makes this institutions of 
primary moral importance. These institutions are those that constitute the basic structure of 
society, and I will argue that they have primacy in a proper order of evaluation amongst those 
moral issues that we need address. 
1.The Basic Structure and Justice
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls made the claim that “the primary subject of justice is the basic 
structure of society.”1  By the “basic structure,” Rawls meant the way our basic social institutions-- 
Introduction 
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1 Rawls, Theory of Justice (Revised), 6.
which include a property scheme, economic system and political constitution--come together as a 
single system of social cooperation.2  I take this choice of subject to be one of the many 
contributions that Rawls made to the fields of moral and political philosophy, and I take it to be a 
contribution that is separable from his others. A reader could agree with Rawls in taking the basic 
structure as subject even when they do not accept his two principles of justice, contractualism, 
constructivism, or his conception of the person. In this dissertation, I mean to show, not only that 
a reader could, but that a reader should appreciate the Rawlsian choice of subject even when they 
disagree with Rawls on these other core issues. 
 What turns many recent theorists away from the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is 
linked to what turned theorist towards Theory of Justice when it was first published. As the title 
states, the book was offered as a theory of justice and the importance of justice immediately grabs 
us.3  The fact that Rawls seemed to offer a renewed account of justice made it more attractive as a 
major work in philosophy. The fact that this renewed account was appealing, rigorous and deep 
made it one of the most significant works in 20th century philosophy. However, if we think of 
Theory of Justice as a theory of justice, we are tempted to read the phrase “the primary subject of 
justice is the basic structure of society” as a claim about the nature of justice. We think of it as a 
thesis about justice; that justice has some unique relationship to the Rawlsian artifice that is the 
basic structure. At this point, many come to doubt the Rawlsian choice of subject. Should we 
think that justice is really about the basic structure in some primary way? Isn’t justice something 
broader than that? Our pre-theoretic understanding of justice seems to cut against the claim that 
justice is somehow uniquely related to the specific subject of the basic structure. So, being about 
Introduction 
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2 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 10.
3 G.A. Cohen motivate his criticism with this claim, “It was because it was thought to offer a new and 
comprehensive theory of justice that the book A Theory of Justice was welcomed with such excitement: the 
excitement was not that Rawls had proved a theory of something, well, sort of like justice.” Rescuing Justice and 
Equality, 304.
justice makes Theory of Justice appealing, but being about justice makes the Rawlsian choice of 
subject seem unappealing. 
 G.A. Cohen, Liam Murphy and Aresh Abizadeh have used this intuition against the 
Rawlsian choice of subject in each of their more focused arguments. First, Cohen argued that 
justice is a unified moral demand whether we are assessing institutions, states of the world or 
individual actions.4  If we are to identify the basic structure--or anything--as “just,” then we must 
be claiming that the unified and fully general demand of justice is instantiated in the basic 
structure. Given that justice is general in this way, Cohen argues that we cannot rightly identify 
justice with a principle that applies only to the basic structure. A principle of justice is general 
across subjects by its very nature, so it cannot apply only to the basic structure. Second, Murphy 
argued that if we think of justice as primarily a concern of our basic institutions, then this only 
frustrates our ability to promote justice in an unjust world. For Murphy, identifying justice as an 
institutional virtue means that we can only advance justice through institutions, but this would 
mean we cannot always do that which would directly advance justice. Here again, Murphy uses a 
common intuition about the nature of justice to challenge the Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure. Third, Abizadeh has focused on distributive justice specifically and challenged the idea 
that the basic structure of society would limit the scope of distributive justice. Once we recognize 
that distributive justice has demands beyond the basic structure, it seems to pull us away from its 
importance as a primary subject. In these arguments again, Abizadeh uses a pre-theoretical idea 
of distributive justice to challenge the Rawlsian choice of subject. 
 My response to these arguments is to distance the claim that “we should take the basic 
structure as subject” from any claim about the nature of justice. Accordingly, I do not claim that 
“the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society,” but instead claim that “the basic 
structure has primacy as a distinct moral subject.”  I will claim that the basic structure of society is 
Introduction 
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4 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Ch. 7 (especially p. 291).
a kind of mooring for ethical life. Regardless of what we think about justice as an ideal, we should 
treat the evaluation of the basic structure as amongst the most important ethical concerns. 
 Before explaining why the basic structure is such an important subject, I first want to 
make clear how my approach differs from typical responses to Cohen, Murphy and Abizadeh. 
Their arguments appeal to a pre-theoretical understanding of justice and show the problems with 
taking the basic structure as primary subject given that understanding of justice. The obvious 
response to their arguments would be to develop or defend an alternative understanding of 
justice, and then to show why we should take the basic structure as primary subject given that 
understanding of justice. Thomas Nagel and Samuel Scheffler seem to make such an argument 
with their appeal to the division of moral labor, each offering an understanding of justice that 
uniquely bears on institutions.5  Andrew Williams argues for an understanding of justice that is 
uniquely related to publicity.6  Kok-Chor Tan shows that core social institutions are the site of a 
suitably defined idea of distributive justice.7  In each case, theorists defend the Rawlsian view by 
articulating a view of justice that institutions would be uniquely related to it. 
 By contrast, my argument does not appeal to any understanding of justice. I do not claim 
that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice but that the basic structure is a centrally 
important subject for ethics. I claim that the reasons for taking the basic structure as subject are 
independent of the nature of justice. Instead, the reasons come from the ways in which the basic 
structure affects the content of ethical life.
 There is an important difference between what I believe about justice and what I need to 
claim for my argument. I have a certain belief about how we should understand justice, but my 
arguments do not require that belief. Specifically, I believe that the demands of justice are not 
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6 Williams, “Incentives, Inequality and Publicity” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1998).
7 Tan, “Justice and Personal Pursuits” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 101, No. 7 (2004); Justice, Institutions and Luck, 
Ch. 3. 
general across all subjects. What makes for a just society, just relations between societies, just 
agreements, and a just character is not a single and unified moral demand instantiated in all these 
things. Such a view towards justice is well-suited to those concerned with a single moral good, 
like equality or happiness, but it not well-suited for those who focus on the complexities and 
conflicts of ethics. Instead, I treat justice in the way that deontologists treat rightness. For 
deontologists, what is “right” is determined by a principle that applies in that circumstance and 
not by a single principle that applies across all circumstances. Likewise, I believe that what is 
“just” is determined by a principle that applies to that subject and not by a single principle that 
applies across all subjects. When it comes to justice, I am a “non-generalist”. With this 
understanding of justice, I can explain why the principles that apply to the basic structure are 
principles “of justice” even when they are not derived from any more fundamental principles of 
justice. I will return to this issue in Chapter 5 in order to highlight responses to Cohen’s 
argument.
 For now, the key is to recognize that I do not need this understanding of justice to make 
my point. I do not need to make any argument about the nature of justice in order to show the 
ethical importance of the basic structure. We can appreciate the Rawlsian choice of subject most 
easily when we distinguish the argument for this choice of subject from any claim about the 
nature of justice.
2. Profound and Pervasive Effects
So, why is the basic structure such a centrally important ethical subject? In short, because the 
basic structure determines the rights, obligations and powers that we have as members of society, 
and these moral demands and claims form a background for our social interaction and thereby 
for the various practice-dependent aspects of ethical life. The whole complex of values, virtues, 
relationships and obligations that specify our ethical life is not explained solely by the 
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particularities of the basic structure, but the basic structure has both profound direct effects and 
wide indirect effects. It directly establishes core obligations, has far-ranging effects on our 
material conditions, and determines much of the distribution of social advantages. It also 
indirectly affects what associations and relationships persons build and the ways we think of 
ourselves. It is this kind of profound and pervasive effect on ethical life that makes the basic 
structure so centrally important for ethics. Think of all the ways in which a feudal society differs 
from a democratic market society. Think of both the direct effects that has in individual rights 
and obligations, and think of the indirect effects in has on our relationships and ends. That is the 
kind of deep significance the basic structure has. 
 In making this claim, I am bound to perk the ears of those familiar with recent criticisms 
of Rawls. Rawls claimed that the basic structure was the primary subject of justice because its 
effects are so “profound and pervasive” from the start of life.8  Yet, G.A. Cohen’s argued against 
such a justification for the focus on the basic structure in his popular essay “Where the Action is: 
On the Site of Distributive Justice.”9  The criterion, “having profound and pervasive effects,” 
cannot justify a unique concern for the basic structure of society because things beyond the basic 
structure also have profound and pervasive effects. For example, suppose we live in a society in 
which a majority of persons greatly value poetry. Perhaps a majority see poetry as the highest 
form of human accomplishment. It is likely that this appreciation would have profound and 
pervasive effects on education, leisure time, career choices, and much else. We would not, 
however, think that this appreciation for poetry is part of the basic structure. Accordingly, we 
could not justify an exclusive concern for the basic structure by appeal to profound and pervasive 
effects because it would not rule out our concern for the appreciation of poetry. It is because of 
such an argument--and his subsequent support for this argument--that Cohen will be the 
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primary interlocutor for much of my argument. I need to explain why my appeal to the profound 
effects of the basic structure does not make me liable to Cohen’s objection.
 In response to Cohen’s argument, I want to make two points. The first point does not 
address his objection, but is nonetheless important. I sense that persons read the phrase 
“profound and pervasive effects” as if it refers solely to material effects. At least, this is how Cohen 
uses the ideas when the effect he is concerned with is material equality. He makes the point that 
an egalitarian ethos could have profound and pervasive effects on equality in the same way that 
economic institutions can.10  It is important for my response however, that profound and 
pervasive effects are not only material effects but also effects on the content of ethical life. The 
profound and pervasive effects are on our values, virtues, relationships, obligations and self-
conception. My concern is with the effects on our relationships with one another, our pursuits in 
life and what our responsibilities are. 
 Even once we are concerned with profound and pervasive effects on ethical life, however, 
Cohen’s objection still stands. The above poetry case is an example of how. I move then to a 
second point, which directly addresses Cohen’s objection. The profound and pervasive effects 
criterion is not meant to distinguish the basic structure from other moral concerns. It is, instead, 
meant to show why the basic structure--otherwise distinguished as an ethical concern--is so 
important. In short, the appeal to profound and pervasive effects is not meant to answer the 
question "what distinguishes the basic structure from other ethical concerns?" but instead to 
answer "why is the concern with the basic structure primary amongst ethical concerns?" The 
organization of the basic structure has profound effects, so it is ethically important that we 
address it. It is also true that the informal structure of society has profound effects, so it is 
ethically important that we address it as well. Yet, the fact that both the informal structure and the 
basic structure are ethically important is no problem for taking one as subject over another.
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 In short, I want to claim that the basic structure is so important because it has profound 
and pervasive effects on ethical life, Cohen objects that other aspects of social life also have such 
effects. I agree. Those other aspects of social life are also important to assess. This fact takes 
nothing away from the importance of the basic structure. 
 The question inevitably raised at this point is “if other aspects of social life are also 
important, then why direct our attention to the basic structure specifically?” I still need to explain 
why the basic structure, specifically, deserves attention. I recognize that an appeal to profound 
and pervasive effects on ethical life will not do that by itself. 
3.Three Issues
At this point, I have said what I will not do. I will neither argue for a focus on the basic structure 
by arguing for a particular conception of justice nor claim that the basic structure is unique in 
having profound and pervasive effects. To explain what I will do, I need to distinguish three 
issues. In his criticism of Rawls, Cohen mixes these three different issues together, and I mean to 
separate them again. 
 The first issue is the need to offer an adequate account of what the basic structure of society 
is. What differentiates the basic structure from the entire system of law or from all norms of 
conduct? What unifies the major social institutions into the basic structure? Rawls does not give 
any such full articulation of what the basic structure is, and he does not do so purposively.11 
However, given recent challenges, we need a more precise account of what the basic structure is. 
Call this issue a concern with the identity of the basic structure. 
 The second issue is explaining why we would need to assess the basic structure specifically, 
once it is identified. Why is the basic structure--given what it is--an object of moral concern? 
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Why wouldn’t our concerns with it be addressed by other moral principles? Even if we recognize 
that certain problems of political philosophy need to be addressed, it is not clear why we should 
address them with principles that apply to the basic structure rather than, say, justifying the use of 
coercion or justifying our social institutions individuality. What would require that arguments in 
political philosophy be about the basic structure specifically?  Call this issue a concern with the 
moral indispensability of the basic structure. 
 The third issue is offering a justification of why we would treat the principles that applies 
to the basic structure as distinct from other moral principles. Even if we should morally assess the 
basic structure, why would we think that the moral demand on it would be any different from the 
moral demands on other subjects? Why wouldn’t we merely apply a more general principle to the 
basic structure as we do other subjects? After all, Rawls starts out developing principles for this 
subject rather than developing first principles to be applied to it. What could warrant detaching 
the basic structure from broader moral commitments in this way? Call this issue a concern with 
the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure. 
 Cohen wrongly supposes that the identity, moral indispensability and moral 
distinctiveness of the basic structure are all addressed by a single account. He offers two options 
that would explain the identity of the basic structure, and then shows either option to be 
inadequate as an explanation for its moral distinctiveness. In the 2009 version of his argument,12 
Cohen claims that we cannot identify the basic structure as the coercive structure because it does 
not explain why we are concerned with the coercive structure rather than the other features of 
social life that have profound and pervasive effects. Likewise, he argues that we cannot identify 
the basic structure as certain norms of conduct because it does not explain why we are not 
likewise concerned with other norms that have profound and pervasive effects. In this way, he 
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claims that no explanation of the identity of the basic structure is adequate because it does not 
explain its moral distinctiveness. 
 A single explanation does not need to resolve these three issues. Why would we think that 
a single account would explain the identity, moral indispensability and moral distinctiveness of 
the basic structure? The three issues are fundamentally different. First, identity is a descriptive 
problem. It addresses what part of the world is picked out by the idea of the basic structure. One 
could articulate a view about what the basic structure is and think it has no moral significance 
whatsoever.13  Second, the moral indispensability issue turns on claims about the aims of moral 
theory. It depends on a view about what our moral principles need to do such that we would need 
principles that apply to the basic structure. Third, the moral distinctiveness depends on broader 
views about how our moral commitments hang together--or don’t. Whether we can detach the 
basic structure as an ethical subject and develop principles for it depends on views about what 
makes appropriate principles. For example, are all appropriate principles derived from first 
principles or can they be generated by a constructive procedure?
 I suspect that the reason why Cohen mixes these three issues together, despite their 
apparent differences, is because of the role that “justice” plays in our moral reasoning. Justice 
seems to be both morally indispensable and morally distinctive. First, we intuitively think that the 
demands of justice are a centrally important aspect of morality and ethics. Second, the ideal of 
justice seems distinct from other moral ideals, like rightness or goodness. If “the primary subject 
of justice is the basic structure of society” our views about the indispensability and distinctiveness 
of justice would seemingly make the basic structure both morally indispensable and morally 
distinct. Those who argue for a conception of justice that is uniquely tied to the basic structure, 
thereby get the moral indispensability and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure for free 
through its ties to justice. For Cohen, justice is indispensable and distinct, but it is broader and 
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more fundamental then our judgements about the basic structure. It is for this reason that the 
focus on the basic structure seems misplaced to him.
 In my core arguments, I do not make any claim about the nature of justice. Instead, I 
claim that the basic structure is a centrally important subject for ethics. To make this claim, I need 
to explain the identity, moral indispensability and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure. If I 
am right that its association with the ideal of justice previously made the basic structure seem 
indispensable and distinct, then my challenge will be to explain these two features of the basic 
structure without appeal to the nature of justice. 
4. Addressing the Three Issues
The first three chapters of this dissertation address the identity, moral indispensability and moral 
distinctiveness of the basic structure respectively.  In the fourth chapter, I review the significance 
of these arguments for moral theory more broadly. The final two chapters, address objections to 
my arguments. 
 The first chapter identifies the basic structure as a specific set of social practices. It begins 
by defining the general idea of a social practice and then progressively defines subclasses of social 
practices until we reach the idea of “major social institution.” I then claim that the basic structure 
is the way these major social institutions come together to form a single system.
 There are two important ideas that are introduced in the first chapter that form the core of 
its argument; the first is the idea of an “ostensibly binding practice” and the second is the 
connected idea of a “major social institution.” Ostensibly binding social practices are those 
practices that persons understand as requiring that they act in ways specified by the practice. As 
an example, the practice of line-waiting is understood by participants as requiring that they wait 
in line in order to get service. There are two important features of this kind of practice. First, we 
can understanding these practices as requiring action without commit ourselves to the judgement 
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that we should act in the required ways. In this way the practices are only “ostensibly” binding. 
For example, one could describe the practice of line waiting as included the rule that “one ought 
to wait in line” without themselves thinking that persons really ought to wait in line. Whether we 
should act in the ways required by an ostensibly binding social practice is a moral question that is 
not answered by detailing our understanding of practice alone. 
 Second, I identify the “major social institutions” as those practice that meet two 
conditions; (1) the rules are specific enough so that persons can form definite claims on their 
basis and (2) the rules apply to us as members of society. For example, a property system is a major 
social institution because it requires that persons respect property specific claims that persons 
have due to their membership in society. As members of society, we know that persons are 
required by the rules to act in that way, and we plan our lives against the expectation that they will 
do so. The fact that the major social institutions are specific enough to establish claims gives 
members of society a kind of “background security.” As they live and plan their lives, they can rely 
on people to generally act according to the institutional rules. I then argue that we can best 
understand the basic structure as constituted by the major social institutions for a single society. 
Hence, the basic structure is the way in which the major social institutions together establish 
background security for persons as members of society. This is the key idea that unites the basic 
structure as a single subject rather than a mere heap of institutions.
 With the identity of the basic structure thereby established, I move on to the moral 
indispensability of the basic structure in the second chapter. It might seem natural to show any 
particular subject is morally indispensable on the basis of a substantive moral view. For instance, 
one might argue that we need to assess the basic structure because of the moral importance of 
either autonomy or happiness and claim that the basic structure uniquely bears on autonomy or 
happiness. Instead, I give a more ecumenical argument that is not based on a commitment to any 
substantive moral claim. Instead, the argument is made on the basis of a view about the 
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normativity of social practices. Most simply, I claim that to assess certain actions we need to 
assess the practices that those actions are a part of. Analogously, I claim that to assess the major 
social institutions, we need to assess the basic structure of which they are a part. 
 To see the motivating commitment of my argument, we should look to Hume. In his 
Treatise on Human Nature, Hume gives an example that highlights the kind of argument I mean 
to make. In §3.2.2, he writes
“A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest; and were it to 
stand alone, without being followed by many other acts, may, of itself, be very 
prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a benevolent disposition, restores a 
great fortune to a miser, a seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the 
public is the real sufferer. Nor is every single act of justice, considered apart, more 
conducive to private interest, than to public; and ‘tis easily conceived how a man 
may impoverish himself by a single instance of integrity.”
In these two cases, Hume gives examples of actions that would be quite wrongful if judged in 
isolation. If one had the choice between giving money to a bigoted miser or to a charity, then to 
give the money to the miser would be uncaring. Yet, if we see the action as an instance of 
returning a loan, our assessment of the action changes. Here, the man of merit ought to give the 
miser the money because the action is part of a practice of contract-keeping. Whether the action 
is part of a social practice is thereby relevant for properly assessing the action. Hume here 
assumes that the practice of contract-keeping is a good one, because we would hardly approve of 
the action of the man of merit if it were not. For this reason, we can recognize the importance of 
assessing the practice of which the action is a part in order to assess that action. 
 The moral indispensability of the basic structure is explained by carrying this analysis to a 
second level. To properly assess an action that is part of a practice, we need to assess that practice. 
To properly assess an institution that is part of the basic structure, we need to assess the basic 
structure itself. We need to treat institutions as we treat the action of the man of merit; just as we 
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see his action as part of the practice of contract-keeping we should see contract-keeping as part of 
the basic structure. The basic structure is morally indispensable as a subject because we can only 
properly assess our major social institutions by assessing the basic structure as a whole. 
 In the third chapter, I move on to explain why the basic structure is morally distinctive. To 
do this, I argue for a fundamental distinction between moral judgments that apply within a social 
practice and judgments that apply to that practice. The reason for this distinction is because social 
practices affect the moral context of individuals within that practice. Judgments made within a 
moral context should be sensitive to the context established by the practice, but the judgments 
made of that practice should not be. For example, suppose that a property system establishes 
trespass as a wrong. Our evaluation of an action within a property system should be sensitive to 
the wrong of trespass, but our assessment of the property system should not be. The fact that a 
property system makes trespass wrong is not a reason to support a property system. I claim that it 
is this distinction between judgments that apply within a social practice and those principles that 
apply to a practice that distinguishes the basic structure as a moral subject.
 In making this argument, I contrast my account of the moral distinctiveness of the basic 
structure with the primary alternative, the “division of moral labor” arguments offered by Thomas 
Nagel and Samuel Scheffler. Both arguments justify distinguishing principles for institutions from 
principles for individuals based on the efficacy of such a separation in satisfying our diverse moral 
aims.  Instead of this, I argue that what justifies assessing the basic structure according to distinct 
principles is a division between principles that apply within a moral context and those that apply 
to practices that establish that moral context. Within an ethical life, the particularities of our 
social practices establish certain values, virtues, relationships and obligations that are relevant to 
determining how we should act. The principles that apply to these practices should not be 
sensitive to the particularities that they establish, but principles that apply within these practices 
should be. The principles that apply to the basic structure are principles that should not be 
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sensitive to any moral context whereas the principles that apply to a variety of other subject 
should be. While the basic structure is not the sole determinant of the particularities of ethical 
life, it has a kind of independence that justifies treating it differently.
 With these three chapters complete, I will have explained the identity, moral 
indispensability and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure. First, the basic structure is the 
way in which the major social institutions together establish background security for persons as 
members of society. Second, we need to assess the basic structure as subject in order to properly 
assess the major social institutions that together form it. Finally, the moral demands on this 
structure are distinct because of the difference between principles that apply within a social 
context and the principles that apply to those practices that determine that context. What explains 
why the basic structure is a centrally important subject for ethics is not the nature of justice, but 
the normativity of social practices and the kind of social practices the basic structure consists of. 
It is because the basic structure is a system of practices that we need to assess it, and it because it 
is a system of practices that it is morally distinct from the principle that apply within it. 
5. Significance and Two Objections
Together, the first three chapters show why the basic structure is a centrally important ethical 
subject. Depending on the reader, this conclusions might seem either humdrum or extreme. In 
Chapter 4, I mean to counter both of these objections. I seek to show that the general approach I 
support meets a reasonable middle between those who insist that morality is independent of our 
social context, and those who believe it is fully determined by our social context. In this way, the 
approach has the possibly of appealing to both Kantians and Hegelians, communitarians and 
liberals, as well as sociologists and moral philosophers. However, I do not think that I am only 
creating friendships through my argument. I also claim that my argument is inconsistent with any 
moral theory that cannot accept “limited conventionalism.” I define limited conventionalism as 
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the view that some--but not all--of our moral demands and claims are practice-dependent. If a 
moral theory cannot recognize either (a) that some demands or claims are practice-dependent or 
(b) that some demands or claims are practice-independent, then they will not accept my 
arguments.
 This fourth chapters does not complete my argument. I still want to respond to two 
objections in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively. Both objections are inspired by recent criticism of 
Rawls, but I dentify them with much deeper tendencies in moral and political theory.  In the final 
two chapters, I want to show why the approach I argue for is preferable to the approaches that are 
consistent with those deeper tendencies.
 The first objection is developed from Liam Murphy’s argument in “Institutions and the 
Demands of Justice.” There, Murphy makes an both a direct argument and an intuitive argument 
against separating principles that apply to institutions from those that apply to individual actions. 
His direct argument seeks to show that separating the principles that apply to institutions 
frustrates our attempts to advance justice in our imperfect world. This argument can be easily 
addressed, but there is a deeper intuitive argument that presents a more persistent difficulty. 
Specifically, Murphy appeals to the intuitive idea that all our moral principles are united at some 
fundamental level. Those principles that are at this fundamental level must then be general across 
all subjects; they apply to institutions as much as they apply to individuals. This intuitive view 
directly conflicts with the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure, because it limits the extent 
to which practices can affect our moral context. Murphy’s view is an intuitive view of moral 
theory, and since this view conflicts with the moral distinctiveness I defend, I need to address it. 
 In response, I first want to show exactly why Murphy’s argument would be problematic for 
the view I argue for. Our social context can affect the assessment of individual action in two ways. 
First, our social context might change the causal processes by which we satisfy moral principles. 
For example, one might think that the convention of driving on the right changes the ways by 
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which I satisfy my obligation not to harm others. One could argue that no news moral standards 
arise from this convention but only a new way by which to satisfy an older moral standard. 
Second, our social context might establish new standards by which to assess individual action. 
For example, one might think that if the institutions of property is justified, then I should respect 
property claims. Someone with this view with think that our social context establishes new 
standard by which to judge actions. My argument relies on the possibility of the second way that 
social context affects our moral assessment of individuals. Murphy’s argument is only an 
objection against my view insofar as it shows why the second possibility is impossible. It is not 
clear that Murphy seeks to make this point, but some might interpret his argument in this way. 
They might claim that “if all valid moral judgments are entailed directly by first principles, then 
social context cannot create new standard by which to judge individual actions.” The act-
consequentialist, for example, is committed to only one principle as grounding any judgments of 
individual action. If such a view is necessarily correct, then social context is not as important for 
assessing individual action as my argument requires. Such a moral theory might seem to be 
entailed by Murphy’s claim that all moral principles are united at a fundamental level. 
 I identify this challenge as a commitment to “Generalism,” which holds that all valid 
moral judgements must be entailed directly by a fully general first principle (or fully general first 
principles). Now, I recognize that a commitment to generalism would block my argument for the 
moral distinctiveness of the basic structure because it would block the importance of social 
context, so Chapter 4 is focused on defending against arguments for generalism. Overall, I mean 
to show that an argument from generalism are not problematic because we have no reason to be 
committed to the generalism. Any argument that assumes it to argue against a focus on the basic 
structure is therefore question-begging. I look at four major kinds of argument offered in defense 
of generalism and show why each of them is lacking. Finally, I end by giving one brief argument 
against a commitment to generalism. 
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 In Chapter 6, I am concerned with a second objection that is used by G.A. Cohen in his 
2009 book, Rescuing Justice and Equality. In this book, Cohen goes beyond the argument from his 
1997 article and appeals more directly to the concept of justice to ground his criticism of Rawls. 
As I made clear in §0.2, my argument consciously avoids making any claims about the nature of 
justice. I see the biggest impediment towards accepting the central importance of the basic 
structure to be the fact that persons see such a focus as only motivated by views about the nature 
of justice. Yet, while I avoid arguing from claims about justice, someone might still object to my 
view from their own view about justice. Shouldn’t we be concerned with justice, especially when 
we are assessing something like the basic structure? As Cohen points out, if we think that the 
basic structure ought to be just, then shouldn’t we first identify what justice requires and then 
apply it to determine how the basic structure ought to be? While I have been avoiding making 
claims about the nature of justice, I have ignored how justice bears on the issue. Since justice 
seems to be a central moral concern, shouldn’t we be concerned with what justice requires?
 I meet this objection by focusing on what the concept of justice is and how it bears on the 
basic structure. I draw a contrast between unified and disunified conceptions of justice. A unified 
conception of justice consists of a single moral demand that unifies all objects that we can rightly 
consider just or unjust. A disunified conception of justice views the demands of justice as 
different for different subjects. A disunified conception of justice is like the deontological 
conception of rightness. For the deontologist, what is right is determined by a principle that 
applies in that circumstance (rather than a single overarching principle for all circumstances), and 
a disunified conception of justice maintains that what is just is determined by a principle that 
applies to that subject (rather than a single principle of justice that applies to all subjects). Cohen’s 
argument relies on a unified conception of justice, and I argued against such a view in Chapter 5. 
Specifically, I show that such an understanding of justice does not fit well with the role that 
concept plays in our practical reasoning. I then show how a disunified conception of justice can 
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better explain why the basic structure of society would be the primary subject of justice, thereby 
returning to the original Rawlsian claim. 
6. A Mooring
The arguments in the chapters to come will show why the basic structure is an indispensable and 
distinct ethical subject, but I here want to briefly preview the argument of Chapter 4 and say what 
is so important about the basic structure for ethical theory. Recognizing that it is not profound 
and pervasive effects that either identifies or distinguishes the basic structure as subject, I want to 
return to explain why it’s profound and pervasive effects make the basic structure--otherwise 
distinguished--such a centrally important subject. 
 To see this, we need to recognize the effects that social practices have on ethical life. Our 
most important decisions are often made between options determined by the social structure, the 
relationships that mean the most to us are understood on conventional terms, and many of our 
moral obligations arise from customary norms. The influence of these various social practices on 
ethical life is apparent whenever one gains a deeper understanding of some distant culture. In 
comparing their ideals, virtues, relationships and obligations with our own, we can see how 
different life in one society can be from life in another.
 Given the apparent influence of social practices, it makes sense that some come to explain 
all of ethical life as dependent on contingent practices. One can easily go from recognizing that 
social practices substantially shape ethical life to supposing that these practices fully shape ethical 
life. However, when we take this perspective, we give up on the possibility of any ultimate 
assessment of those practices. While one might criticize a society according to the values that the 
society itself inculcates, we would still give up on any perspective that is external to these 
practices from which to judge them.
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 Yet, when we then look to find some practice-independent ethical perspective from which 
to judge our own society, we risk a different problem. If so much of our ethical life is influenced 
by contingent social practices, then any practice-independent foundation for ethical life risks 
being too thin. The danger is that if we treat the practice-independent perspective as though it 
were the only perspective, we then ignore the rich aspects of ethical life that come from being 
embedded in a specific culture. In looking for some way to assess our own practices, we risk 
looking past them; we risk losing sight of the significant practice-dependent aspects of ethical life. 
 Given these two difficulties, our ethical theories are pulled in two directions, one local and 
one universal. We are pulled towards a more local perspective in being concerned with the 
particular ideals, virtues, relationships and obligations that are specific to our society. We often 
care deeply about these aspects of ethical life even when we recognize that our concern with them 
is explained by our being embedded in a particular culture. Alternatively, we are also pulled 
towards a more universal perspective in seeking out a suitable principle or perspective from 
which to judge our own society. We can be concerned with this perspective even when we do not 
see how it can explain the richness of ethical life.
 The conflict between these two contrary pulls has manifested itself historically in 
arguments between figures allied more with either local or universal concerns. For instance, Kant 
was explicit in trying to identify a transcendental perspective from which to judge all moral 
questions. He tried to identify a valid standard that was not only independent of the 
contingencies of a culture but also independent of the contingencies of our inclinations. In 
response, Hegel was pulled in the opposite direction. He was concerned that Kant’s ultimate 
standard was too thin to validate the full experience of ethical life.14  To do so, we need to 
recognize the richness of a particular culture at a particular time and we need to appreciate our 
place within it. Whether or not Hegel offered an adequate standard for assessing particular 
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cultures, many readers stop with his criticism of Kant. For them, it is more important to recognize 
the significance of a society for ethical life than to determine how one should assess that society. 
 Given the conflicting pulls of our local and universal concerns, perhaps the appropriate 
role of moral theory is to discredit one or the other. One could try and show that all the richness 
of ethical life can be validated by a practice-independent ethical perspective, or one could show 
that there is no practice-independent perspective that could provide such validation. Neither of 
these seem the right approach because each would miss something important. We should instead 
recognize that our contingent social practices have an important role in vindicating many of the 
ideals, virtues, relationships and obligations that we care most deeply about, and a practice-
independent perspective has an important role in both grounding certain duties and providing a 
perspective from which to assess those practices. With this view, the real difficulty is not to 
discredit one aspect of ethical experience but to show how they complement one another. Some of 
the most important aspects of ethical life are practice-dependent and some are practice-
independent, and we can hardly expect to progress far in ethical theory until we determine which 
are which. This project is all the more difficult because it must be done always from within a 
particular culture, but that is the project I am concerned with. 
 What I have found most valuable in Rawls’s political philosophy is his contribution to this 
project. Too often, theorists will read Rawls as carrying through on the Kantian project as 
conceived above; he is thought of as identifying the perspective from which we can assess all 
aspects of ethical life. Yet, that is not the Rawlsian view. He does not try to identify a single 
perspective from which all ethical questions are addressed. Instead, he sought to identify a 
perspective from which to address a specific question; how should the basic structure of society be 
organized? It is Rawls’s identification of this question that contributes to the project I am 
concerned with. Identifying the basic structure as ethical subject can properly respect both the 
universalizing and localizing aspects of ethical experience.
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 There are practice-dependent aspects of ethical life, and the particularities of a basic 
structure have profound and pervasive influence on those aspects of life. There are also practice-
independent aspects of ethical life, and the particularities of the basic structure have no effect on 
these. In assessing the basic structure, we need to treat it as having this profound effect on ethical 
life and differentiate it from the choices that happen within ethical life. We respect the practice-
independent aspects of ethical life by ensuring that our assessment of the basic structure is 
sensitive to them. We respect the practice-dependent aspects of ethical life in recognizing that the 
basic structure has a profound influence on the content of ethical life. It is because the basic 
structure has this profound influence on the content of ethical life that its assessment can properly 
respect both the universalizing and localizing perspectives in ethical philosophy. 
 According to this analysis, we can recognize that the particularities of our social context 
are relevant for much of moral and ethical philosophy. Our culture, shared meanings, 
institutional roles, and social ideals are important for understanding how we should live; their 
importance is not merely a socially determined illusion. Moreover, we can recognize 
particularities of ethical life without embracing a kind of moral relativism. How our society is 
organized will influence much of the content of ethical life, but how our society is organized 
should be justified by practice-independent values. In this way, our assessment of the basic 
structure acts as a kind of mooring for ethical life. The particularities of culture, history and chance 
will swash our culture in different directions and with it carry the particularities of our values, 
virtues, relationships and obligations. Nonetheless, so long as we hold that the basic structure of 
society should be a certain way, these particularities will not sweep our ethical life too far afield. 
We will stay tethered to the solid ground that our practice-independent values provide.
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Chapter 1: 
Social Practices, the Basic Structure, and Social Cooperation 
“‘Let us unite,’ he says to them, “to protect the weak from oppression, restrain the ambitious, 
and secure for everyone the possession of what belongs to him. Let us institute regulations of 
justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform, which make an exception of no one, and 
which compensate in some way for the caprices of fortune by equally subjecting the powerful 
and the weak to mutual duties. In a word, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, let us 
gather them into one supreme power which governs us according to wise laws, protects and 
defends all the members of the association, repulses common enemies, and maintains us in an 
eternal concord.” ...All ran to meet their chains thinking they had secured their freedom, for 
although they had enough reason to feel the advantages of a political establishment, they did 
not have enough experience to foresee its dangers.”   
- J.J. Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality
When we plan our lives, we do so against a background of expectations. Some of these 
expectations are about the natural world, as when the sailor plans her voyage in accordance with 
the tides or a biker plans his cross-country trek for when his knees are sturdier. Other 
expectations are social. We plan a career on the basis of how professional fields are organized; 
going into marketing rather than sales or teaching mathematics rather than physics. We put work 
into a house based on the expectation that we will have an exclusive claim to use and sale of the 
property. We build a family with the expectation that we bear responsibility for our children. In 
these cases and so many others, we are able to plan our lives because we have reliable expectations 
about the social world. 
 The expectations we have about our social world are expectations about other persons, but 
they are not like those expectations we have of those we know personally. For instance, we might 
save up for a beachside cottage because we expect that it would make our partner happy. Or, we 
might choose to live closer to home on the expectation that our closest friends will also stay near. 
These expectations are based on personal information in a way that our expectations about the 
social world are not. Instead, our expectations of the social world are based on an understanding 
of how persons--even strangers--will generally act. We expect that persons will generally continue 
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to treat sales and marketing as fields and that strangers will abide by the rules of property. 
Because these expectations are general, they can seem quite similar to our expectations of the 
natural world. The fact that our economy is organized as it is and that occupations are categorized 
as they are can seem determined by scientific laws. However, these generalized expectations are 
nonetheless expectations of other persons; they are expectations of how persons will generally 
act.1
 Oftentimes, our expectations about how persons will generally act are backed by a kind of 
normativity. It is not merely our observation that persons generally follow a certain pattern of 
behavior but that persons “ought” to follow this pattern.2  If a person doesn’t act in the expected 
way, they act wrongly (rather than merely acting strangely). I say that these expectations are based 
on a “kind” of normativity because it does not need to be the case that (a) one judges that persons 
really should act a certain way or (b) that persons objectively should act that way. Instead, these 
expectations are backed by our recognition that persons in a relevant group make claims on one 
another to act according to these patterns. For example, I expect others to wait in line behind me 
when they come to get coffee, but I do not expect this merely because I have observed a pattern of 
people doing this. I also recognize that those who wait in line make claims on others to do so. 
Whether I judge these to be valid claims is quite different from my recognition that persons make 
these claims. 
 Oftentimes, the phrase “normative expectations” is used exclusively to refer to those 
expectations that I hold others to. It refers to those expectations for which I think certain reactive 
attitudes are appropriate if those expectations are not met. Yet, I can recognize that persons will 
Social Practices, the Basic Structure, and Social Cooperation 
- 25 -
1 In The Company of Strangers (Princeton University Press, 2004), Paul Seabright advances the view that what 
makes society possible between creatures with our biology is a kind of trust in strangers to act according to 
expectations.
2 In Grammar of Society (Cambridge University Press, 2006, 11), Cristina Bicchieri analyzes social norms as having 
a similar structure. She argues that a social norm exists when a person prefers to act in a way because (a) they 
recognize a social rule that requires that action (b) they believe others in their social group will act in that way, 
and (c) they believe others expect them to act in that way. 
generally hold others to certain normative expectations even when I do not hold them to those 
expectations. I might think that one should not wait in line but still recognize generally held 
normative expectations that persons “ought” to wait in line. 
 There is a sense in which mere patterns of behavior can be described in terms of “rules,” 
but it is when patterns are backed by claims and normative expectations that they seem most 
“rule-like.” It is because there is a rule that persons should act a certain way that we can identify 
behavior that violates that rule as “wrong” in some sense. Since my recognition of such a rule 
involves my belief that the members of a relevant group make claims on others to act in certain 
ways that these rules are “social rules.” When I recognize a social rule, I recognize that the rule 
requires that I should act in a certain way.3  I may or may not ultimately decide that I should act in 
the way that the rule dictates, so we can identify these rules as “ostensibly binding.” They claim to 
bind in virtue of their form, but do not necessarily do so.
 In outlining ways in which persons should act, these rules can create certain obligations, 
rights, and powers. They create an obligation when the rules specify that a person must act a 
certain way, they create a right when the rules specify claims that a person has on the actions of 
others, and they create a power when the rules specify ways in which one might change the 
obligations and rights of others. Yet, these rules are merely ostensibly binding, so they can merely 
create ostensible obligations, ostensible rights, and ostensible powers. 
 As I will continue to emphasize, our social world is incredibly complex. I might recognize 
social rules that apply to members of a religious organization, an ethnic group, a company, or a 
group of friends. In each case, the social rules are relative to a particular social position. In this 
chapter, my concern is the social rules that apply to individuals as members of society. There are 
certain social rules that apply to persons due to membership in a society, and the mutual 
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community as generally holding normative expectations that I should act in a certain way.” However, I think that 
we tend to skip this step and merely understand social interaction in accordance with rules rather than as 
normative expectations.
recognition of these rules establishes obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members 
of society. 
 From this idea, I argue that we can understand the basic structure of society as consisting of 
those and only those practices that establish ostensible obligations, rights, and powers for 
individuals as members of society. Accordingly, the basic structure is a basis for those expectations 
that we can rely on as members of society in planning our lives. These expectations are not merely 
based on observed patterns of behavior but on our recognition of social rules. Understanding the 
basic structure in this way gives us a clear standard by which to distinguish it from other aspects 
of the social world. A “social ethos,” for example, might be important in shaping the values and 
relationships in a society, but it does not specify clear claims. It does not consist of “rules” in the 
strict sense. By contrast, a property scheme, economic system, political constitution and legal 
system are constituted by strict rules that specify individual claims. Accordingly, these institutions 
create determinate obligations, rights and powers. Moreover, the fact that the basic structure 
institutions establish our claims as members of society differentiates it from a myriad of other 
practices that might also ground specific claims. 
1.1 The Basic Idea of the Basic Structure
The idea of the basic structure is most familiar from Theory of Justice, where it is identified as 
consisting of “the political constitution and the principle economic and social arrangements.”4  
Examples of these arrangements include, “the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty 
of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the 
monogamous family.”5  While this characterization of the basic structure provides some guidance 
in thinking about what it is, Rawls never provided a clear criterion by which one could identify 
whether some aspect of our social world is or is not part of the basic structure. He supposes that 
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we should understand the basic structure as “the main political and social institutions and the 
way they fit together as one scheme of cooperation,”6 but this notion leaves it unclear exactly what 
the main political and social institutions are and how they fit together. 
 Rawls himself did not see any problem with his looser characterization of the basic 
structure. He writes, “Note that our characterization of the basic structure does not provide a 
sharp definition, or criterion, from which we can tell what social arrangement, or aspects thereof, 
belong to it. Rather, we start with a loose characterization of what is initially a rough idea.”7  
Likewise, he says, “A sharp definition of that [basic] structure might have gotten in the way of 
fitting it into these other ideas, just as a sharp definition of them would have gotten into the way 
of fitting them to it.”8  For Rawls, a more precise articulation of what the basic structure is was not 
necessary for his project and may have made issues unnecessarily difficult. Yet, while a clear 
criterion for identifying the basic structure was not necessary for Rawls’s primary purposes, 
recent objections show why such a criterion might be helpful for us. 
 Specifically, there are three recent objections that a more precise articulation of the basic 
structure might address. First, recent cosmopolitan challenges demand a principled 
differentiation between the basic structure and the global structure. Such a differentiation seems 
important for understanding why distributive justice would or would not be a concern for 
domestic society alone. Specifically, Aresh Abizadeh has argued that none of the criteria typically 
used to ground a concern with the basic structure can actually justify restricting the difference 
principle to domestic society.9  Second, some political theorists have identified the basic structure 
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7 Justice as Fairness, ed. Erin Kelley (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA.  1999), 12.
8 Justice as Fairness, 57. The way that Rawls purposively uses an intuitive understanding of the basic structure is 
brought out in Samuel Freeman “The Basic Structure as First Subject of Justice,” Blackwell Companion to Rawls 
[forthcoming].
9 Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 35, No. 4 (2007)
of society as the coercive structure. Most prominently, Michael Blake has argued that we are 
concerned with the basic structure because of the kind of coercion it uses against us, which 
differentiates it from the global structure and justifies the limited scope of distributive justice.10 
Since the justification of coercion has been one of the most historically significant concerns in 
political philosophy, it is important to identify exactly what the connection between the basic 
structure and coercive power is. Finally, arguments like G.A. Cohen’s and Iris Marion Young’s put 
pressure on Rawlsians to include more informal aspects of society within the basic structure.11 
For Cohen, the personal is political and an exclusive focus on the basic structure obscures this. 
Insofar as certain norms in society have important effects on us, why not assess them by the same 
standard we assess political and economic institutions by? To better address these three 
challenges, the contemporary Rawlsian needs a more developed conception of the basic structure 
than Rawls himself used.
 Below, I develop a characterization of the basic structure that can address these challenges. 
Specifically, I argue that we can understand the basic structure as those social practices that 
establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society. To do so, I will first 
explain the Rawlsian use of “institution” as referring to--what I call--ostensibly binding practices in 
§1.3. Then, in §1.4, I will better explain what I mean by saying that we are concerned with those 
practices that establish obligation, rights, and powers “for individuals as members of society.” In 
many ways, this idea allows us to see what unifies the major social institutions as all forming the 
basic structure.
 My central concern in this chapter is to show how we can conceive of the basic structure, 
and it is not to address the three criticisms above; an adequate answer to each would require its 
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(2001) 
11 Young, Responsibility for Justice, Ch. 2; Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Ch. 3
own focus. However, to see the general contours of the account I offer, I want to give a broad-
brush response to each of these three challenges. 
 First, my response to Abizadeh’s cosmopolitan argument comes in two parts. We should 
distinguish the claim that (a) there is no principled way to distinguish the basic structure from 
the global structure from the claim that (b) there is no moral reason to be concerned with the 
basic structure and not the global structure. The argument of this chapter is concerned with 
addressing the first claim, and I address the second in Chapter 2. I want to give a characterization 
of the basic structure that distinguishes it from the global structure, but I do not here say why the 
distinction is morally significant. I will return to that issue in §2.3.2. I do not claim that the basic 
structure is the exclusive site of distributive justice (nor do I claim that it is not). Abizadeh is 
ultimately concerned with whether there is a morally significant difference between the basic 
structure and global structure that could justify restricting the scope of distributive justice.
 While I am not concerned with identifying the site of distributive justice, I am concerned 
with giving a principled distinction between the basic structure and the global structure. While I 
do not deny that there are global institutions, these institutions do not establish obligations, 
rights, and powers for individuals as members of society in the way that domestic institutions do. 
The primary difference is that the basic structure institutions bind individuals as members of 
society whereas the global structure binds international bodies (such as states). Ultimately this 
difference will be morally significant, but it is left to Chapter 2 to say why. 
 To address the second challenge, I argue that some coercive institutions are part of the 
basic structure, but the basic structure is not identified as the coercive structure. For us, the basic 
structure of society is likely to be coercively enforced, but that is not what makes it the basic 
structure. We could have a system of social practices that establishes obligations without those 
practices being coercively enforced, but coercive enforcement will always be an important part of 
ensuring that are institutions are reliable. Given the creatures that we are, the basic structure 
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institutions should be coercively enforced, but that does not mean that they are necessarily 
coercively enforced. We should not confuse the justification of coercive force within a basic 
structure with the justification of the basic structure. 
 Finally, to address the third challenge, I argue that the basic structure consists only of 
ostensibly binding practices. While there are many other important aspects of society that form 
the “informal structure,” the basic structure consists only of ostensibly binding practices because 
those are the practices that provide the relevant kind of security. In requiring specific actions at 
specific times, these practices establish claims for individuals as members of society. The informal 
structure does not provide this same level of security and specificity in our claims.
 In short, I argue that we should understand the basic structure as consisting of those 
institutions that establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society. 
This provides us with not only an intuitive sense of the basic structure, but a criterion. The basic 
structure is differentiated from the global structure by the moral demands it establishes, 
differentiated from the coercive structure because it is not necessarily coercive, and differentiated 
from the informal structure because it consists of specific rules capable of establishing claims. To 
better explain the various aspects of the account, I will start with the idea of “ostensibly binding 
social practices” in §1.2, explain social institutions as an instance of these practices in §1.3 and 
and then show which institutions form the basic structure in §1.4. 
1.2 Ostensibly Binding Practices
Social practices take a variety of forms and and diverse roles in social life. Some practices allow 
for coordination, others create new forms of behavior, and some require that we act in specified 
ways. In this section, I narrow our focus to “ostensibly binding practices.” I use this phrase 
because these practices present themselves as requiring action, but the mere fact that social 
practices present themselves in this way does not mean that we are morally or prudentially bound 
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to follow its rules. As paradigm examples, I take the practices of line-waiting, property, and a legal 
system. An appropriate description of these practice’s rules requires a “should,” “ought,” “must,” or 
similar term, but that does not mean that we actually should, ought or must follow the rules. The 
practices are not necessarily binding; they are only ostensibly binding. 
 Ostensibly binding practices have three key features; they are (a) conventional (b) systems 
of rules that (c) have an authoritative character. First, by being “conventional” I mean that these 
practices could have been otherwise.12  The specific rules that constitute the practice are not 
morally required or naturally required.13  Second, each practice can be understood by certain rules 
that guide behavior and specify valid claims that participants can make on one another. The 
feature that most distinguishes authoritative practices, however, is the third; we understand these 
practices as requiring certain actions or validating certain claims. Rather than merely providing 
opportunities or structuring our choices, these practices make a claim on what we ought to do. 
For example, it is not only that we think we should wait in line, but that line-waiting consists in 
rules that persons should wait in line. Accordingly, we understand the rules of authoritative 
practices as ostensibly binding; whether or not we actually have reason to follow the rules, we 
understand the rules as having a binding character. 
 It can be potentially misleading to refer to a social practice as constituted by “rules” 
because we often think of rules as explicit or promulgated while the rules of social practices do 
not need to be either. Instead, in referring to social practices as a “system of rules,” I mean that we 
can articulate our implicit understanding of a social practices in the form of rules. If we want to 
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13 It is possible that it is morally required that there be some rules to accomplish a particular aim, but that does not 
morally require a specific set of rules. For instance, we might have a natural right to property, but the rules of 
property are underspecified. 
individuate or discuss the structure of a particular social practice, we do so by articulating the 
features of this practice in terms of rules. Importantly, our implicit understanding of any social 
practice might very well outrun our ability to articulate rules for the practice. Just as we can 
accurately use a word in conversation without having an explicit definition in mind, so can we 
follow a social practice without having any explicit rules in mind. We should not think that an 
individual understands a social practice by consciously applying explicit rules; an implicit 
understanding often comes before any rules can be articulated.
 Yet, while the rules of a social practice do not need to be explicit or promulgated, they can 
be.  When there are differences in interpretation of practices, it will aid cooperation when there is 
an “official statement” of the rules.14  This official statement might come from either a trusted or 
conventionally-recognized authority. For instance, a system of law acts as such an authority and 
makes many of the rules of social practices explicit that might be disputed. In these cases, there 
will be an explicit and promulgated set of rules that outline the social practice because it will be 
codified in legislation or in court decisions. Yet, even if there are such cases in which social 
practices have definitive and explicit rules, we do not need to think that all social practices must. 
 In The Myth of Ownership, Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy seem to mistakenly suppose 
that the rules of a property system must be explicit legal rules. It is surely the case that most rules 
of property are explicit and legally enforced, but this does not mean that a property scheme needs 
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interpretation of that practice. Any particular set of rules will merely be what is generally understood about the 
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swear to you that I will do X” without uttering “I promise” and without further remark? Is there a mutual 
understanding that a promise does not need to be fulfilled when the personal costs exceed a certain amount, or is 
a wrong always done in such cases that needs be repaired? Different persons are likely to have different 
understandings on how the conventions of promising bear on these particular situations. When one offers an 
interpretation of promise-keeping, they seek to find the overlapping consensus that is implicit in our shared 
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claim that there is a single authoritative standard in all cases.
to have explicit rules or to be legally enforced. Perhaps Nagel and Murphy did not mean to 
suggest that property is necessarily a legal practice but merely meant to say that it is a legally 
specified practice for us.15  In either case, it is important to recognize that a system of property can 
exist without explicit rules. This is easiest to imagine in small societies where the conflicts related 
to property claims are limited, but such an implicit understanding would not be efficient in 
contemporary society. However, we should not confuse efficiency with possibility. There is 
nothing about a scheme of property or any normative practice that requires that rules be explicit.
 What is most distinct of ostensibly binding practices is that our implicit understanding of 
the rules involves some implicit “ought,” even when we do not think it is morally or prudentially 
required of us. Other practices might be articulable in terms of interpreted patterns of behavior, 
but ostensibly binding practices require that we act a certain way. When I choose to make a 
promise, I recognize a role that I “ought” to keep that promise. How we should understand our 
recognition of this ought is open to interpretation, but I will take its recognition as basic for my 
account.
 In this same way that we can articulate the structure of social practices in terms of rules, 
we can articulate the authoritative character of social practices in terms of ostensibly-binding 
rules. The rules are not just that when persons utter “I promise to X” they typically do X but 
instead the rules have the form that “a promise made ought to be kept.” We recognize a rule that 
we should wait in line even if we could sneak into the front. We recognize a rule that we should 
not steal even if we could get away with it.  These demands are implicit in our understanding of 
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schemes do not violate anyone’s rights or claims to desert. They argue that a taxation scheme and a property 
scheme must be assessed together as part of a legal scheme, thus it is wrongful to suppose that a taxation scheme 
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the practice that is represented in the form of rules. When represented, these rules take the form 
of ought claims, “persons P ought to X in circumstances C.”
 In referring to the rules of a practice as ostensibly binding, I purposively mean that their 
authoritative character is not reducible to either moral oughts or prudential oughts. We represent 
the rules as requiring that “person P ought to do X in context C,” but we can recognize this rule 
without thinking that either “P morally ought to do X in C” or that “P prudentially ought to X in 
C.” In regards to the prudential ought, there is a tradition in rational choice theory that has 
explained conventions as arising from the coordination of individuals around a salient choice.16 
Given this perspective, it would seem sensible to understand “recognizing a social rule” as either 
(a) a prediction about coordination or (b) coming to see a particular strategy of interaction to be 
most rational. Yet, the first does not explain the ostensibly binding representation of the rules and 
the latter fails to explain how we can recognize a social rule that applies to us even when following 
that rule would not be an optimal strategy. For instance, I might recognize a social rule that 
requires me to keep a promise, even without being sure whether keeping that promise would be 
most rational for me. Perhaps I should keep promises only when I might be found out instead. 
For similar reasons, we cannot explain “recognizing a social rule” as consisting in the judgment 
that a particular action would be morally best. As above, we can recognize a social rule without 
thinking that there is moral reason to follow that rule. For instance, an individual might recognize 
the social rules that they ought to follow (what is mutually recognized as) the law, without 
thinking that they really have a moral obligation to obey the law. 
 Since we cannot reduce the notion of recognizing an ostensibly binding social rule to 
either of these notions, we can distinguish three judgments from each other; (a) the judgment 
that an action would be prudential, (b) the judgment that an action would be morally best, and 
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(c) the judgment that an action is required by a social rule. Oftentimes the fact that there is a 
generally recognized convention that requires one to take some action will make taking that 
action prudential (as when the rules are backed by coercive power) or moral (as when the 
practice serves a justified purpose), but neither of these need to be the case for us to recognize a 
social rule.
 In explaining ostensibly binding practices, I am most concerned with the fact that we can 
recognize a rule as part of a practice and still be uncommitted as to whether we ought to follow 
the rule. If a person were explaining the practice of line-waiting, they would say that the practice 
consists in the rule that “persons ought to wait in line who are waiting for service” even if they do 
not think that persons morally ought to wait in line. A devout Nietzschean who thought line-
waiting was the most pure form of herd-mentality might think that persons ought not to wait in 
line, yet still describe the social practice as consisting of the rule “persons ought to wait in line.” 
We can recognize the social rule without judging that we ought to follow it. This opens up the 
space for a person to ask “I know that the social practice of line-waiting requires that I wait in 
line, but should I wait in line?” 
1.3 Institutions
The next step in this analysis of the basic structure is to show why “institutions”--in the Rawlsian 
use of the term--should be understood as a kind of ostensibly binding practice. To show this, I 
need to answer two questions. First, why would we think that the Rawlsian understanding of 
“institutions” aligns with this model of ostensibly binding practices?  Second, what distinguishes 
the class of social institutions from the larger class of ostensibly binding practices? To answer the 
first question, we can look to Theory of Justice, where Rawls writes, 
“by an institution, I shall understand a public system of rules which defines offices 
and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. 
These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and 
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they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur. 
As examples of institutions, or more generally social practices, we may think of 
games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of property”
In this characterization of institutions, Rawls identifies institutions with social practices, but he 
does not mean “social practices” in the broadest sense of “regularities in conduct.” He specifically 
has in mind those practices that are a “public system of rules.” It might be possible that there are 
some practices that could not be easily specified by a system of rules, let alone a public system of 
rules. For instance, many symbols in pop culture or artistic expression have a conventional 
significance that could not be easily specified by rules. In American music, the use of a banjo 
tends to suggest southern backcountry living, but this convention might not be aptly describable 
in terms of rules.  If we would identify this use of the banjo as part of a social practice, then that is 
not the kind of social practice Rawls has in mind. Instead, Rawls is speaking specifically of those 
practices that can be specified by rules, and ostensibly binding practices are of this type.17
 The more important feature of Rawls’s characterization of institutions is the way in which 
the rules are authoritative. As Rawls puts it, these rules “specify certain forms of action as 
permissible, others as forbidden.” Rawls never explains the authority of these rules, but he cannot 
do so either in terms of moral or prudential authority. First, these rules cannot explain certain 
forms of activity as “morally” permissible or forbidden because it is not a social practice that 
determines the morality of those actions. Whether it is morally permissible to follow the rules is 
different from what the rules make permissible. The property norms might make it permissible 
for me to bequest my entire wealth to the Ku Klux Clan, but it is not morally permissible for me 
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to be codified in law.
to do so. Likewise, we would not think of the rules of “games and rituals” as making certain action 
morally permissible, but only permissible as part of the game or ritual. Second, these rules cannot 
explain certain forms of activity as “prudentially” permissible for similar reasons. Whether it is 
prudentially right to follow a social rule is different from what the rules make permissible, as we 
can notice that the rules forbid breaking a promise even when doing so might be in our interest.18
 The model of ostensibly binding practices is able to explain the authority of institutional 
social rules without recourse to either moral or prudential authority. The social rules specify 
certain actions are permissible and other as forbidden because they are ostensibly binding.  We 
understand the rules as requiring certain actions, but that does not mean that we have judged that 
it would be moral or prudential to follow those rules. Insofar as Rawlsian institutions are systems 
of ostensibly binding social rules, then institutions are authoritative social practices. 
 Yet, what about the second question? Even if institutions are a kind of ostensibly binding 
practice, we might not think that all ostensibly binding practices are institutions. While someone 
is free to define institutions in any way they like, we typically use the phrase “institutions” to apply 
to a subclass of ostensibly binding practices. However, there does not seem any necessary and 
sufficient conditions that a social practice might meet for it to be an institution. Rather, we are 
more likely to call a social practice an “institution” to the extent that it meets three conditions. 
First, the rules of institutions are more clearly understood and less open to interpretation; there is a 
general understanding about what the core rules are that structure institutions. Oftentimes this 
feature is explained by the fact that there is some body that has the authority to determine those 
rules, but not always. Second, institutions are often more complex and structured than other social 
practices. This complexity is not just in the nuances of particular rules, but in the different roles 
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themselves part of the institution” Rawls, Theory of Justice, 49.
that system of rules may establish. Institutions often include different positions, powers and 
privileges that fit together into one system. Third, institutions are particularly important or 
socially significant.  There is no single definitive standard for determining when a social practice is 
an institution, but these are three features that “institutions” seem to have to a greater degree than 
social practices generally.
 This link between institutions and ostensibly binding practices is significant because it 
shows why we do not need to think of institutions as anything more than a particular kind of 
practice. They do not need to have a legal or material basis. There is a natural tendency to see 
aspects of our social world as if they were part of the natural world.  In short, we tend to reify our 
social institutions. This is quite obvious when one hears conservative activists claim that we 
should not allow same-sex marriage because that is not what marriage is, but reification of the 
social structure goes far beyond this.19  
 The fact of reification should be no surprise because our institutions form a background 
for our plans, and we thereby take their presence and stability for granted. Thinking in these 
terms can even be quite helpful because it allows us to abstract away from the complicated 
structure of interaction that forms an institution, and just focus on the institution itself. It is 
because of our commonsense reliance on these institutions that persons looks for something 
beyond social practices to ground social institutions, and they ultimately look towards the law or 
patterns of sanction as something more solid than mere social practice. Ultimately, however, our 
social structure is composed on nothing more than social practices, certain shared patterns of 
activity and expectation. The above analysis shows how we can understand institutions in these 
terms and do not need to make recourse to anything else. 
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 So, the social world is structured by a thick array of social practices, some of these social 
practices are authoritative, and some of these authoritative practices are social institutions. The 
next step of the analysis is to show that some of these institutions form the basic structure of 
society. The difficulty is explaining which social institutions do so. 
 
1.4 The Major Social Institutions and the Basic Structure
The basic structure is constituted by the “major social institutions,” but it is not immediately clear 
what qualifies a social institution as “major.” So, in order to explain what the basic structure is we 
need a standard by which to distinguish the major social institutions from the broader class of 
institutions. The goal of this section is to explain this standard. I argue that the major social 
institutions are differentiated by their unique role in structuring our lives as members of a society. 
By better explaining the unique role of these institutions, I will identify the standard by which we 
can distinguish the basic structure.
 The unique role of the major social institutions is that they establish obligations, rights, and 
powers for individuals as members of society. Accordingly, those institutions that do this are those 
that belong to the basic structure and we can understand the basic structure as the system of 
institutions that together establish these demands and claims for individuals as members of 
society. To better substantiate this idea, I want to break my exposition into two parts. First, I will 
better explain how the basic structure “establishes obligations, rights, and powers.” Second, I will 
explain the significance of the clause “for individuals as members of society.” With these notions 
explained, I then identify the basic structure as the way in which the major social institutions 
come together to form a single system.
1.4.1 “establishing obligations, rights and powers...”
In understanding how a class of practices can establish obligation, rights, and powers, it is crucial 
that we distinguish the ostensible from the actual. The mere fact that a social practice is practiced 
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does not mean that we should act in the ways required by the rules or that we have legitimate 
claims based on the rules. The practice itself is merely a pattern of behaviors, expectations and 
understandings. To accurately explain these practices, we need to represent them as consisting of 
rules, but we need only represent these rules as “ostensibly binding.” The rules are understood as 
involving the claim to bind but might not actually bind. 
 In representing rules as “ostensibly binding,” I mean to offer an analysis of practices that is 
consistent with social theory. Yet, I would need to draw on resources from a moral theory in 
order to explain when these rules are “actually binding.” Such a moral theory would need to 
explain both when persons should follow the rules of contingent practices and when they have 
claims on others to do likewise. Typical explanations appeal to the principle of fair-play, the 
power of consent, our identification with the social roles,20  and indirect utilitarianism. Any such 
explanation will need to explain (a) why an individual is obligated to follow the rules of a morally 
justified practice (rather than merely showing how the rules are often efficacious ways to advance 
some end), and (b) when a practice is morally justified. The fair-play theorist, for example, 
supposes that (a) we are obligated to practices because we owe a fair-share for receipt of the 
benefits and (b) we are so obligated when the practice is fair to each participant. 21 
 For my argument to succeed, I do not need to argue for any one of these theories over the 
others. Instead, I merely need to suppose that there is some explanation for why contingent 
practices can establish actual obligations, rights, and powers. I identify any moral theory that 
meets this requirement as a form of “limited conventionalism.” It is a form of conventionalism 
because conventional practices can establish new requirements and claims, but it is a limited form 
of conventionalism because it does not suppose that all more requirements and claims are 
established by practices. Limited conventionalism is fully consistent with commitments to 
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21 The conditions that consent theorists and Hegelians would put on obligating practices are more difficult to 
articulate, but I nonetheless believe that both views need to satisfy both conditions. 
practice-independent obligations, rights and values. It merely needs to be the case that the major 
social institutions can establish requirements and claims. I better explain the commitments and 
importance of limited conventionalism in §4.1.  
 Importantly, practices can establish requirements and claims in two different ways. A 
practice can either (a) better specify pre-existing obligations/rights/powers that are too vague, or 
(b) create new obligations/rights/powers ab nihilo. For example, we might think that we have a 
practice-independent right to personal property, but that this practice-independent right does not 
entitle us to any specific property. According to this view, it is only when we live within a society 
with definitive property norms that our pre-institutional right entitles us to the specific property 
that the norms identify as ours. Or, we might think that there is no practice-independent rights to 
personal property. Instead, we might think that persons have come to coordinate around norms 
of property and that these norms bind us because the Principle of Fair-Play requires that we 
follow the rules that benefit us. In the first case, a practice of property specifies a pre-existing right 
while the practice creates a right to property in the latter case. Either case is consistent with 
“limited conventionalism.” In each, our practices establish specific requirements or claims that we 
would not have if the practice did not exist. 
 A moral theory that accepts limited conventionalism will recognize that the major social 
institutions can establish actual obligations, rights, and powers. However, we do not need to 
appeal to any such moral theory to identify a basic structure. The moral theory explains when an 
an ostensibly binding practice is actually binding, but we can still identify ostensibly binding 
institutions when they are not actually binding. 
 The major social institutions are those practices that establish ostensible obligations, 
ostensible rights, and ostensible powers. For this reason, society can have major social institutions 
that are so unjust that persons should not follow the rules of those institutions. For example, the 
institution of slavery is typically so unjust that no person has a moral reason to follow it’s rules. 
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However, it is still likely that persons would understand that institution as consisting of ostensibly 
binding rules. The rules create ostensible obligations to obedience, ostensible rights of ownership, 
and ostensible powers of authority. The fact that these rules are morally heinous does not change 
the analysis of these rules as ostensibly binding, and an institution of slavery can accordingly be 
amongst a society’s major institutions. 
1.4.2 “...for individuals as members of society”
The basic structure institutions are not all the institutions that establish (ostensible) obligations, 
rights, and powers, but are specifically those that establish these demands and claims by virtue of 
membership in society. In this way, the basic structure institutions are closely tied with belonging 
to a particular society. To see the importance of this point, we can see that there will be free 
associations that establish obligations, rights, and powers. For instance, the employees of IBM 
could mutually comply with social rules that establish obligations amongst coworkers, rights to 
vacation, and powers of authority. In this case, these demands and claims are established for 
individuals as employees of IBM.  Likewise, the members of a church could mutually comply with 
social rules that establish obligations, rights, and powers in the religious community. 
 What is unique about the basic structure institutions is not that they establish demands 
and claims--since IBM and a church might do that--but that they establish these obligations and 
claims for individuals as members of a society. It is because I am a member of the United States 
that I have certain obligations and rights. In a society that cooperates through norms of property, 
members can know that each has obligations and rights to property. In a society that cooperates 
through certain norms of family life, members can know that there are certain demands and 
claims in a marriage. Even if a person chooses to be an ascetic and live without property or to be 
single and live without a family they are aware that they could be entitled to security in those 
things as a member of society. They know that if they acquired property, then others would 
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generally refrain from seizing it. They know that their authority over and responsibility for 
children would generally be respected if they choose to have children. These demands and claims 
are part of being a member of society because all members of a society live under the same social 
rules. 
 At this stage, an objection from circularity might seem obvious. I have said that the basic 
structure institutions establish security for individuals as members of society, yet how can we 
understand who is a “member of society” in this sense? If one defines membership in a society as 
being an individual to whom the rules of the basic structure institutions apply, then we define 
“member of society” in relation to the idea of  the “major social institutions” and define the 
“major social institutions” in relation to the idea of being a “member of society.” If that is correct, 
my account seems circular. I rely on a notion of members of society to explain who is a member 
of society. 
 Yet, there are two ways of getting away from this circularity objection. First, I can deny 
that the idea “member of society” is best defined as a participant in the basic structure 
institutions. While this first way of avoiding circularity might be open to me, I do not currently 
know of any other satisfying way to explain who is a member of society. Accordingly, I will 
assume that a “member of society” is best understand as “a person identified as participant in the 
basic structure institutions,”22  and I will appeal to a second way to avoid the circularity objection. 
Even if “member of society” is explained in terms of participation in the major social institutions 
and the “major social institutions” are explained by relying on a notion of member of society, this 
is not actually a problem. Remember that the various basic institutions are social practices. In 
explaining these practices and their relations to one another, we give an explanation of how 
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persons act and reconstruct their implicit understanding of the social world. Doing this does not 
require an ontology whereby we appeal to some fundamental notion from which all other notions 
are built. Rather, it only needs to depict how persons act and understand the world. Such a 
depiction can be circular without problem. We start from within an ongoing social practice, and 
we only need to characterize that practice. At this stage, we might understand Americans as those 
bound by American institutions and understand American institutions as those that bind 
Americans. While this might be circular, it is not problematic if it accurately describes our 
implicit understanding of these practices. 
1.4.3 the basic structure
At this stage, we have narrowed our concern from social rules to ostensibly binding practices to 
institutions and, finally, to the major social institutions. From this final notion, we can now 
understand the basic structure of society as constituted by the major social institutions. The basic 
structure is how these institutions come together and complement one another. Accordingly, we 
can now understand the basic structure of society as those ostensibly binding practices that 
together establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. 
 In establishing obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society, the 
basic structure creates a kind of social “background.” In deciding how to live our lives, we do so 
on the basis of various expectations about our social world. This includes the various 
opportunities we have, the powers and rights of individuals, and the limits on what we can 
rightfully do. As we plan our lives, we hold things about our society constant as we think about 
the different lives we might lead within that society. In such choices, the obligations, rights, and 
power that we have as members of society form a kind of background for the choices about which 
particular life we will lead. Our various expectations of others give us a security with regard to the 
actions of others. Since we hold this security constant across the lives we might lead, the basic 
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structure institutions establish a kind of “background security.” As we make the choices that make 
our lives our own, we come to have security in particular things; in our property, our family, our 
occupation, and our worship. The basic structure institutions do not establish the security we 
have in these particular things, but they establish the security we have as a member of society; it 
establishes background security.
 To better emphasize the significance of this point, it might be helpful to see the way in 
which a basic structure establishes background security through a comparison between anarchy 
and society. We do not need to suppose that anarchy would be a war of all against all, even if we 
recognize that it might be. Perhaps persons would not be likely to attack one another or even to 
make claims on them. In the absence of society, persons might live as in Rousseau’s “most-happy” 
age.23  There, persons are independent of one another and do not consider their needs to be 
satisfied by the actions of others. Now, regardless of whether persons are peaceful or at war in 
anarchy, persons will not have security with regard to the actions of others. Without a social 
structure that specifies how each must act, no one can have rightful expectations of strangers. 
Even if moral rules or natural rights are binding, we only have security when we believe that 
persons will follow those rules. Even peaceful and safe anarchies do not have the obligations, 
rights, and powers we have as members of society.
 As soon as there are mutually recognized social rules, there is a social structure, and there 
is no longer anarchy. We move away from anarchy as soon as we “institute regulations of Justice 
and peace to which all are obliged to conform, which make exception of no one, and which 
compensate in some way for the caprices of fortune by equally subjecting the powerful and the 
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weak to mutual duties.”24  These are rules that establish obligations, rights, and powers amongst 
the members of a society. In establishing these clear and reliable rules, our social rules establish a 
kind of background security. In §1.6, I will argue that we can understand “social cooperation” as 
the unique form of cooperation between members of society that establishes these rights, 
obligations, and powers. First, however, I want to survey a few objections to this understanding of 
the basic structure. 
1.5 Objections
On first look, this characterization of the basic structure might seem problematic for a number of 
reasons. I want to address three of the most pressing objections here. By addressing these 
objections, I should also be able to explain the central idea behind my account. 
 First, one might be tempted to think that my characterization of the basic structure would 
be too expansive. For example, does it include the obligations and rights we have against 
deception? After all, if we are lost on a street corner and ask a random passerby for directions, we 
can have a right to the truth and the passerby has an obligation to tell the truth. Since I 
characterized the basic structure as establishing such rights, it would seem like my 
characterization of the basic structure would include truth-telling. Since we do not typically 
recognize truth-telling as part of the basic structure, this would be problematic for my 
characterization.
 In response, I only need to stress the importance of the clause that the basic structure 
establishes obligations, rights, and powers “for individuals as members of society.” When we have 
a right to the truth, it has nothing to do with our position as member of society. Instead, if we do 
trust persons, it is either on the basis of a judgment of their individual character or on the basis of 
our position as persons. Regardless of whether that street corner is in one’s own society or in a 
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distant society, we likely will still trust a random passerby to tell the truth. Accordingly, norms of 
non-deception are not part of the basic structure because they do not establish rights for 
individuals as members of society. 
 A second, and similar, objection would charge that my account would include obligations 
like promise-keeping as part of the basic structure. If one thinks that it is a moral obligation of all 
persons to keep their promises, then my response to this objection will be the same as that above. 
Our promissory obligations are established by being persons rather than being members of 
society. If one thinks that promise-keeping is a moral obligation only because it is a social 
convention, then it seems more difficult to claim that our promissory obligation is established by 
our role as persons.
  Nonetheless, this obligation is still unproblematic. First, insofar as a person utters “I 
promise” it is clear that they identify themselves as a participant in the promise-keeping 
convention, regardless of whether they are a member of society or not. So, if promise-keeping is 
conventional, it can still establish security for persons as persons because our security is explained 
by their recognition of the convention rather than our membership in society. To see the 
difference, compare the rights and obligations involved in a signed contract between strangers 
and the rights and obligations involved in a promise. The conditions that identify a contract as 
valid are specified by legal norms specific to a society whereas the conditions that identify a 
promise as valid are more important to interpretation and may vary from one social group to the 
next. In this way, we can recognize security in contracts as arising from our role as members of 
society while we explain security in promises as arising from our role as persons. 
 Finally, as a third objection, one could point out that foreigners and tourists have 
obligations, rights, and powers specified by the major social institutions even though they are not 
members of society. This objection might seem to show problems with the clause that the basic 
structure establishes security for individuals as members of society. 
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 Yet, if everything else about the account is not problematic, then this last objection should 
be no worry. This is because when foreigners and tourists are treated as members of a society that 
is not their own, they merely assume the role of member of society.25  Now, this does not mean 
that they assume the role of citizen. To be a citizen--in the way, I distinguish the phrase--is to have 
a particular role in a political and legal structure. Being a citizen entitles one to certain privileges 
and responsibilities, but being a citizen and being a member of society are not synonymous. It is 
fair to say that illegal immigrants are members of society even if they are not citizens in the 
proper sense. Likewise, we might not consider tourists to ultimately be members of society, 
though we do treat them accordingly. When we travel to other societies, we likewise should act 
according to the norms that members of that society act in accordance with.
 In this way, the identification of basic structure institutions does not include moral rules 
because we do not have security in these rules as members of society, it does not include aspects 
of the informal structure because the rules of the informal structure are not sufficiently particular, 
and it does not rule out the possibility that those in a foreign society assume the role as member 
of society.
1.6 The Basic Structure, Social Cooperation and the “Fundamental Problem of Justice”
In this chapter, I have developed the idea of the basic structure in ways that Rawls does not. While 
I have not said anything that I believe Rawls would reject, I want to go beyond Rawls’s intuitive 
understanding of the basic structure and develop the idea in ways that withstand recent 
challenges. In this section, I want to explain one additional advantage of this account; it can better 
justifying Rawls’s own method by connecting the idea of “social cooperation” with the idea of the 
basic structure. 
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 In Political Liberalism, the idea of social cooperation is central for unfolding the various 
aspects of Rawls’s theory. He writes, “the fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness, within 
which the other basic ideas are systematically connected, is that of society as a fair system of 
cooperation over time.”26  In assessing a society, we should not be concerned with whether it 
advances some particular moral end or makes human perfection possible. Instead, we should be 
concerned with whether the terms of social cooperation are fair. In society, we work together to 
advance what we each think is important in life, but we need to ensure that we work together on 
fair terms. For Rawlsians, the central problem of political justice is then identifying the fair terms 
of social cooperation. Rawls makes this point explicit when he identifies “the fundamental 
question of political justice” as determining “what is the most appropriate conception of justice 
for specifying the terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as 
normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life?”27   
 Now, it is not immediately obvious from Rawls’s own remarks why this concern with the 
terms of social cooperation justifies his focus on the basic structure of society. Rawls uses an 
intuitive extension of the basic structure as including “the political constitution,...the legally 
recognized forms of property, and the structure of the economy... as well as the family in some 
form.”28  Yet, why would these institutions be the ones most relevant for setting the terms of social 
cooperation? Rawls starts from a concern with the terms of social cooperation, but then only 
stipulates that we address this concern by focusing on the basic structure. How is a concern with 
identifying the fair terms of social cooperation related to a focus on the basic structure?
 While the connection between these ideas is not obvious from Rawls’s explicit remarks, it 
can be explained by the account provided here. The key is a particular understanding of social 
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cooperation. Cooperation is distinct from coordination in that cooperation is done with 
deference to the others with whom one cooperates. One can selfishly coordinate, but one cannot 
selfishly cooperate. The best way to interpret Rawls’s use of “social cooperation” (in contrast to 
“cooperation” more generally) is as referring to the unique form of cooperation that exists 
between members of a society.29 Social cooperation is the distinct kind of cooperation engaged in 
by members of society, it is neither mere coordination nor cooperation in all its forms. 
 Yet, what is the unique kind of cooperation between members of society? What is referred 
to by “social cooperation”? I maintain that we can best understand this unique form of 
cooperation as the cooperation between members of society in following the social rules that 
establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society. This is a form of 
cooperation when persons (a) coordinate in following the same social rules (b) with deference to 
those with whom they coordinate. This is a unique cooperative relationship between members of 
society because it specifically establishes our obligations, rights, and powers as members of 
society. 
 Given this understanding of social cooperation, the terms of social cooperation in a 
particular society will be specified by the rules of the major social institutions. In this way, the 
terms of social cooperation are given form as the basic structure of society. Thus, by determining 
how the basic structure ought to be organized, we determine what the terms of social cooperation 
are. In short, by focusing on “the first subject of justice,” we address “the fundamental problem of 
political justice.” 
 In the section, I have made important connections between a number ideas quite quickly, 
so it will be helpful to provide a more formal summary of the main points. The core ideas that got 
us to the above conclusion can be expressed as follows:
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1) Social cooperation is the unique form of cooperation that establishes the obligations, 
rights and powers of individuals as members of society.                                                       
2) In any society, these obligations, rights and powers are established by mutual 
compliance with certain social rules, R.                                                                                     
3)The major social institutions are those institutions defined by those social rules R.       
4)Thus, in any society, these obligations, rights, and powers are established by mutual 
compliance with the rules of the major social institutions.                                          [2, 3]
5)The basic structure of a society is the way in which all the major social institutions 
together form a single system.                                 
6)Thus, these obligations, rights, and power are established in any society by mutual 
compliance with the rules of the basic structure                                                            [4, 5]
7)Thus, in any society, social cooperation proceeds through the rules of the basic 
structure.                                                                                                                               [1,6]
8)Thus, by evaluating the organization of the basic structure, we evaluate the terms of 
social cooperation.                                                     
All together, this explanation should make better sense of why the basic structure is “the 
arrangement of the major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation.”30  Social 
cooperation is the unique cooperation between members of society in establishing background 
security, and the basic structure is the entirety of those institutions that social cooperation 
proceeds through. In this way, the basic structure forms a single scheme of cooperation.
 Rawlsians do not ultimately judge society by whether it accomplishes some moral end, 
such as the promotion of happiness, individual perfection or equality. Instead, society is a system 
of social cooperation and we ought to assess it by determining whether the terms of cooperation 
are fair. Since the terms of social cooperation are given form in the basic structure of society, we 
should take the basic structure as the primary subject for assessing society.
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1.7 The Identity of the Basic Structure
The primary task of this dissertation is to show why the basic structure has primacy as a distinct 
moral subject. As I discussed in the introduction, I will do this by explaining three features of the 
basic structure; its identity, its moral indispensability, and its moral distinctiveness. The account 
of this chapter addresses the identity of the basic structure specifically. It explains that the basic 
structure consists of those institutions that establish background security for individuals as 
members of society. 
 Starting from the idea of ostensibly binding practices and building up to the notion of the 
basic structure, we have the tools to overcome many of the traditional problems with the idea of 
the basic structure. According to this theory, the basic structure consists of ostensibly binding 
social rules. It does not necessarily consist of rules that are legally or coercively backed. Instead, it 
consists of rules that we understand as ostensibly binding. Likewise, the rules are specific enough 
that they differ from the informal structure. While our entire social structure consists in many 
ostensibly binding practices, the basic structure does not include all of them. Rather, the basic 
structure consists of only those ostensibly binding practices that establish obligations, rights, and 
powers for individuals as members of society. This differentiates the basic structure from moral 
practices that bind all persons, from social practices that persons choose to be part of, and from 
the global structure that provides security for international actors. The basic structure remains a 
distinct and unified aspect of the social structure.
 Moreover, this articulation distinguishes the basic structure from the broader set of 
practices that establish our social context. There is wide diversity of practices in social life, and 
only some of them are part of the basic structure of society. In his objections to Rawls, Cohen 
appeals to the example of a society with an “egalitarian ethos.”31  Even if our major social 
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social norms and attitudes that are prevalent and pervasive in society. An egalitarian ethos would be part of, but 
not the whole of, the informal structure of society.
institutions maximally promote equality, we promote equality even further if persons generally 
acted for the sake of equality in their personal decisions. In his arguments from “On the Site of 
Distributive Justice,” G.A. Cohen argues that there is no non-arbitrary way by which Rawls can 
distinguish the norms that form the basic structure from the norms that would form an 
egalitarian ethos.32  Now, I have little doubt that such an ethos would be a significant part of social 
life. It might impact what individuals in that society value, the shape of their life plan, and their 
relationships. Moreover, I do recognize that both the basic structure and an egalitarian ethos are 
formed by norms. However, neither of these points mean that there is no non-arbitrary way by 
which to distinguish an egalitarian ethos from the basic structure. 
 While the norms of an egalitarian ethos outline patterns of behavior, the norms of the 
basic structure require action or specify claims. The rules are particular in identifying specific 
actions as required and as rights-violations. Once one has security in property or security in 
religious freedom, then there are certain actions that individuals cannot take. With an egalitarian 
ethos, there is no such specificity. The fact that we live in a society where members of the military 
are particularly esteemed does not require any particular actions from individuals or give any 
persons claims. I do not act wrongly if I do not buy a soldier a beer at the bar even if there is an 
ethos of appreciate for the military. Such informal norms--whether esteem for military personnel 
or appreciation for equality--do not establish particular obligations, rights, or powers in the way 
that basic structure institutions do. 
 In his 2009 book, Cohen slightly changes his objection. He does not claim that there is not 
way by which to distinguish the basic structure from informal norms like an egalitarian ethos. 
Instead, he argues that any such distinction would be morally arbitrary. Ultimately, we only care 
about identifying the basic structure as distinct from informal norms because we think that there 
is something morally significant about the basic structure and not about the informal structure. 
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Instead of focusing on the possibility of a distinction between the basic structure and the informal 
structure, Cohen focuses on the moral significance of the distinction. 
 So far, I have only tried to show what the distinction is and not what the moral 
significance of this distinction in. In Chapter 2, I will show why the basic structure is an 
indispensable moral subject, and I show why the principles that apply to it will be distinct from 
the principles that apply to individual action in Chapter 3. Here, I have identified the basic 
structure as those institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of 
society. An egalitarian ethos does not establish specific rights or obligations upon persons. In 
being concerned with the basic structure, Rawlsians are concerned with these specific 
institutions. Next I argue for why they should be so concerned. 
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Chapter 2
Levels of Moral Evaluation 
“The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately, by a direct 
tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in view the simple object, moving the affections, and 
comprehends not any scheme or system, or consequences resulting from the concurrence, 
imitation, or example of others...The case is not the same with the social virtues of justice and 
fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind: 
but the benefit, resulting from them, is not the consequence of every individual act; but arises 
from the whole scheme or system, concurred in by the whole, or greater part of society. 
General peace and order are the attendants of justice or a general abstinence from the 
possessions of others: But a particular regard to the particular right of one individual citizen 
may frequently, considered in itself, be productive of pernicious consequences.” 
- Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix 3
Few doubt that we need some guiding principles for individual action. We are faced with the 
difficulties of ethics because we need to act, so we seek principles that help guide our choices. 
Being members of political communities, we are also accustomed to arguing about principles to 
guide the choices of the state, so few doubt that we need some guiding principles for government 
decisions. We know that we need principles for these issues, but why would we need principles 
that apply to the basic structure of society? 
 The question is not why we could develop principles for such a subject. After all, we might 
invent any number of subjects to develop principles for; we could develop principles to regulate 
which street fairs a city ought to have or what beers bars should serve. We are not concerned with 
all the subjects for which we could develop principles, so why be concerned with the basic 
structure? Why wouldn’t the various issues surrounding the basic structure be otherwise 
addressed? Why couldn’t a broader principle be applied to the specifics of the basic structure? 
Since there are so many ways to think about the moral questions involved in society, the questions 
that needs to be answered is why we would be particularly concerned with any particular subject. 
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 Many of the most intuitive answers do not explain why the basic structure, rather than 
some similar subject, deserves our attention. For example, my concern with the basic structure is 
not explained by a concern for its profound and pervasive effects on individual life because other 
aspects of the social world also have similar effects.1  Undoubtedly, one of the reasons why the 
basic structure is so important is because of its profound and pervasive effects, but that cannot be 
the reason why the basic structure (rather than all influential norms) is an indispensable moral 
subject in itself. Second, I cannot claim that a concern with justifying coercion explains why we 
need to evaluate the basic structure because I have not identified the basic structure as coercive. 
Third, I cannot claim that a concern for social cooperation explains why we need to evaluate the 
basic structure because I have identified “social cooperation” as the unique form of cooperation 
between members of society. Since the basic structure is constituted by the institutions that 
persons cooperate with one another through as members of society, justifying a concern for the 
basic structure on a concern for social cooperation would be like justifying a concern for the basic 
structure on a concern for the basic structure. Moreover, arguing from profound effects, coercion, 
or social cooperation would require that I support a moral theory that identifies coercion or 
social cooperation as particularly morally significant. I want to construct an argument that fits 
with a broader range of moral views. 
 In “The Basic Structure as Subject,” Rawls did give one clear reason why the basic 
structure is morally indispensable.2  He argued that principles for the basic structure were needed 
in order to regulate “background fairness.” This argument starts from the intuitive idea that both 
the economy and society generally should progress “in accordance with free agreements fairly 
arrived at and fully honored.”3  Such an ideal ensures that persons’ free decisions are respected. 
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2 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Ch. 7. 
3 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 265.
However, free agreements can only be fairly arrived at against a background of fair relationships 
between persons. If inequalities are too great, then we could not expect the agreements made to 
truly be fair to all participants. Thus, we need to evaluate the basic structure of society in order to 
ensure background fairness, which would make the ideal of a society progressing according to 
free and fair agreements possible. Thus, the basic structure is morally indispensable because of 
our concern for background fairness. 
 The force of Rawls’s argument, however, is limited. It was meant primarily as a response to 
libertarians and classical liberals who hold the ideal that “society should progress according to 
free agreements fairly made.” In this way, the Rawlsian argument shows why libertarian ideals 
require a concern with background fairness and, therefore, a concern with the basic structure. 
While many others (besides libertarians and classical liberals) share this ideal,  it is not universally 
held. If this was the sole argument for treating the basic structure as subject, a Hegelian who saw 
this ideal as inappropriately applying the ideals of civil society to the state would not have reason 
to treat the basic structure as subject.4  A second challenge that Rawls’s argument faces is to show 
why we need principles that apply specifically to the basic structure rather than principles that 
regulate background fairness. After all, the basic structure is not obviously those and only those 
institutions that regulate background fairness. For these reasons, we should see Rawls’s argument 
in “The Basic Structure as Subject” as a response to the laissez-faire capitalists who see no reason 
to be concerned with the basic structure. It is not a complete argument in favor of taking the basic 
structure as subject. 
 With the identity of the basic structure established in the last chapter, I can now give a 
more complete argument for the moral indispensability of the basic structure in this chapter. The 
argument does not rely on profound effects, coercion, social cooperation or background fairness. 
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with the ideal of the state (rather than the argument that the ideal of society progressing in accordance with free 
decisions misidentifies the ideal of civil society with the ideal of the state). See Political Liberalism, 285-288. 
Instead, it relies on the normative structure of social practices. Oftentimes, individual actions are 
part of social practices. For example, if I walk through your land uninvited, I am trespassing. Yet, 
this action is understood as trespass only because it occurs within a generally recognized practice 
of property. In order for me to fully evaluate the actions that are part of a practice, I often need to 
evaluate the practice of which it is a part. Whether an act of trespass is rightful or wrongful, for 
example, depends on whether the practice of property is rightful or wrongful. In such cases, the 
proper evaluation of an action requires that we evaluate the practice that the action is part of. 
This requires that we have some way of evaluating the practice; we need principles that apply to 
the practice that action is part of. In the example, we need some way of determining whether the 
property system is rightful. 
 Likewise, I argue that to properly evaluate certain social practices, we need some way of 
evaluating the systems of which those practices are a part. In the same way that we need to 
evaluate a practice to determine whether the actions that are part of that practice are justified, we 
need to evaluate a system of practices to determine whether the practices that are part of that 
system are justified. Since the major social institutions together form a system--the basic 
structure--we need to evaluate the basic structure in order to properly evaluate the institutions 
that are part of the basic structure. All the basic structure institutions together specify our role as 
member of society, so we need to evaluate these institutions as part of that system. For example, 
in order to evaluate a property scheme, political constitution or economic system, we need to see 
each as part of the basic structure; we need to see each as contributing to the specification of our 
role as members of society. 
 To establish this argument, the chapter will proceed in three parts. In §2.1, I explain why 
the evaluation of individual actions often requires that we evaluate the practices that the action is 
part of. Then, §2.2 explains why the evaluation of certain practices requires that we evaluate the 
systems of that those practices are part of. I then apply this argument to show how it justifies 
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evaluating the basic structure as subject. In the final part, §2.3, I answer some important 
objections and highlight what needs to be established in the next chapter. 
 In making this argument, this chapter seeks to show one way in which ethical life is 
complex. Whether moral principles aid or determine our moral evaluations, we cannot think 
that moral principles apply only to individual actions. We must see actions as part of practices, 
which also need to be evaluated. Moral principle either aid or determine our evaluation of 
these practices. This makes for a complex moral landscape, especially since our actions are part 
of so many different practices. This complexity extends even further when practices together 
form systems. We then evaluate not only actions and practices but systems of practices. The 
basic structure is an indispensable moral subject because it is the system that specifies one’s role 
as member of society. As complex as the social and moral landscape is, we need to evaluate the 
basic structure in order to properly evaluate those institutions that establish our obligations, 
rights, and powers as members of society. 
2.1 Actions as Part of Practices
In many cases, we can properly evaluate an action by looking at it and its effects in isolation. If 
one saves a child from drowning, for instance, we can generally assume that the person acted 
rightly. In other cases, we can only properly evaluate an action when we look at it as part of a 
practice. Famously, Hume made this argument in A Treatise of Human Nature. In §3.2.2, he 
writes
“A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest; and were it to 
stand alone, without being followed by many other acts, may, of itself, be very 
prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a benevolent disposition, restores a 
great fortune to a miser, a seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the 
public is the real sufferer. Nor is every single act of justice, considered apart, more 
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conducive to private interest, than to public; and ‘tis easily conceived how a man 
may impoverish himself by a single instance of integrity.”5
In this passage, Hume emphasizes that we cannot merely look at all actions as though they 
“stand alone.” If we look at the act of giving money to a seditious bigot, it would not call for our 
approval. A more laudatory action would be to give that money to those who need it and not 
leave it in the hands of the bigoted miser. Yet, we might approve of the action when we see it as 
an instance of keeping contracts if we learn that the man of merit had agreed to repay a loan. In 
this case, we see the action as part of a social practice of contract-keeping. For Hume, this 
demonstrates that we cannot explain our judgment of actions merely by appeal to the action in 
isolation. He ends the passage by pointing out that doing so is no less problematic if we focus 
only on personal advantage. One might uphold a contract and thereby bring herself into 
poverty, and we would still approve of this action as appropriate. Looking at the effects of 
action alone--either the moral or prudential effects--cannot explain why the action is laudable. 
 In Hume’s view, our approval of the man of merit’s action is explained by our 
recognition that the practice, as a whole, benefits ourselves and others. Our approval is 
transferred from the practice as a whole to the individual actions that contribute to it. Even if 
upholding a contract does not seem to have any merit on its own, we recognize that the 
practice of keeping contracts has merit, and so we approve of actions that are part of the 
practice. According to Hume, to understand our response to such actions, we recognize how 
we see such action as part of a beneficial social practice. 
 Now, others might offer a different explanation of Hume’s particular example. They 
might say that what explains our approval of the man of merit is our recognition of a practice-
independent moral obligation to keep contracts. So long as we recognize that keeping contracts 
is morally laudable in isolation, we do not need to recognize the action as part of a practice of 
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contract keeping. Yet, even if this response shows a problem with this particular case, it will not 
be a problem for all cases. Some actions will be praiseworthy as part of a practice that will not 
be praiseworthy in isolation. For example, a citizen who researches the candidates and votes in 
an election does a praiseworthy action, but the fact that it is praiseworthy only makes sense 
within a representative democracy. 
  Hume’s example works particularly well because it is a clear instance of an action that 
would be judged differently if it were not viewed as part of a practice. In our everyday life, 
however, the issue is much more complex. We live amongst overlapping practices, and even 
those actions that are praiseworthy or condemnable because they fit within a social practice are 
not as clearly linked to any specific practice. I harm a student’s interests when I give a student a 
bad grade on a paper, but I am justified in doing so within the complex practices of education. 
Grades should be given on the basis of merit and the harm caused is irrelevant according to the 
practice. Beyond grading, if we praise a teacher as particularly dedicated to students and clear 
in his explanations, such praise makes sense within the role that is established for teachers. To 
properly evaluate the various actions one takes as teacher, we need to recognize the particular 
practices that a teacher acts within. 
 In broader society, the ways in which our actions are part of practices proliferate. We 
make choices as parents, citizens, and friends. All of these roles carry particular ways of acting, 
and proper evaluation of action should be sensitive to these actions. We should not think that 
Hume’s point is limited to simple cases where the rules are explicit and clear; we have much 
more complex practices that individual actions need to be seen as part of. 
2.1.1 Why we should see actions as part of practices
What examples like Hume’s show is the intuitive way in which we see actions as part of social 
practices, but it is less clear why we should do so. Hume offers it as a brute psychological fact 
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that our approval of the practice transfers to a our approval of the action, but we can ask 
whether we really ought to transfer our approval in this way. Why should we evaluate actions as 
part of practices? Answering this question is particularly important for the larger argument of 
this chapter. Since I want to show that we should evaluate practices as parts of systems, I will 
need to show that the same reasons that explain why we should evaluate actions as part of 
practices can be extended to show why we should evaluate practices as part of systems. 
 Put simply, the reason why we need to see actions as part of practices is because the 
moral significance of a practice is not reducible to the significance of the actions that are part of 
the practice. When an individual action is part of a practice, that action is significant as 
contributing to whatever is significant about the practice that is not reducible to the actions in 
isolation. If we did not see the action as part of the practice, our evaluation of that action would 
not capture the way in which the action contributes to that practice. We would capture the 
moral significance of the action in isolation, but we would not capture the significance of the 
action related to the irreducible significance of the practice. 
 In Hume’s example, there is a particular good involved in being able to rely on others 
with whom one has made a contract. This is a good in having a practice of contract-keeping 
that is not reducible to individual acts of keeping contracts. In isolation, acts of contract-
keeping are good because they promote the interests of the contracted with, but bad insofar as 
they could advance greater interests of others. As a part of the practice of contract-keeping, 
particular acts contribute to a system of reliance. Such a practice allows persons to coordinate 
and trust one another in ways that might not be possible in the absence of the practice. We can 
say that a practice of contracts facilitates trust and cooperation in ways that would not 
otherwise be possible. Accordingly, there is some value in having the practice that is not 
reducible to the value of persons generally doing that which they said they would. It is relevant 
to the evaluation of the man of merit’s action that it contributes to the well-functioning of the 
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practice and thus contributes to this irreducible benefit. To properly evaluate the man of merit’s 
action, we need to see it as contributing to the practice of contract. If we looked at the action in 
isolation, we would lose sight of this morally significant aspect. 
 What is true in the case of Hume’s example is true of practices generally. To show this, 
§2.1.2 will look more carefully at the benefits (and costs) of practices that are not reducible to 
the benefits (and costs) of individual actions. Then §2.1.3 will focus more on how we need to 
see individual actions as contributing to these practices. Finally, §2.1.4 will show how this all 
requires that there is (at least) two levels of moral evaluation. We need to be able to evaluate 
actions, and we need to be able to evaluate the practices that actions are a part of. 
2.1.2 The irreducibility of practices
While practices manifest themselves through patterns of individual action, the effects of 
practices are not fully reducible to the actions that are part of the practice. This is not because 
there is some ontologically important entity over and above individuals, but because the 
recognition of a practice changes how persons understand their social world. In recognizing 
social rules, persons think about their own action in different ways and expect different actions 
from others. The existence of a practice changes the social context within which our choices are 
made. Our concern with social practices is not merely a concern with a convergence of 
individual actions, we are concerned with the ways that practices structure our actions.
 In his article, “Two Concepts of Rules,” John Rawls is focused on the difference between 
justifying a practice and justifying an action that is part of a practice.6  To show the importance 
of this distinction, he uses the practices of punishment and promise-keeping as examples. From 
the utilitarian perspective, we cannot make sense of why keeping promises per se is justified. 
After all, we always ought to do that action that best promotes happiness and this will not 
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always involve keeping a promise. Likewise, if harming another could count as happiness-
promoting deterrence, the utilitarian perspective requires that we harm regardless of whether 
the harmed is innocent of a crime or guilty. Yet, we can justify both punishment and promise-
keeping as actions required by the rules of a practice, and we can see that practice as justified 
by the utilitarian principle. Accordingly, when the utilitarian principle is used directly to justify 
acts of promise-keeping or punishment, it seems inadequate. Yet, when the principle is used to 
justify practices, and actions are justified as part of the practice, then utilitarianism seems like a 
more appealing moral position.
 Now this distinction would not be helpful if practices did not have effects that were not 
reducible to individuals’ actions. The reason why both punishment and promise-keeping can 
serve as Rawls’s examples is because they both have effects that could not be captured merely by 
individuals action. Punishment works as a deterrence only because it sets up a certain context 
in which persons who contemplate crimes can expect to be harmed. Moreover, it works as a 
good system of deterrence because there are certain expectations about who does the 
punishment and under what situations, so that harm cannot be perpetrated on a mere pretense 
of punishment. Likewise, the practice of promise-keeping establishes a way of assuring others 
of your action due to the mutually recognized wrong of breaking promises. In both cases, it is 
not merely individual actions that are important, but the establishment of mutually recognized 
rules. These rules structure behavior in new ways, and the effects of this structuring go beyond 
the effects of individual actions. These practices establish a social context for our actions.
 Generalizing beyond these examples, we can recognize three ways that social practices 
structure behavior and thereby have unique effects. First, a practice structures behavior when it 
constitutes a new activity. As with punishment and promises, practices can have important 
effects by making a new activity possible. For instance, persons can only play chess when there 
are generally recognized rules that constitute the game of chess. Likewise, persons can only 
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have property when there is a generally recognized practice of property claims. Persons can 
only pass, enforce or obey laws when a system of law is in place. In any of these examples, by 
establishing the new activity, the practice changes our social context. We now have an option to 
play chess that we would not otherwise have. We are bound by claims of property that we 
would not otherwise be bound by. We can make laws and be compelled to obey them. The 
effects of these practices go beyond the effects that persons have in playing chess, making 
property claims or making law. We need to also consider the effects that having the option to 
play chess, make property claims or make law have. Oftentimes, the existence of these practices 
will have an effect even when persons choose not to follow their rules. 
 A second way in which practices structure behavior is by facilitating cooperation. For 
instance, the practice of waiting in line provides a way of cooperating for those who wait for 
service. Through a mutually recognized system of rules, persons coordinate who gets service 
next--whether at the DMV, at a coffee shop, or at Disneyland. While we can identify line-
waiting as its own activity in one sense, people only engage in this activity as a way of waiting 
for service.7  It coordinates our behavior rather than creating a new activity. Such coordination 
structures our behavior by establishing specific ways of working with others. As we make 
decisions, we hold these ways of coordinating with others as fixed. For instance, I might not go 
to the coffee shop if I am running late because I know there will be a long line. Moreover, such 
ways of coordinating can have broader effects than merely coordinating. Right now, line-
waiting is a particularly egalitarian activity. However, in airports, a growing norm has been that 
those with a willingness to pay a higher price can bypass the line--either at security or at the 
terminal--because they have bought a special pass to do so. If this were to become pervasive 
Levels of Moral Evaluation 
- 66 -
7 Whereas we do not say that persons engage in chess as a way of playing a game or respect property as a way of 
living together. 
across situations of line-waiting, then line-waiting would have a different social significance.8  It 
would be an indication of social class. In this way, practices structure behavior by coordinating 
our behavior and by coordinating it in a certain way. The particular way of coordinating might 
have expansive effects beyond just coordination. 
 The third way that practices structure behavior is merely by creating expectations of 
behavior. Even when individuals do not try to coordinate with others, the fact that persons act 
in ways specified by a practice will have effects on how they understand the social world. For 
instance, it might have an epistemic impact as persons take the fact that others act a certain 
way as evidence that it is a good way to act. For example, in a society where women primarily 
work in the home, members of that society might be more likely to think that there is 
something inherently right in women working at home. In planning their lives, they will tend 
to think that this is the better way to live--even when they are not concerned with coordinating 
with others. Even beyond this, we cannot ignore the myriad ways in which expectations of the 
social world influence our linguistic practices, and with that the ways we understand the world. 
To be any more specific on this would require a theory of learning and development that I 
cannot offer, but few can doubt the ways in which our social practices impact our habits, 
heuristic rules, modes of understanding and aims. 
 Regardless of which of these three ways practices structure behavior, each has a moral 
significance that is not reducible to the significance of those actions that compose it. The fact 
that persons see that practice as part of the social world has a deeper significance. These 
practices organize our behavior with one another and provide us with a social context within 
which to act. For this reason, we need to be concerned with these practices as having these 
effects. We need to be concerned with the irreducible significance of practices. 
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2.1.3 Evaluating contribution
While the benefits and costs for any of these practices is not fully reducible to the effects of 
those actions that are part of the practice in isolation, it is nonetheless true that there would be 
no practice if persons did not follow the rules of the practice. Accordingly, those actions that 
correspond to the rules of the practice contribute to the functioning of that practice, and those 
actions thus contribute to the benefits and costs of the practice. When we evaluate those actions 
that are part of a practice, we need to evaluate them as parts of a practice in order to capture 
this morally significant aspect of the action. The fact that the action contributes to the benefits 
or costs of the practice is relevant for evaluating that act.
 To see the point here, imagine a case in which a city will suffer from a drought unless 
persons generally cut down on their water usage. Suppose that the city is large enough such 
that no one person’s usage will either cause or avert the drought, but a general change by all 
would solve the problem. If we look at an individual situation in isolation, there is little reason 
for any individual to cut back. After all, their own choice will not either cause or solve the 
problem. Yet, we can praise an individual who contributes to the solution by cutting back--even 
if the drought is not ultimately avoided. In this case, it is the effects of general behavior rather 
than any particular action that matters. We can then evaluate the action as contributing to this 
general behavior. Similarly, when we are concerned about the effects of a practice that are not 
reducible to effects of isolated actions, we should still evaluate actions as contributing to the 
practice. 
 Intuitively, we often jump from approving the general behavior to approving the 
individual action. We jump from thinking that a general reduction in water usage makes the 
particular choice of an individual to reduce their water usage good. Yet, this is a jump. It does 
not directly follow and different moral theories will justify it on different grounds. For instance, 
some appeal to the “Principle of Fair Play,” which requires that persons contribute to a practice 
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that they accept the benefits of. Alternatively, utilitarians might appeal to an indirect utilitarian 
principle such that persons ought to act in the way that, when persons generally act that way, 
would best promote utility.9  My present concern is not to argue for any particular way of 
justifying individual contribution to practices, but merely to point out that there must be some 
ground that aligns with our intuitive approval of such actions. 
 In speaking of our evaluation of individual actions as “contributing” to a practice, it may 
seem as though such actions would not be strictly obligatory.  The phrase makes it seem as 
though the practice accomplishes an end, and our action is praiseworthy insofar as it 
contributes to that end. However, sometimes a practice strictly requires compliance and then 
our evaluation of the action does not seem to depend on any contribution. For instance, a 
practice of contract-keeping does not explain praise of those actions that contribute to the 
reliability of contracts; it requires that persons keep their contracts. A practice of property does 
not explain praise of actions that secure property claims; it requires that persons respect 
property. How can we explain such requirements while being concerned only with the ways the 
actions contribute to the practice?
 Oftentimes, the efficacy of a practice requires that persons can fully rely on individuals 
acting a certain way. For instance, a practice of promising only works because persons are 
always required to keep their promises. It would not work the same way if the practice only 
requires that persons do enough to maintain trust in promises. A practice of property only 
works when persons have trust that others will respect their property claims. When such 
practices exist, then one contributes to the practice by strictly following its rules. The 
praiseworthy action is not to contribute however one sees fit--it is to follow the required rules. 
In these situations the rules of a practice will be obligatory. 
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 What goes for good practices, equally goes for bad practices. If we praise actions that 
contribute to good practices, then we condemn actions that contribute to bad practices. For 
example, in areas of Africa and the Middle East, there is a practice of female genital cutting. 
According to this practice, young girls undergo procedures of varying severity from limited 
circumcision to complete infibulation. Given the harm caused to these girls, we can condemn 
such a practice and with it condemn the actions that contribute to it. Just as we evaluate actions 
that contribute to a justified practice as good, we can evaluate actions that contribute to a 
unjustified practice as bad. Accordingly, our evaluation of individual actions will often depend 
upon our evaluation of the practice of which it is a part. To fully evaluate individual actions, we 
need to evaluate the practices of which they are part. 
 
2.1.4 Two levels of evaluation
So, individual actions will have moral significance as isolated acts, and they will have 
significance as part of social practices. In order to fully evaluate an action we need to appreciate 
both perspectives towards the action. In order to evaluate the action as part of the practice, 
however, we need to evaluate the practice itself. If the practice is justified, then individuals have 
reason to contribute to the practice. If the practice is unjustified, then individuals have reason 
against contributing to the practice. A full evaluation of action needs to take this into account, 
so a full evaluation of action requires a judgment of the practice of which the action is part.
 What all this shows is that we cannot suppose that moral evaluation happens only at the 
level of individual actions. At times, what an individual ought to do depends upon whether a 
practice is justified, and this shows that moral evaluation cannot be directed only at individuals 
actions. We need to be concerned with the evaluation of practices. In developing moral 
principles, we should have moral principles for individual action and we should have principles 
for practices. 
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 So, this argument shows why we should be concerned with social practices, but it does 
not do so on the basis of any substantive moral theory. Instead, the argument relies merely on 
the role of social practices and the way in which actions contribute to them. This argument 
applies whether one ultimately thinks that social practices should be evaluated by self-interest, 
utility, rational agreement, reasonable agreement, pluralist values or god’s will. Since practices 
have effects that are not reducible to effects of isolated actions, we need to be able to evaluate 
those practices in order to evaluate the actions that contribute to them. 
 In section §2.2, I will extend this argument to systems of practices and the basic 
structure. I will argue that we have reason to view moral theory as having three levels. I argue 
that we should be concerned with actions, practices and systems of practices. Since the basics 
structure of society is a system of practices, we should be concerned with the basic structure of 
society. In this way, I will have argued for the moral indispensability of the basic structure 
without relying on any particular moral theory.
2.1.5 Applbaum’s objection
In his 1999 book, Ethics for Adversaries, Arthur Applbaum examines the morality of actions that 
are part of adversarial practices such as the law, business, and political campaigning.10  His 
primary concern is with behavior that would not be permissible were it not part of a social 
practice that licenses it. He asks how deceptive, coercive and violent actions can be justified 
merely because they are part of a practice. As a particularly stark example, he offers the case of 
an executioner. Such a person kills, but we think he kills in virtue of a certain institutional 
capacity. If the executioner did not have a particular role in a legal system, we would not think 
such killings could be justified. Applbaum’s challenge is whether such killing is even justified 
within the institution. He asks how being part of such an institution could really justify this 
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violent behavior. In what way does being part of a practice really change our evaluation of the 
action?
 Applbaum’s real object of concern is not executioners, but the more mundane 
institutions of law and market competition. In these cases, we pit persons against one another 
and believe that a system in which they compete is beneficial in the long run. Yet, when lawyers 
manipulate or hide facts in the courtroom, they do not cease to lie merely because they are 
lawyers. When persons focus solely on profit in market exchanges, they are not less guilty of 
greed. While persons might cite their role as a justification for their conduct, it is not obvious 
how their role could justify such prima facie immoral conduct. 
 Much of Applbaum’s argument presses against the view that I have argued for in this 
chapter. While I argue that we should see actions as part of practices, he convincingly argues 
that we should see actions in isolation. We ought to see lawyers as lying, businessmen as greedy, 
and executioners as killing. Being part of a practice does not justify a fundamentally different 
evaluation of the action. In fact, we might wrongly judge an action by viewing it as part of a 
practice rather than by viewing it as an isolated act. Applbaum’s arguments are significant 
because they push against the fundamental move of this chapter. They show why actions that 
are part of a practice should not always be evaluated as part of a practice. 
 Yet, Applbaum’s views and my own do not conflict in any way. Both can recognize that 
we should evaluate actions as part of practices and that we should evaluate actions in isolation. 
Both perspectives are relevant to the ultimate evaluation of that action. My claim is not that 
being part of a practice fully determines whether an act is right or wrong. My claim is only that 
a proper evaluation of that action requires that we evaluate it as part of a practice. In fact, there 
could be four ways in which our evaluation of the act in isolation and our evaluation of the act 
as part of a practice interact in an ultimate evaluation of that action. 
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 First, it might be the case that persons should generally follow the rules of a practice, 
but that situations arise when the rules should not be followed. Here, the particularities of the 
action in isolation require that we do not follow the rules that would typically justify the action. 
Perhaps it is wrong for an executioner to kill political criminals even if an executioner can 
generally kill criminals.11  There might be cases when a lawyer should not lie, even if the 
adversarial legal system is generally good. There might be cases when one should not keep their 
contract, even if contracts should generally be kept. In such situations the fact that persons 
should generally follow the rules of a practice does not mean that they should always do so.
 Second, it might be that a practice is unjustified because it requires that persons act in 
ways that are immoral in isolation. It might very well be an objection against capital 
punishment that it causes persons to kill outside of self-defense. It might be an objection 
against adversarial legal conventions that they require lawyers to lie. In such cases, the fact that 
practices encourage (if not require) such immoral acts would be a reason against the practice 
being practiced. When this occurs the reasons for the practices would be compared to the 
reasons against, and we could determine whether or not the practice is, ultimately, justified. 
 Third, Applbaum does not deny that a practice can make an otherwise immoral action 
moral, only that we cannot assume it does so.12  It is also consistent with both of our positions 
that a practice might be important enough to justify persons acting in immoral ways as part of 
it. Perhaps the advantages of the adversarial legal system are great enough to justify the lies that 
it encourages. Perhaps a market system in which advertisers deceive could be sufficiently 
justified in a way that excuses individual actions of deception. 
 Fourth, these two perspectives towards our action might very well be irreconcilable. If 
the practice is justified, but the act it requires is immoral, then a person who acts according to 
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the practice might act both rightly and wrongly. We do not need to suppose this conflict can be 
resolved. This, after all, is how Michael Walzer treats the problem of dirty hands.13  The political 
leader is put in a place whereby they ought to do that which benefits their public. When this 
requires that they act in immoral ways, their political role pulls them towards one action and 
the immorality of the isolated action takes them in another. For Walzer, the politician who acts 
in accordance with their role does right, but they do right by doing wrong. We should not 
suppose that the wrong is wiped away by the right. The politician should appreciate both 
aspects of his act. This might be a fact of moral life far beyond politics. Our institutional 
obligations and social roles might require that we do wrong to do right--and we should not 
think that the wrong we do is wiped away. 
 Applbaum’s argument importantly shows that the view of our actions as part of 
practices is not the only morally relevant view of our actions. Even when they are part of 
practices, our actions are still isolated actions. For a full evaluation of them, we need to 
recognize both aspects. We need to see our actions in their particularity, and we need to see 
them as contributing to practices. How these two perspectives towards the action are resolved 
needs to be determined by a particular moral theory, so I cannot offer a general solution here. 
What matters is that his emphasis on evaluating actions in isolation does not itself conflict with 
my emphasis on evaluating actions as part of practices. 
2.2 Practices as Parts of Systems
The reason why we need to evaluate certain practices as part of systems is the same as the 
reason why we need to evaluate actions as part of practices. Systems of practices can have 
certain effects that practices alone do not have. When practices contribute to such a system, 
this contribution is an important aspect of that practice. A contribution to a beneficial system is 
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laudable, and a contribution to a harmful practice is condemnable. For instance, the coercive 
enforcement of good laws can be a great good whereas the coercive enforcement of bad laws 
can be a great bad. While being part of a system is not the only salient feature of such practices, 
it will be relevant for determining whether that action is rightful. For this reason, it will often 
be the case that to properly evaluate an individual’s action, we need to evaluate the practice of 
which that action is a part. 
 To extend this argument from the last section, §2.2.1 will argue that systems of practices 
have the same kinds of unique effects as practices do. Oftentimes, systems of practices can be 
justified by the effects they have beyond the effects of the practices they are made of. Following 
this, §2.2.2 argues that we need to evaluate practices by their contribution to such systems. The 
fact that a practice contributes to a justified system counts in favor of that practice and it would 
count against it if it contributed to an unjustified system. Finally, in §2.2.4, I better explain how 
we can understand the basic structure, specifically, as a system that the major social institutions 
need to be justified as part of. 
2.2.1 The effects of systems
Just as practices have unique effects in creating a social context for individual actions, so do 
systems of practices create a context for practices. Accordingly, the effects of a system of 
practices are not reducible to the effects of practices in isolation. Once we see the unique effects 
that systems of practices have, we can see why we need to see individual practices as 
contributing to systems. 
 As an example, we can focus on the educational system in the United States. In this 
system, there is no one over-arching institution that has authority or influence over the other 
institutions. Pre-schools operate under a different framework than primary schools, public 
schools operate under a different framework than public schools, and colleges operate under a 
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different framework than high schools. Moreover, there are plenty of secondary institutions 
that are well integrated within these. For instance, the companies that administer Advanced 
Placement tests, the companies that organize the SAT, ACT, GRE, and MCAT tests, and the 
various financing organizations that offer student loans are all integrated within the educational 
system. While these various institutions are not unified as part of any formal system, they do 
work together as part of “the educational system” in the United States. Each institution is 
organized in ways the presume the idiosyncrasies of other institutions, and members of society 
have certain expectations on the system as a whole. 
 Because our educational institutions are part of the educational system, they are all part 
of a particular social context. If we wanted to evaluate any one kind of institution, we would 
need to do so within the context set by the system as a whole. If we were evaluating high school 
education, we would need to think of it as situated within the system of primary schools, 
colleges and placement tests. We could not properly evaluate high school as an institution if we 
viewed it in isolation; we would need to see it as part of the educational system. 
 In this way, the evaluation of educational institutions is quite similar to individual 
actions. If we are to evaluate the choice of the man of merit, we would need to see his action as 
within the context of a practice of contracts. To see the action in isolation would be to treat it 
wrongly. In fact, the same three ways in which practices structure individual action also apply 
for how systems structure individual practices. First, systems of practices could constitute new 
kinds of systems. When this occurs, then the practices will only make sense within the system 
that it partly constitutes. For example, we might understand “the state” as constituted by 
various institutions--perhaps a political constitution, legal system, and police force. These 
institutions will only make sense as part of the state, as a whole, in the way that moves of chess 
only make sense as part of the game of chess. Second, systems of practices will often coordinate 
the actions of other practices. For example, the educational system coordinates the activities of 
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the various educational institutions. In this case, the way the system is organized has influence 
on how its parts are organized. Third, systems of practices will also have a structuring role by 
setting expectations and a context for understanding. For example, persons might see 
themselves and their own maturity in the context of the educational system. As the normal 
course of education extends past high school into college, persons come to see themselves as 
adults after college and not after high school.
  Just as practices structure behavior in these three ways, so do systems of practices 
structure practices in these three ways. Accordingly, we need to evaluate systems of practices as 
having this unique structuring effect; just as practices provide a social context for actions, 
systems provide a social context for practices.
 
2.2.2 The contribution of practices
So, systems of practices have irreducible effects by establishing a social context for practices, 
but it is still practices that together form a system. Accordingly, the role that a practice plays in 
the system is important for evaluating that practice. Just as we need to evaluate individual 
actions as contributing to practices, we need to evaluate individual practices as contributing to 
systems. A practice will have morally significant aspects as an isolated practice, but it will also 
have morally significant aspects as part of a system. Thus, a full evaluation of practices requires 
that we see them as part of these systems. 
 Just as evaluating an action as part of a practice requires that we evaluate the practice as 
a whole, so does evaluating a practice as part of a system require that we evaluate the system as 
a whole. A practice could be part of a justified system, and fulfilling a role within that system 
would count in favor of that practice. A practice could contribute to an unjustified system, and 
fulfilling a role in that system would count against the practice. A full evaluation of practices 
requires that we see them as part of systems. 
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 Continuing our example, while the educational system in the United States is far from 
ideal, we can imagine an educational system that--as a whole--works well and fairly. Now, 
whether this system works well will depend on the individual institutions that comprise it and 
how they work together. So, suppose that we focused on any one institution--such as pre-
school. Now, there are certainly parts of a pre-school that we can evaluate as an isolated 
institution. For instance, pre-schools should be healthy environments where children feel safe. 
However, we could not focus only on making pre-school the best it could be without 
considering what role it plays in the larger system. If we evaluate pre-school in isolation, we 
would not be adequately evaluating pre-school. Part of our evaluation of the institution also 
depends upon what we think of the system as a whole. The fact that a pre-school fulfills a 
necessary role in a justified system counts in favor of that institution. Yet, if a pre-school fulfills 
its role within an unjustified system, that does not count in its favor. In this way, the individual 
institutions that comprise the education system need to be viewed as part of that system, and 
this will often require that we be able to judge that system as a whole. 
 So, what all this shows is that we should be concerned with the moral evaluation of 
systems of practices. Just as our concern for adequate evaluation of individual action will 
require that we evaluate the practices that actions are part of, so does our concern with 
practices require that we evaluate the systems of which practices are a part. Again, it is not due 
to any substantive moral theory that we should be concerned with the system as a whole, but 
because of the structure of practices and of systems. Regardless of what moral theory one holds, 
we should be concerned with evaluating systems of practices. 
 Accordingly, moral evaluation cannot be confined to one level or two, but must occur at 
(at least) three levels. We need to be concerned with individual actions, with the practices that 
actions are part of, and with the systems that practices are part of. Oftentimes the evaluation of 
individual action requires that we view that action as part of a practice and that requires that 
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we evaluate that practice. To evaluate that practice, we may need to see it as part of a system of 
practices, and that requires that we evaluate that system as a whole. Accordingly, a full moral 
theory needs to have principles that apply at these three different levels. 
 The final step of the argument will be to show that the basic structure of society is one 
such system of practices that we should be concerned with. Yet, before I do that, I want to clear 
up one difficulty. 
2.2.3 What makes a system a system?
The argument thus far relies on the claim that those practices that are part of systems should be 
evaluated as part of those systems. But, what exactly counts as a “system” of practices? Whether 
or not we should evaluate any particular practice as part of a system depends on how we 
answer this question. That will determine when a practice should be evaluated only in isolation 
and when it should not be. 
 In accordance with the core analogy of this argument, I want to answer the question of 
what counts as a system by asking what counts as a practice. When do we know when actions 
are parts of practices? The same answer could potentially be applied to determine when 
practices are a part of systems. There are, however, two problems with this approach. First, we 
have an intuitive notion of practices that is not easy to articulate. As Wittgenstein claimed of 
games, it is quite difficult to offer a clear standard by which to identify a practice.14  Second, we 
might be able to refer to the participants’ attitudes towards a practice to identify it as a practice, 
but we cannot refer to the attitudes towards systems to identify a system. It is not nearly as 
common for persons to think of systems as it is to think of practices. Accordingly, it is not 
obvious how the analogy between practices and systems can be carried through.
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 What we can say of both practices and systems is that they organize their parts as a 
single activity. Oftentimes that activity is constituted by the rules of the practice, but other 
times it merely provides a way of pursuing a prior activity. This is the key aspect of practices 
that can be extended to identify systems. A practice organizes individual actions around a 
single activity, and a system of practices organizes practices around a single activity. In our 
repeated example, the educational system organizes the various institutions around the activity 
of educating members of society. Each institution has a role in education. 
 So, what makes a heap of practices into a system is that the practices jointly contributes 
to some activity or goal. This raises the question: what activity do the major social institutions 
jointly contribute to such that they form a system?
  In the last chapter, I explained the basic structure as consisting of those institutions that 
establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. While this gives some unity 
to the major social institutions, it is not clear whether it really counts as a single activity. Isn’t it 
actually a mere heap of distinct activities; establishing property rights, voting powers, and the 
like?
 My response to this worry is to emphasize the ways in which the requirements and 
claims we have as members of society define our role as members of society. The obligations, 
rights, and powers that the major social institutions establish jointly specify our role as member 
of society. The unity of the basic structure as single system can be explained as joint 
contribution to the single activity of specifying our role. 
 To talk in terms of a “role” might seem odd in this context. Often, we might associate a 
role with specifying a particular goals that one has in virtue of occupying some office. For 
example, one’s role as parent is to raise and healthy and autonomous individual. In being a 
member of society, the is no single goal that one has. It therefore seems odd to suppose that the 
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major social institutions thereby specify our “role.” Being a member of society hardly seems to 
give content to a role in the same way that various offices do. 
 However, this objection comes from a skewed way of viewing a role. Oftentimes our 
roles in an institution will be tied to the goal of that institution. Our role as parent is tied 
together with the broader role that the family institution has. Yet, a liberal society does not have 
a single goal. Instead, it is organized in ways that facilitate the accomplishment of it’s members 
goals.  The rules that we follow are those that mutually advantage members of society generally. 
Their justification is this mutual advantage and not a contribution to some goal. Accordingly, 
our role as member of society is not understood as goal-oriented. Instead, our role is specified 
by the obligations, rights, and powers we have as members of society. Our role comes in the 
forms of claims and obligations rather than as ends. In a liberal basic structure, our goals will 
be our own and our role as member of society will be specified by the rules of the major social 
institutions. 
 
2.2.4 Why evaluate the basic structure
At this stage, all the parts of the argument have been assembled to show why we have reason to 
be concerned with the basic structure of society. A full moral appraisal of certain actions 
requires that we see them not only in isolation, but as part of a social practice. If a practice is 
justified, then persons have moral reason to follow the rules of the practice. If a practice is a 
morally bad practice, then persons have a moral reason to not follow the rules of the practice. 
Accordingly our evaluation of the practice itself is relevant to our evaluation of individual 
action. We need to be able to evaluate actions and practices. However, to evaluate certain 
practices, we likewise cannot view them as isolated. Certain practices should be evaluated as 
parts of systems of practices. When the system is good, then the practice can be justified as 
contributing to the practice. When the practice is bad, then the fact that the practice 
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contributes to it might make the practice unjustified. Accordingly, we need to be able to 
evaluate not only actions and practices; we must also be able to evaluate systems of practices. 
Our moral evaluation must reach to three levels. 
 As argued in the last chapter, the basic structure of society is a system of social 
practices. Specifically, it is the system of social practices that specify our role as member of 
society. Accordingly, it makes sense that we view the basic structure as a system. The various 
institutions that form the basic structure together specify the requirements and demands that I 
have as member of society. 
 More intuitively, we can see this point by noticing that we live in a society, and that 
society establishes a range of claims, obligations, and expectations. These various claims, 
obligations, and expectations are established by the major social institutions, like an economic 
system, property scheme, legal system and political constitution. We do not have a choice to 
participate in any one of these institutions and not any of the others. Instead, they come as a 
mutually supporting group. These institutions together establish the requirements on and 
claims of persons as members of society. Since we cannot choose to be a participant in one or 
the other, we should evaluate each of them as contributing to the whole. The most important 
moral concern then is whether these institutions as a whole are justified. Whether the society 
we find ourselves in is justified. To try and evaluate one of these institutions in isolation from 
the others, like the legal system or property system, would ignore the way in which they are 
part of the society that establishes our claims, obligations and expectations as a whole. It would 
be like evaluating preschool without understanding how preschool fits into the educations 
system; it would be like evaluating returning money to the bigoted miser without seeing it as 
part of contract-keeping.
 Once we conceive of the basic structure as a system of practices, we can see why we 
need to focus on the basic structure as an object of ethical concern. To fully evaluate any basic 
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structure institution, we need to see it as part of the basic structure. Whether the institution is 
itself justified then depends upon its role within the basic structure and whether the basic 
structure--as a whole--is justified. Accordingly, we need to have some way of evaluating the 
basic structure as subject. 
 The argument can be seen if we focus on particular actions. So, imagine we are 
concerned with whether an individual ought to follow the law. If we conceive of a legal system 
as a social practice that consists partly of the rule “citizens ought to follow what is identified as 
the law,” then persons ought to follow the law if they ought to follow the rules of the legal 
system. Whether they ought to follow the rules of this social practice depends upon whether 
the social practice is justified, so we need to determine whether the legal system is a good one. 
To do this, we need to see the legal system as part of a system of practices. Since the legal 
system is one institution that establishes security for persons as members of society, we should 
evaluate the legal system as part of the basic structure of society. Whether the legal system is 
good partly depends upon whether the basic structure of which it is part is good, and to 
determine this we must be able to evaluate the basic structure of society. So, in order to 
properly evaluate certain actions--like following the law--we need to be able to evaluate the 
basic structure of society. Regardless of what moral theory someone holds, we need to be 
morally concerned with the basic structure of society.
 In this way, the argument for being concerned with the basic structure as subject 
extends the original argument offered by John Rawls in “Two Concepts of Rules.” As explained 
above, Rawls was there concerned with the distinction between justifying an action and 
justifying a practice. Some actions are parts of a practice, and the justification of those actions 
requires that we see them as part of a justified practice. Likewise, I maintain a distinction 
between justifying a practice and justifying a system of practices. Some practices are parts of 
systems, and the justification of these systems requires that we see them as part of a justified 
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system. A concern with the basic structure recognizes the logical distinction between actions 
and practices and extends it to another level. The concern with the basic structure is justified by 
this distinction between justifying practices and justifying systems of practices. 
3.3 Addressing Objections
At this stage, the core argument for focusing on the basic structure is established, but a number 
of objections might still be raised. In this section, I seek to anticipate two major objections and 
offer responses. Doing this should do more than seal potential gaps with the view, it should also 
help to better explain the core argument.
 The first objection I address is one that questions the restricted focus of the basic 
structure. Why not instead focus on the entirety of our social life and see our basic institutions 
as part of that social system. While we should judge our social institutions as part of a larger 
social context, why restrict ourselves to seeing the institutions as only part of the basic 
structure? The second objection argues for extending the argument beyond its intended 
purview. Why wouldn’t we see the basic structure as itself part of an even larger system, the 
global structure? 
3.3.1 First objection: focusing on society as a whole
Why do we need to see the basic structure institutions as part of the basic structure specifically? 
One might recognize that we should evaluate the major social institutions as part of a larger 
system, but does that larger system need to be the basic structure? Why not see them as part of 
society as a whole? Why not evaluate them as part of the full social structure, and determine 
how the entire social structure ought to be? In all likelihood, this would seemingly require that 
we evaluate both the basic structure and informal structure as working together as part of the 
same social system. 
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  In “Remarks on Bentham’s philosophy,” J.S. Mill argues against Bentham that he is too 
focused on individual actions and not the larger social context in which decisions are made. 
His own objection to Bentham might support this first objection to my view. Mill writes, 
“A theory, therefore, which considers little in an action beside that actions’s own 
consequences...will be most apt to fail in the consideration of greater social 
questions--the theory of organic institutions and general forms of polity; for 
those (unlike the details of legislation) to be duly estimated, must be viewed as 
the great instrument of forming the national character; of carrying forward the 
members of the community towards perfection, or preserving them from 
degeneracy.”15
In this quotation, Mill recognizes the major driving intuition behind the argument of this 
chapter. We cannot merely evaluate individual actions in isolation, but must see them as part of 
the larger social context. For Mill, this meant using the principle of utility to apply to the 
entirety of the social context.16 He was concerned with using the principle to evaluate “national 
character” and sees our actions are part of these larger social questions. Mill does not make any 
such restriction in saying that we should see actions as only part of practices and practices as 
only parts of systems. Rather, he seems to suggest that they are all part of the whole of a 
national character. 
 Extending this idea, we only need to ask why we do not start from the largest possible 
unit of evaluation. Why not be concerned with evaluating society as a whole, and see the 
various aspects of society as part of it. This would mean that we evaluate the basic structure 
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16 “The recognition of happiness as the only thing desirable in itself, and of the production of the state of things 
most favourable to happiness as the only rational end both of morals and policy, by no means necessarily leads to 
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the probable consequences of that particular kind of act, supposing it to be generally practiced. This is a very small 
part indeed of what a morel enlarged understanding of the “greatest-happiness principle” would require us to take 
into account...All acts suppose certain dispositions, habits of mind and heart, which may be in themselves states of 
enjoyment or wretchedness, and which must be fruitful in other consequences, besides those particular acts.” Mill, 
Collected Works, Vol. 10 (Liberty Fund Press), 7.
institutions, the informal structure, and even particular acts as all part of the national character. 
The perspective agrees with my claims that we need to take a larger perspective towards our 
actions than seeing them in isolation, but why wouldn’t this larger perspective see all aspects of 
social life as part of society as a whole and start from an evaluation of society? 
 Most simply, we do not evaluate practices as part of the society as a whole because 
society is not a system. There is no single activity that all parts of society are contributing to. 
We evaluate the major social institutions as part of the basic structure because they all 
contribute to the specification of our role as member of society. While I urge us to take a 
broader perspective in evaluating actions and practices, this does not require that I take a 
maximally broad perspective. It is because actions contribute to practices that we  need to 
evaluate them as part of the practice and it is because practices contribute to systems that we 
evaluate them as part of the system. Since society is not understood as any single activity, we do 
not need to evaluate particulars as part of society. 
 In response, a teleological moral theory might object that we can see all of society as 
contributing to a single activity; the furtherance of the moral end. The utilitarian, for example, 
will see all of society as contributing to the activity of promoting the greatest happiness. 
Accordingly, we could evaluate any practice as part of a single system; the system that promotes 
happiness. Yet, even those who accept such a view need not reject my conclusion. That we 
should be concerned with all of society does not mean that we should not be concerned with 
the basic structure. If anything, it would only mean that we should see the basic structure as 
part of the social structure. If we have a comprehensive social view, then surely our evaluation 
of the basic structure should be consistent with that larger view, but it does not show that you 
should not focus on the basic structure as a particular system. Hence the argument does not 
seem like an objection against a concern with the basic structure. It merely shows that this 
concern is insufficient for moral theory, and I’ve never held that it would be. 
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 As a final point, I want to make a more general point about ethical theory. From the 
perspective of any moral goal, anything might be evaluated as instrumental towards that goal. It 
is unsurprising that someone who has an ethical goal would then see little reason to distinguish 
a concern for the basic structure from a concern with any other part of the social structure; all 
of the social structure is viewed as instrument to that goal. If equality is a moral aim, then the 
basic structure, like any other part of the social structure, can contribute to equality. If 
autonomy is a goal, then both the basic structure and the informal structure are important for 
promoting autonomy. Yet, this does not really change the underlying point of my argument. I 
mean to emphasize the distinct role that the basic structure has in establishing our obligations, 
rights, and powers as members of society. Even if we ultimately assess the basic structure by 
some single moral end, the way in which it implicates that moral end will be unique. The basic 
structure forms a background against which each person lives their lives; obligations, rights, 
duties and opportunities are all explained by the idiosyncrasies of the basic structure. In so 
doing, the basic structure will have unique effects on whatever moral ends we take to be 
important. Even if we are concerned with how all of society affects autonomy, equality or 
happiness, we have reason to distinguish our concern with the basic structure because of the 
unique ways in which the obligations, rights, and powers we recognize will effect autonomy, 
equality and happiness. 
3.3.2 Second objection: focusing on the global structure
A second objection extends my argument and argues that just as we should evaluate the major 
institutions as part of the basic structure of society, so should we evaluate the basic structure as 
part of the global structure. We could not then properly evaluate the basic structure without 
evaluating the global structure. 
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 My first response is to point out that this is not, strictly speaking, an objection to my 
argument. Even if we should see the basic structure as part of the global structure, that still 
does not count against evaluating the basic structure as a moral concern. It merely suggests that 
we need to take a broader view to properly do so. 
 Nonetheless, we also should not see the basic structure of society as part of the global 
structure. Actions are part of social practices because practices only exist when persons act in 
accordance with the rules, and institutions are part of the basic structure because the basic 
structure only exists when the practices that compose it exist. Yet, it is not the case that the 
global structure is made up of basic structures. Rather, the global structure consists of 
international practices, and those practices consist in actions by international agents--such as 
states, corporations and various NGOs. In this way, the global structure is similar to the basic 
structures rather than constituted by basic structures. The difference between the two is that the 
basic structure is a structure of practices between persons whereas the global structure is a 
structure of practices between international agents. Whereas the objection supposes a 
relationship like that in figure A below, the real situation is like that of figure B
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So, while the objection supposes that my argument should be extended to see the basic 
structure as part of the global structure, the conclusion we should draw is quite different. Just 
as we need to evaluate the basic structure to properly evaluate individual actions, so we should 
evaluate the global structure to properly evaluate international actions.
 Of course, this argument relies on a certain empirical fact about the global structure, 
that international practices and the global structure are constituted by actions of international 
agents rather than by individual agents. This point might seem contentious, but my argument 
still stands even if I am wrong. Suppose it is the case that international practices are constituted 
by the actions of individual agents. This still would not imply that the basic structure should be 
evaluated as part of the global structure. Instead, it would imply either (a) that the global 
structure is a system of practices alongside the basic structure as system or (b) that the global 
structure counts as a basic structure. If (a), the global structure might establish claims that 
individuals make on one another as members of the globe--rather than as members of society. 
In the case of (b), the global structure would establish obligations, rights, and powers for 
persons as members of society, in which case there would be a global basic structure. In either 
case, it would not mean that we should see the basic structure as part of the global structure. 
2.4 The Moral Indispensability of the Basic Structure
So, the core argument for being concerned with the basic structure does not arise from any 
particular moral value. I do not claim that happiness is important and the basic structure has a 
unique role in promoting happiness. I do not claim that autonomy is important and claim that 
the basic structure has a unique role in protecting autonomy. Instead, the argument arises from 
the way in which our social structure is organized and how moral theory needs to treat that 
social structure. We live amidst social practices and those social practices are part of systems of 
practices. In order for our moral evaluations to be complete, we need to see actions as part of 
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practices and practices as parts of systems. As the basic structure institutions are practices that 
are part of an important system, we need to see these institutions as part of the basic structure. 
Accordingly, complete moral evaluation requires that we have a concern with the basic 
structure, regardless of what is substantively valuable. It is for this reason that the basic 
structure is a morally indispensable ethical subject. 
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Chapter 3
Within and Without an Institutional Context 
“In accord with the interests and occupations of the group, certain things become objects of high 
esteem; others of aversion. Association does not create impulses of affection and dislike, but it 
furnishes the objects to which they attach themselves. The way our group or class does things tends 
to determine the proper objects of attention, and thus to prescribe the directions and limits of 
observation and memory...Just as the sense requires sensible objects to stimulate them, so our 
powers of observation, recollection, and imagination do not work simultaneously, but are set in 
motion by the demands set up by current social occupations”
- Dewey, Democracy and Education
Having shown that we should evaluate the basic structure as a moral subject, I now turn to how 
we should do this. One intuitive approach holds that we should identify first principles that can 
be applied across all moral problems, and then apply these principles to the basic structure. Yet, 
this approach hardly warrants giving any more attention to the basic structure as a moral problem 
than we would give to any other problem. In each case, we would merely apply first principles to 
the issue.
 To overcome this challenge, there must be something morally distinct about the basic 
structure. What is morally different about the basic structure such that we would evaluate it with 
distinct principles? Why not merely identify the correct ideals for individual actions and 
recognize those as the same ideals for the basic structure? To claim that the we should focus on 
the basic structure seems to require that there is something that makes the basic structure worthy 
of distinctive principles. 
 If one argues for a conception of justice that is uniquely related to the basic structure, then 
one can easily explain what is distinct about the basic structure. Justice strikes us as a distinct 
normative ideal. If justice uniquely bears on the basic structure, then the basic structure is distinct 
by its relation to justice. However, I do not argue for a focus on the basic structure from any 
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particular conception of justice. Instead, I mean to show why the arguments for a focus on the 
basic structure transcend any particular conception of justice. 
 There is already an expansive literature on the ways in which the basic structure is morally 
distinct, though it is not typically understood in these terms. Beginning with his 1992 Tanner 
Lectures, G.A. Cohen has argued that being committed to the principles of justice should requires 
certain norms of conduct.1  In these arguments, Cohen challenges the Rawlsian approach of 
identifying principles that apply only to the basic structure. In 1997, Cohen explicitly argued that 
any distinction between principles that apply to the basic structure and those that apply to 
individual actions is morally arbitrary; whatever concerns us about the basic structure should 
concern us about individual action.2  In this way, Cohen denies the moral distinctiveness of the 
basic structure as subject. Similarly, Liam Murphy’s 1998 article, “Institutions and the Demands of 
Justice,” argues that our principles must be unified at a fundamental level. Any separation 
between two principles, he argues, would only frustrate our attempts to promote our fundamental 
values or satisfy our first principles. Most recently, Seanna Shiffrin has offered a more nuanced 
argument on behalf of a similar conclusion, claiming that our acceptance of the two principles of 
justice indirectly commits us to certain norms for individual action because of our commitment 
to the justification of the two principles.3  Each of these arguments challenges the moral 
distinctiveness of the basic structure in claiming that the fundamental principles that apply to the 
basic structure should also be applied to individual choices.
 The predominant response on behalf of the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure 
has been an argument from the “moral division of labor.” According to this view, we have a 
plurality of fundamental values, and we can best respect all these values by dividing the labor 
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Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, UK. 2009), Ch. 1.
2 Cohen, G.A. “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26, Iss. 1, 
3-30 (1997). Also Rescuing Justice and Equality, Ch. 3.
3 Shiffrin, Seanna. “Incentives, Motives and Talents,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 (2010), 111-142.
between principles that apply to institutions and principles that apply to individuals. We do best 
in respecting all our values if our institutions are primarily assessed by some values and our 
individual actions assessed by others. Thus, we should divide institutional principles from 
individual principles. Both Thomas Nagel and Samuel Scheffler advance versions of this basic 
argument, but they differ on why the separation between principles would best respect our 
values.4
 In this chapter, I will offer an argument that addresses Cohen’s, Shiffrin’s, and Murphy’s 
criticisms, but I will not appeal to any moral division of labor. Instead, my argument relies on 
claims about how practices affect the content of moral and ethical life. Like the last chapter, I rely 
on claims about the normative structure of social practices. Our social practices often establish an 
“institutional context,” and principles that apply within this context should be sensitive to its 
particularities. For example, a justified practice of property might identify certain acts as 
wrongful trespassing. For those who act within that practice, the wrong of trespass is relevant for 
evaluating their action in a way that the wrong of trespass is not relevant for evaluating the 
practice itself. As particular persons in a determinate social structure, there are certain 
considerations relevant for assessing our actions only because of the particular institutions we act 
within, and our individual principles need to be sensitive to these considerations. I will claim that 
it is these considerations that make the basic structure morally distinctive.  
 My argument for this conclusion will proceed in two sections. In §3.1, I argue that those 
committed to conventionalism will recognize certain considerations that are only relevant for 
evaluation within an institutional context. This allows me to provide a direct answer to Seanna 
Shiffrin’s recent argument. In §3.2, I apply the argument of §3.1 to justify the general distinction 
between  principles that apply to the basic structure from those that apply to individual action. 
This allows me to answer Cohen and Murphy’s recent arguments. With my positive argument 
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complete, I then contrast my own argument with the moral division of labor argument offered by 
Nagel and Scheffler. 
 All together, the three sections of this chapter show the importance of our moral context 
for the evaluation of actions and practices. In this way, it contributes to a view of political and 
moral theory that respects both the importance of a universal foundation for our moral claims as 
well as the ethical significance of our particular social context. We are, after all, determinate 
persons living within a form of social life, and this shapes who we are, what we care about, and 
how we relate to others. Our individual principles should not be distant and detached from our 
way of life but embedded within it.
3.1 Our Institutional Context
For my argument to succeed, I will need to show why there are certain considerations that are 
relevant for moral evaluation within an institutional context that are not relevant outside that 
context. To do this, I first need to explain what I mean by “institutional context.” Suppose we 
recognize that trespassing is wrongful only because it violates the rules of a specific system of 
property rights. In this case, the fact that an act counts as trespassing is a consideration against 
the act for those to whom the practice’s rules apply. It is only a wrong within the “institutional 
context” set by the property system. As we recognized in the last chapter, institutions can establish 
obligations, rights and powers. Because the institution so establishes these demands and claims, 
we say that a persons only has such an obligation, right, or power in an institutional context. 
 The influence of such practices is pervasive across ethical life. Our practices establish 
specific obligations that bind us and they set the terms of our most important relationships. These 
practices can shape our particular values and they can define our virtues. In a variety of ways, our 
institutions establish a moral context within which our choices are made. If individual principles 
are to guide our conduct, then we cannot rely solely on our foundational and universal values to 
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determine how we ought to act. Instead, our individual principles need to be sensitive to the 
particular values, virtues, relationships and obligations within our institutional context. 
 By contrast, the principles that apply to our basic social institutions should not be 
sensitive to the particular values, virtues, relationships and obligations that arise within the 
institutional context that those institutions create. For example, it would be wrong to justify our 
system of property on the basis that it limited trespassing. For this reason, principles that apply to 
the basic structure should not be sensitive to our moral context in the way that principles that 
apply to actions within an institutional context should. I maintain that this distinction explains 
the distinctiveness of the basic structure as moral subject. 
 To build this broader argument, I will first need to show how practices can establish 
considerations that are only relevant within an institutional context. In §3.1.1, I give a general 
argument for how this occurs that draws on resources from Chapter 2. Then, in §3.1.2, I show 
how this argument is relevant for addressing Seanna Shiffrin’s recent arguments that those who 
accept Rawls’s two principles of justice shouldn’t accept inegalitarian incentives. I then answer 
some objections in §3.1.3 and summarize the significance of these arguments in §3.1.4. 
3.1.1 Conventionalism
Consider the different ways in which property systems could treat trespassing. In one system, the 
rules might absolutely forbid setting foot on someone’s land without their consent. In another, the 
rules might forbid such action unless someone is in dire circumstances. In a third, the rules might 
only forbid setting foot on the land of another when doing so would harm the owner’s property. 
In a fourth, the rules might not forbid setting foot on another’s property at all, though it might 
forbid actions associated with trespass such as violating certain privacy rights. We might 
immediately think that one of these property systems would be better than another, but we 
nonetheless recognize them as possible specifications of a property system. 
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 Now, suppose we ask the moral question, “should an individual avoid setting foot on 
another’s land?”  According to some moral theories, we can only answer this question if we know 
which of the above property systems the individual lives within. These theories suppose that if the 
rules of property forbid setting foot on another’s land, then one should avoid doing so. If the rules 
do not forbid it, then one does not need to avoid doing so. Whether a person should avoid setting 
foot on another’s land would then depend on the conventional rules of property. Of course, not 
every moral theory would answer the question in this way. For some, trespass might be morally 
forbidden in every possible social structure--perhaps because of a natural right to property. Or, 
one might never act wrongly in setting foot on the land of another--perhaps because we all have 
an inalienable right to the use of land. 
 To simplify the issue, we can say that one is either a conventionalist or absolutist with 
respect to the morality of trespass. One is a conventionalist in this respect when one must 
reference the conventions of the property system to settle whether one should not set foot on the 
land of another. One is an absolutist when the particularities of a property system are irrelevant 
for answering the moral question. A typically under-appreciated point is that one can be a 
conventionalist about any particular moral obligation without being a conventionalist about all 
moral obligations. I might be a conventionalist with regard to trespass but an absolutist with 
regard to promise-keeping.
 In fact, it makes little sense to be a conventionalist about everything. One needs to be able 
to explain why a practice can create new obligations, rights, or powers. To supply this explanation, 
we need some non-conventional moral principle. For example, Rawls was a conventionalist with 
respect to property rights. In this commitment, he followed Hume, who analyzed promise-
keeping, property, allegiance to government and even fidelity in marriage as conventional 
obligations.5  However, Rawls grounded his own conventionalism in two natural duties. First, the 
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Natural Duty of Justice requires that individuals (a) follow the rules of just institutions when they 
exist and apply to that individual, and (b) build just institutions when they are needed.6  Second, 
the Principle of Fair Play requires that we follow the rules of a cooperative scheme when we have 
accepted the benefits of that scheme.7  Together, these two principles explain why we would be 
obligated by the rules of conventional practices. We are obligated by the Principle of Fair Play to 
follow the rules when we have voluntarily accepted the benefits of a practice, and we are obligated 
by a duty of justice to follow the rules when the practice is sufficiently just and applies to us.8  
 Rawls was a conventionalist not only about obligations, but also about rights and powers. 
This point is often lost because he emphasized the Principle of Fair Play and the Natural Duty of 
Justice, which both explicitly specify obligations. However, his conventionalism goes beyond this. 
As he writes in Theory of Justice, 
“In a well-ordered society individuals acquire claims to a share of the social 
product by doing certain things encouraged by the existing arrangements. The 
legitimate expectations that arise are the other side, so to speak, of the Principle of 
Fairness and the natural duty of justice. For in the way that one has a duty to 
uphold just arrangements, and an obligation to do one’s part when one has 
accepted a position in them, so a person who has complied with the scheme and 
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Political Liberalism, 428, 393. This has also been noted by G.A. Cohen (Rescuing Justice and Equality, 339), Andrew 
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The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (2005), 227)
done his share has a right to be treated accordingly by others...what we can say is 
that, in the traditional phrase, a just scheme gives each person his due: that is, it 
allots to each what he is entitled to as defined by the scheme itself.”9
Rawls does not ever develop this idea extensively, but a full treatment of his conventionalism 
would need to recognize how claims arise and are linked to the natural duties. I take the basic 
idea here to be quite intuitive; if persons are morally obligated to stay off my land, then I also have 
a right that they do not set foot on my land. If the natural duty of justice explains why persons are 
so obligated, then a corresponding story should be able to say why persons have a right. While a 
complete account would need to be defended, the Rawlsian view accords with the general 
approach of this dissertation is identifying institutions as establishing obligations, rights, and 
powers. 
 As with the commitments of the last chapters, my argument only requires that persons 
recognize some way in which social practices can establish obligations, rights, or powers. 
Regardless of what moral principle one appeals to to explain this, the point remains the same; 
there are new considerations that arise within an institutional context. The Natural Duty of Justice 
and Principles of Fair Play are popular ways in which to ground such obligations, but they are not 
the only principles that can do so. 
3.1.2 Labor markets, conventionalism, and incentives
In “Incentives, Motives, and Talents,” Shiffrin argues that those who accept the difference 
principle are committed to treating talents as arbitrary from a moral point of view; the fact that 
someone possesses a certain talent makes that person no more deserving of social goods than 
someone without that talent. She then argues that if someone believes that talents are morally 
arbitrary, then that person cannot justifiably seek out inegalitarian incentives on the basis of their 
talents. They do not have a claim to higher wages on the basis of their talents. 
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 In this section, I will use the importance of an institutional context to address Shiffrin’s 
claim that those who accept the difference principle should not pursue or accept inegalitarian 
incentives.10  I will argue that an institutional context can change the way in which talents are 
relevant in determining what persons deserve. An institution that treats those with different 
talents differently can be justified on the basis of a commitment that talents are morally arbitrary. 
Within that institution, however, talents will no longer be fully arbitrary. An institutions might 
specify what persons deserve, and treat those with talents as having different claims than those 
without. In this way, talents are not morally arbitrary within a practice even when they are 
morally arbitrary for justifying that practice. In this way, my argument will demonstrate the 
difference between moral considerations within a social practice from the moral considerations 
outside a social practice. 
 If we recognize, as Rawls does, that our institutions establish new rights, obligations, and 
powers, then individual actions need to be assessed within the moral context established by those 
institutions. For example, we can only say that a person acts rightly or wrongly in setting foot on 
the property of another when we know whether trespass is proscribed by the rules of a sufficiently 
just property scheme. For ease of reference, I will say that we need to assess an agent’s actions 
within an “institutional context” when the institutions they act within affect the agent’s rights, 
obligations and powers. 
 Within a Rawlsian view, it is correct to say that talents are arbitrary from a moral point of 
view when determining how our institutions should be organized. However, talents are not always 
arbitrary from a moral point of view within an institutional context. If the rules of an institution 
identify those with a particular talent as the bearer of a right, obligation, or power, then talents 
are no longer morally arbitrary within that institution. In this case, the fact that a legitimate 
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institution differentiates a person’s rights, obligations, or powers on the basis of their talents 
makes talents morally relevant. 
 If we accept the moral arbitrariness of talents for assessing institutions, as Rawls does, 
then it would be wrong to justify any institution on the basis that either (a) it treats those with a 
particular talent well or badly or that (b) it gives them what they deserve. However, if the 
institution can be justified while treating talents as morally arbitrary and that institution treats 
talents differently, then talents are not morally arbitrary within the context set by the institution.
 Two examples might help to bring out this core point. First, we can return to the property 
case. Suppose I am committed to the view that, outside of social institutions, trespassing is not a 
moral wrong. In this case, I could not argue against some property system because it did not 
proscribe trespass. Whether a property system proscribes trespassing has no direct bearing on 
whether it is a good or bad property system. However, I can recognize that trespassing might be 
wrongful when a property system is established. While I do not think trespassing is wrongful 
when assessing the institution of property, I can think it is wrongful within an institutional 
context. 
 Second, we can imagine a simple case where talents are not morally arbitrary. Suppose the 
members of our society agree that high-quality music is a public good worth investing in. In this 
case, we might think that it is worth funding public education in music and we might recognize 
the value of getting students started early in this education. Suppose we then establish a system of 
schools where those who seem to have exceptional musical talent are awarded a free and high-
quality education in music. If such a system were justified, then those identified as having 
exceptional musical talents deserve the free education. If any particular child with sufficient talent 
were purposively denied the education--perhaps by a sinister administrator with nepotistic 
motives--we would recognize that the child was wronged. Yet, this wrong is not explained by a 
natural right to free musical education. The child was wronged because they were denied a right 
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established by their particular institutions. If the musical education institution was sufficiently 
just, then musically talented children have a right to that education. 
 Similarly, a labor market is a kind of institution, the rules of which put labor-buyers and 
labor-sellers at odds with one another. Sellers expect that buyers will want a low price and buyers 
expect that sellers want a high price. The labor price is thus established by the prices that buyers 
and sellers are willing to agree upon. Such an institution tends towards an efficient allocation of 
labor because an individual’s labor is then used in the place where it is most demanded. A labor 
market is efficient, in part, because labor sellers aim to get a high price for their labor. The market 
would not be as efficient if they did not do so. 
 While there are many good criticisms of a labor market as a way to distribute wages and 
labor, let us suppose--for the sake of argument--that a labor market can be sufficiently just under 
some conditions. Suppose the gains are greater than the costs, and the costs can be offset by 
additional institutions like high quality and free education. If a labor market can be sufficiently 
just, then the rights, obligations, and powers that are associated with that institution are 
legitimized according to Rawlsian conventionalism. If labor-buyers put a higher price on certain 
talents, then those with such talents act within the rules of the institution in seeking out or 
accepting that higher price. Their doing so contributes to an efficient allocation of labor. In the 
institutional context of a labor market, talents would no longer be morally arbitrary. If the labor 
market is justified, then persons have a right to the wage they can get on the market and their 
talents might explain their being offered that wage.
 Importantly, this argument does not support the libertarian view that an individual has a 
right to that which they can earn on a free market. A person’s claims are determined by their 
institutional context, and this context might be established by more than one institution. If a tax 
system taxes those with higher wages at higher amounts, then individuals only have a claim to 
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their post-tax income.11  Since the labor market is justified within a broader context that includes 
the tax system, individual claims are established by both the labor market and tax systems. 
 From Rawls’s perspective, a labor market is justified if it is part of a basic structure that 
satisfies the two principles of justice. He believes that a labor market can be sufficiently just 
because of the gains to efficiency, but his principles place strong restrictions on when a labor 
market would be just. First, the society would be one with fair equality of opportunity. This 
requires that we do not assess a labor market in isolation but see how it relates to an education 
system and the broader patterns of inequality. Second, the society would be one in which the 
worst off are better off than the worst off would be under any other system.12  Third, Rawls 
suggests that a society that meets the two principles of justice will have a state that acts as 
employer of last resort.13  This possibility would insulate individuals from the more rapacious 
aspects of a labor market. When these conditions are met, it seems far less strange to think that a 
labor market could be a sufficiently just economic institution. If it is sufficiently just, then the 
rights, obligations, and powers associated with the institution are legitimate. Persons have a valid 
claim to that which they can earn on the labor market. 
 When persons have a valid claim to what they can earn on the labor market, and the 
market rewards those with certain talents, then persons have a right to the wage they earn on the 
basis of their talents. Within the institutional context of a labor market, talents are not morally 
arbitrary. Instead, persons deserve the wage they earn on a labor market and that wage is partly 
explained by the talents one possesses. 
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(2002)
12 That is, better off than in any other system that also protected equal rights and secure equality of opportunity. 
13 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press (1999), 50.  (“The lack of a sense of long-term security 
and of the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is destructive not only of citizen’s self-respect, but of 
their sense that they are members of society and not simply caught in it”)
 For this reason a person can simultaneously (a) accept the justification for the difference 
principle and (b) claim a right to higher wages on the basis of their talents, so long as they believe 
that (c) the principles of justice justify a labor market that gives persons a right to a market wage 
partly determined by talents. Such a person recognizes that talents are morally arbitrary outside 
of an institutional context, but are not morally arbitrary within the context established by a labor 
market. In this way, it is Rawls’s commitment to conventionalism that can explain why it is 
possible that one can accept or pursue inegalitarian wages on the basis of their talents. 
3.1.3 Three objections
I want to briefly address three possible objections to this argument.  First, one might object that 
my argument does not really show that talents are not morally arbitrary. Instead, it only shows 
that persons have a right to what they earn on a labor market. In this case, talents would only be 
morally relevant insofar as those talents explain the wage one can earn on a labor market. The 
talent itself is not morally relevant, but merely the wage one is able to get. After all, having 
adequate talent does not entitle anyone to a wage or a job---as many a professional philosopher 
can attest to. According to this objection, talents are still morally arbitrary in a sufficiently just 
labor market because talents do not actually determine any claim. I only have a claim to what I 
can earn, it just so happens that talents might explain why I am offered some wage.
 I think this objection is broadly correct. I recognize that my argument does not directly 
explain why talents are not morally arbitrary in an institutional context. However, I do not think 
this changes the broader argument in any way. A person might cite their talent as the reason they 
were offered a wage, and it is the fact that they were offered the wage in a sufficiently just market 
that gives them a claim to this wage. I have chosen to talk about the arbitrariness of talents 
because that is the language that Shiffrin and Cohen use, but I do not think that refining our 
language would substantially change their argument or my response. In either case, Shiffrin 
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would find the pursuit of inegalitarian incentives wrongful whereas I argue that persons have a 
conventional right to such incentives by the rules of a justified institution. 
 The second objection would claim that, “if this argument shows that talents are morally 
relevant for wages, can it equally show that race, gender or sexuality are morally relevant?” If my 
argument seemed to justify such discrimination, it would be a severe problem. Yet, unless one 
thinks that a labor market could never be sufficiently just or that a bigoted market could be just, 
the two cases will not be similar.14  My argument presupposes that a labor market can be 
sufficiently just, but I doubt that a labor market that established claims on the basis of race, 
gender, or sexuality could be sufficiently just.15  While a labor market might be part of a society 
that satisfied the two principles of justice, markets that discriminate on the basis of race, gender 
and sexuality would not be. Accordingly, a labor market that discriminated on the basis of race, 
gender or sexuality would not establish legitimate claims in the same way that a market that 
discriminated on the basis of talents could. 
 The third objection points out a deeper problem of Rawlsian conventionalism. The two 
principles of justice specify what a fully just society would be like. They express an ideal for a 
society. Yet, an institution only needs to be sufficiently just for that institution to establish rights, 
obligations and powers. We would not think that only the very best property system would 
establish property rights. Instead, the property system only needs to be sufficiently just. Likewise, 
we have a right to market wage even when the labor market is not part of an ideally just society. 
Instead, it only needs to be part of a sufficiently just society. 
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14 Shiffrin makes this analogy in her article (“Incentives, Motives, and Talents,” 126-128) and demonstrates her 
point about the moral arbitrariness of talents through our intuitions about the moral arbitrariness of race. For 
many, their is a deep difference between these issues. As KC Tan expresses the point in Justice, Institutions, and 
Luck, “To put the point schematically, racism is morally objectionable, and hence we create institutions that reflect 
this moral stance; inequalities due to talents need not be morally objectionable, and we create institutions in order 
to determine conditions under which they are acceptable and under which they are objectionable” (Oxford 
University Press, 2012, 66).
15 My point is not lessened if one can think of extreme cases in which such bigoted markets do seem justified. 
That, then, is merely an extreme case that is not our situation now.
 Rawls does not give any general principles about when a basic structure would be 
“sufficiently” just. So, we could not use Rawls’s theory to determine whether we--in our imperfect 
institutions--have a right to what we earn on a labor market. We would first need to argue about 
when institutions are sufficiently just before we could settle that argument, and that is a complex 
problem far from the current point.
 While Rawlsian conventionalism is limited in this way, it does not limit its effectiveness 
against Shiffrin’s argument. This is because Shiffrin focuses on the specific case of the well-
ordered society in which all members accept the two principles of justice and their justification. 
Accordingly, whether the institutions they live under are sufficiently just is not an issue. After all, 
the institutions are fully just. So, the difficulties that arise when we try to specify when institutions 
are sufficiently just do not arise. This difference is relevant for us to decide how we ought to act in 
the here and now, but it does not represent a problem for Rawls’s ideal theory. 
3.1.4. How extensive is an institutional context?
The significance of this argument goes beyond providing a Rawlsian response to Shiffrin’s 
argument. It serves as an example of the way in which considerations within an institutional 
context are distinct from those outside that institutional context. In this case, the fact that the 
labor market establishes certain claims to wage shows why talents are not morally arbitrary within 
an institutional context. The fact that persons have such claims, however, has nothing to do with 
whether a labor market is justified. We do not justify a labor market because the talented have 
certain claims, but the talented might have those claims within an institutional context. In the 
example of property, trespass becomes a moral consideration within an institutional context but it 
is irrelevant for evaluating the property system itself. 
 The arguments of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 appealed to the ways in which practices can 
establish new obligations, rights, and powers. That is all my argument relies on, but these same 
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ideas might be extended further to recognize other effects that practices might have on the 
particularities of ethical life. The fact that a particular practice is practiced might not only ground 
demands and claims but also explain the emergence of certain values, virtues, and relationships. 
While I have focused on more rule-based features of moral life, the influence of social practices 
likely carries over to features of ethical life that are much less ordered. In this section, I want to 
suggest how my argument might be extended in this direction. 
 To show how this might be the case, I want to offer some possible examples for how the 
choice of particular basic structure institutions might affect the relationships, ideals and self-
conception of members of society. I do not suppose that any evidence favors these stories, but I 
mean to show how our institutional context might effect ethical life beyond the obligations, rights, 
and powers directly specified by the basic structure institutions. 
 First, we might suppose that differences in the economic structure will create differences 
in how we view our relationships with others. For instance, one might stipulate that a capitalist 
economic structure relies on competition in the labor market. In a competitive labor market, 
individuals are situated towards others as rivals. In order to achieve one’s goal of securing an 
occupation, one must out perform other members of society who vie for that job. While this 
mentality has its primary manifestation in the adult search for jobs, it could easily spread to 
earlier stages of education; a competition for spots at universities gives rise to a competition for 
top-level classes and gives rise to a competition in high school, middle-school, elementary school, 
and pre-school. Children would then be raised against a background of competition against one 
another and parents would be aware that this is the relationship with which their children stand. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that all children or parents will necessarily be competitive, but 
only that the capitalist economic structure tends to make persons more competitive than 
alternative economic structures. The relationship between persons is partly a relationship of 
competition. This differs substantially from the way in which G.A. Cohen envisions the relations 
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of socialist society in which persons view one another through the spirit of fraternity.16  If such a 
socialist economic structure were able to counter competitive tendencies, then persons might 
view their relationships with one another as part of a larger “siblinghood.” While this might seem 
far more appealing than a society of individuals in competition, it might also have different 
unfortunate results beyond a reduction in production. For instance, if each individual understood 
him or herself as related to the social family, this attitude might encourage social homogeneity. 
Persons would be hesitant to explore new ways of life and pursuits, and there would not be the 
diversity of pursuits available in a capitalist society. 
 Likewise, we could see why an individual’s conception of themselves might be influenced 
by the contingencies of the social structure. For instance, in a capitalist economy with a free labor 
market, and individual might conceive of themselves partly in terms of what their assets in such a 
labor market are. In a sense, the individual comes to see himself or herself as having “human 
capital”. The person with experience in the field of retail sales might come to identify themselves 
partly as a retail salesperson (as others might as well). More troubling, the person who cannot 
find a job might come to see themselves as being less valuable of a person merely because they see 
themselves as less valuable on the job market. Here, the individual identifies his personal value 
with the market value of his skills. One might suppose that in a socialist economy, individuals 
would be less likely to view themselves in terms of their human capital. Instead of being 
individualized atoms competing in a chaotic and alien labor market, they see themselves as 
having a place in democratically planed production scheme. In this economic system, persons 
may be more likely to see themselves in terms of their contribution to society’s projects. However, 
persons might also come to see themselves merely as parts of these projects and not as self-
standing and full individuals. In understanding themselves in terms of their role in society’s 
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projects, they may be less likely to identify themselves with their human capital, but also less 
likely to identify themselves with their own goals and aspirations--atomistic as those might be.
 With these differences in mind, we can likewise see why different ideals might be 
emphasized in a society with a capitalist economic structure than an socialist structure. In the 
competitive and labor-differentiated markets of capitalism, it would be unsurprising if the public 
culture emphasized the ideals of individual achievement and self-perfection. Likewise, insofar as 
capitalism tends to engender commercialism across its culture, the ideals of personal happiness 
would be emphasized and associated with the accumulation of goods. Alternatively, in a more 
socialist structure, the social ideals of solidarity might be emphasized while the ideals of 
achievement and individuality are degraded. 
 What holds for the way in which the choice of economic structure impacts relationships, 
self-conception, values and obligations also holds for our choice over other aspects of the basic 
structure. While it is much more difficult to imagine alternative family structures than economic 
or political structure, it is much easier to recognize how differences in family structure might 
change a society’s public understandings. Likewise, choice between government forms would be 
fundamental in how persons conceive of the relation between themselves and those with political 
authority. We can imagine that the members of a democracy would have different public 
understandings from the members of an Aristocracy, Plutocracy, Military dictatorship, Theocracy 
or Hereditary Monarchy. Still we can imagine different schemes of property whereby the class of 
things that can be owed is different or who can own what is different. If the maternal head of a 
family were recognized as the primary owner of all property, then public understandings would 
be quite than if all members of a family were recognized as co-owners. 
 When a basic structure protects a certain freedom, the existence of such an 
institutionalized freedom has its own effects. The role the free religious institutions play within a 
basic structure might have a quite profound influence on ethical life. For instance, protecting 
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freedom of religion will likely lead persons view their religious denomination as a choice. The 
lesser role that religious institutions have on public life, the more likely it is that persons will see 
these institutions as only part of their social life. Rather than seeing themselves as liable for their 
behavior to the religious official or as educating their children through church resources, they 
may see the religion as a resource for personal, social and spiritual fulfillment. This will tend to 
impact the ways in which religious officials interact with members as religious institutions seek 
ways to better address the expectations and needs that members come to them with. More 
noticeably, a plurality of religious organizations will likely create an environment of pluralism. 
Optimistically, this might lead persons to better come to appreciate a diversity of views as well as 
better know their own beliefs in all the ways that J.S. Mill suggests. Pessimistically, it might lead to 
a kind of society that Marx warns about as public life becomes a the space of satisfying wants, and 
persons treat other members of society as means to their ends. In either case, the religious 
organizations themselves are not part of the basic structure, but the freedom that allows free 
worship is. This freedom itself has profound ethical effects. 
 In each case, the choice of basic structure institutions has a much broader effect on ethical 
life than what is immediately obvious. The choice of an economic structure has a broader effect 
than merely efficiencies in production or employment rates, the choice of family has broader 
effects than health and education of children, the choice of a government has a broader effect 
than control over coercive power, and the choice of a property scheme has a broader effect than 
the control over material objects. In each case, the choice of a basic structure institutions exercises 
direct impact on our public understandings and thereby on our relationships, self-conception 
values and (especially) obligations.
 There are difficult questions about the extent to which an economic structure affects the 
content of ethical life as opposed to merely affecting our perception of that content. If a socialist 
economy has the tendency to stifle individuality, that does not make individuality any less morally 
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significant. If a capitalist economy tends to stifle social solidarity, that does not make solidarity 
any less significant. In this case, the economy merely influences our perception of what is 
significant. However, the influence of social institutions is still worth our attention if the major 
social institutions merely change our perception of ethical life. The fact that our relationships and 
values are affected by particular institutions is reason to evaluate the institutions differently from 
our individual choices within those institutions. Beyond this, we should not diminish the extent 
to which our perception of our values, virtues, and relationships affects what is actually ethical. 
How we should live our lives is often partly dependent on how those around us our living their 
lives. The fact that persons hold certain ends or think about their relationships in specific ways 
gives us some reason to value those ends and act within those relationships. Otherwise, we risk 
acting as Prince Myshkin amongst St. Petersburg’s Yepanchins. Living with others in a social 
world affects what ends we should hold and the terms within which we should affect others. 
While the extent to which our institutions affect the actualities of ethical life versus our 
perspective of ethical life is a difficult question on which much more should be written, but I 
think the arguments of this section emphasize the great influence of social institutions regardless 
of how you answer that question. 
 This all suggests that our institutional context is quite extensive. Which values, virtues, 
relationships, obligations, rights, and self-conceptions are specific to our institutional context and 
which are independent of that context? For my argument to succeed, I only need it to be the case 
that the obligations, rights, and power established by our major social institutions contribute to 
an institutional context. While much more of moral and ethical life might be specific to such a 
context in the ways discussed above, I do not require that it is. The more impact the basic 
structure has on ethical life, the more important and distinctive the basic structure is. I now 
return to my more limited argument, and explain how the establishment of obligations, rights, 
and powers justifies distinct principles for the basic structure. 
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3.2 Moral Principles Within and Without an Institutional Context
The aim of this chapter is to show why the basic structure is a morally distinct subject. In §3.1.1 - 
§3.1.3, I showed why the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an institutional 
context are different from the considerations relevant for evaluating the institutions that 
determine that context. What I have not yet shown is why this justifies developing distinct 
principles for the basic structure of society. Cohen and Murphy argue that, at a fundamental level, 
the principles that apply to institutions must be the same as the principles that apply to 
individuals. In §3.2.1, I will show how the difference between relevant considerations 
differentiates the principles that apply within an institutional context from those that apply to the 
institutions that establish that context. Then in §3.2.2, I will show why the principles that apply to 
the basic structure are distinct from the principles that apply to other institutions/systems. 
Finally, in §3.2.3, I will explain why the principles that apply to the basic structure are distinct 
from those that apply to the informal norms in a society. 
3.2.1 Deliberative and decisive principles
To make the transition from talking about “considerations” to talking about “principle, I need to 
make a distinction between two kinds of moral principles; deliberative principles and decisive 
principles. I understand “deliberative principles” as guiding us towards the recognition of 
considerations that are relevant for moral and ethical evaluation. I call them deliberative principle 
because they guide us in our deliberation about moral and ethical problems. By contrast, “decisive 
principles” guide us in reconciling various considerations and coming to a final evaluation or 
decision. They are decisive in the sense that they provide the decisive evaluation of that to which 
they apply. 
 Some moral theories, like forms of intuitionism or pluralism, will only recognize 
deliberative principles as valid. Such theories suppose that we cannot articulate any final 
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principles that can reconcile relevant considerations. Perhaps autonomy and well-being are both 
irreducible moral considerations, but there are no principles that determine how tradeoffs 
between the two should be made. Other moral theories will only recognize decisive principles as 
valid. According to such views, the only relevant considerations are those that decisive principles 
identify as decisive. Since other considerations do not ultimately determine how we should act, 
they are not really considerations because they should not be considered. A third group of 
theories might recognize both kinds of principles, supposing that we need to understand what 
considerations are relevant before we can make any decisive judgments. If we think that decisive 
judgments are explained by a relation between considerations, then we will think both kinds of 
principles will be relevant. 
 In §3.1, I argued that the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an 
institutional context will be distinct from those that are relevant for evaluating the institutions 
that determine that context. Why does this mean that the principles that apply to institutions will 
be distinct from the principles that apply to individual actions? Well, that depends on what kind 
of principles you have in mind. 
 First, if one is concerned with deliberative principles, then such principle will need to 
present the considerations that arise within an institutional context in some way. If one is 
deliberating about whether they should accept inegalitarian wages, a deliberative principle should 
present the claims that arise within a labor market as a relevant concern. In this case, the 
(deliberative) principles that apply to an action within an institutional context will not be the 
same as those (deliberative) principles that apply to the institutions that determine that context; 
the principles that apply to actions should represent the claims within a labor market whereas the 
principles that apply to the labor market itself should not. 
 My claim is not that all the principles or considerations that apply within an institutional 
context will be different from those that apply to the institutions.  Helping persons satisfy their 
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basic needs might be a consideration that is relevant for evaluating both individual and 
institutions. Though some considerations might be relevant for each, not all are. The crucial point 
is that the set of considerations relevant for assessing institutions is distinct from the set of 
considerations relevant for assessing individual action, so we should distinguish institutional 
principles from individual principles. 
 Second, if one is concerned with decisive principles, then we need recognize how a 
institutional context ultimately affects what an individual should do. Suppose that two different 
property schemes, A and B, would identify two different people, Y and Z, as the owner of a 
particular object. If we live under property system A and that system grants the property right to 
Y, then we think that Z should not claim that property as her own. A decisive principle should 
recognize this, so decisive principles need to be sensitive to the particularities of the institutional 
context in which they are applied. Y’s ownership of the object is only a consideration against Z’s 
seizing it within a particular institutional context, and our decisive principle should track the 
relevance of such considerations. 
 So, regardless of whether we are concerned with deliberative or decisive principles, the 
principles that apply to individual actions within an institution’s context should be distinct from 
those that apply to that institution. It should then be no surprise that moral theories that 
recognize both the validity of both deliberative and decisive principles will recognize that 
principles should be distinct in these two cases. To present and track the significance of 
considerations relevant in an institutional context, the principles for the two should be distinct. 
 How does all this bear on the arguments of Cohen and Murphy. Well, Cohen’s overall view 
is concerned with considerations that are represented by fundamental principles. Suppose we 
recognize that equality, autonomy, and well-being are always significant for any moral problem. 
Cohen wants to argue that we address moral problems by seeing how they relate to these 
fundamental values, regardless of whether we are evaluating institutions or individual conduct. I 
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can agree with this. I only maintain that we do not only evaluate individual actions by these 
fundamental moral values. The considerations that are particular to an institutional context are 
also relevant. The fact that our institutions specify obligations, rights, and powers is also relevant 
to evaluating action. Our moral principles must also present the particularities within an 
institutional context as relevant, and these considerations can oftentimes change our overall 
evaluation of an action. It might be permissible for a person to enhance inequality within a 
justified labor market if that labor market grants her a claim to such incentives. I do not need to 
deny that equality, autonomy, and well-being are fundamental values to recognize that the set of 
considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an institution’s context are distinct from 
those relevant for evaluating that institution. 
 A similar point applies to Murphy’s argument. Murphy emphasizes that the same 
fundamental principles should apply to individuals and institutions. I will have more to say on 
Murphy’s complete argument in §5.1, but let me give a preliminary reply here. So long as we 
recognize that our institutions can establish obligations, rights, and powers, then the 
considerations relevant for evaluating actions will be distinct in an institutional context. 
Fundamental principles will still apply to both individuals and institutions, but there will be 
additional (and often decisive) considerations that apply to individual action. 
 At this stage, I have shown (a) that the considerations relevant for evaluating individual 
action within an institutional context are distinct from those relevant for evaluating the 
institutions that establish that context, and (b) that the principles that apply to individual actions 
in that context are distinct from the principles that apply to the institutions. This does not yet get 
me to the claim that the basic structure is a distinct moral subject. After all, the basic structure is 
not constituted by all institutions, but only those that establish our obligations, rights, and powers 
as members of society. First, I need to explain why it would be that principles for the basic 
structure would be morally distinct from the principles for other institutions or practices. I do so 
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in §3.2.2. Second, I need to explain why the principles for the basic structure would be morally 
distinct from the principles for the network of informal norms that also have a role in shaping 
ethical life. I do this in §3.2.3. 
3.2.2 Institutions and the Basic Structure
What would justify treating the basic structure differently from other institutions? So far, I’ve only 
discussed the difference between principles that apply to actions in an institutional context and 
the principles that apply to the institutions that establish that context. However, it would be 
wrong to think that individual actions are the only subject evaluated within an institutional 
context. Our social practices and institutions shape the moral context relevant for assessing 
individual actions, but they also shape the moral context relevant for assessing other practices. 
Sometimes an institution will be justified only because of the role it plays within a particular 
institutional context. What differentiates the basic structure from other institutions is that our 
assessment of the basic structure should not be sensitive to any institutional context whereas  our 
assessment of other institutions often should be. In this way, my strategy to distinguish principles 
for the basic structure from institutional principles more generally is merely an extension of my 
argument for distinguishing principles that apply to institutions from those that apply to actions 
within an institutional context.
 To see why the assessment of the basic structure should be insensitive to moral context in 
a way that other institutions do not need to be, we need to look again towards what the basic 
structure is and why it is morally indispensable. The basic structure is that system of social 
institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. In so doing, it 
forms a social background against which the various other practices and institutions in society 
are formed. Accordingly, these other practices and institutions will often need to take into 
consideration the institutional context established by the basic structure institutions. It is because 
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various practices and institutions are situated within a basic structure that we should treat the 
basic structure differently from these other institutions. The basic structure is not situated within 
any other institutions that its assessment should be sensitive to. 
 As an example, consider our assessment of a particular educational practice--such as the  
admission tests like the SAT and ACT. This practice is not itself part of the basic structure because 
there is nothing about the practice that establishes obligations, rights or powers as members of 
society. Instead, the practice is a general understanding amongst students and admission officials 
about what one needs to do to get into a college. If we want to assess the practice, we need to look 
at how it fits within the various practices around it. We should look at the role that college plays in 
the job market, at the ways in which high school prepares students for the test, and so on. Our 
assessment of the educational practices as a whole requires that we see how education fits within 
the larger society. How does education prepare students for the life they will live? Does it prepare 
them for the economy? Does it prepare them to contribute to a democracy? In this way, we assess 
our educational practices as within the basic structure institutions of the political constitution 
and economic system, and we assess the admission tests within this education system. Now, if we 
assess the individual actions of students, teachers, and administrators that are related to 
admission tests, we need to see their actions as within these practices. So, the actions of 
individuals are within an institutional context, but the practices are also within such a context. 
The basic structure, however, sets the fundamental rules in society around which various other 
practices are formed. This distinguishes the basic structure as uniquely removed from the moral 
context established by institutions. 
 Now, the explanation that I give here should not be confused for a mistaken historical 
theory. I recognize that the particularities of the basic structure that one lives within were not 
created first and followed by the creation of other institutions. I recognize that the institutions 
that constitute the basic structure were themselves developed against a moral context composed 
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of particular practices and norms that were themselves within another basic structure. The point 
is not to say that the assessment of other institutions should be sensitive to the moral context 
established by the basic structure because the basic structure institutions are temporally prior. 
Instead, the idea is that the rules of the basic structure institutions apply to all persons in a 
society, and so they apply to persons engaged in other institutions within society. Accordingly, the 
background that the basic structure sets is a background for these other institutions. It is not 
because the basic institutions came first, but because their rules set a background for the activities 
of other practices that we need to assess these other practices within the moral context set by the 
basic structure. 
 For example, we can recognize the activities that religious organizations engage in will be 
limited by the basic structure institutions. If our society establishes certain basic rights, then the 
activities of religious organizations need to respect these rights. Whatever property system is 
recognized designates what property rights these groups have. What economic system we live 
within determines how the group can fund itself. In these cases, it is within the broader systems of 
the basic structure that religious activities proceed and religious groups are sustained. Even if we 
carve out exemptions for religious groups, for example by allowing gender to be a factor in hiring, 
it is a feature of our legal institutions that grants that exception. It might be the case that the basic 
structure of society is explained because of the structure and influence of these religious groups, 
but that does not change the fact that their activities are now bound by their rules. Even if the 
historical story is one in which the religious traditions explain the basic structure, the normative 
story is that the religious traditions are now within a moral context set against the rules of the 
basic structure. 
 One might object that the basic structure is situated within another institutional context, 
the global structure. It might seem like the particularities of the global structure should influence 
our evaluation of the basic structure, thus reducing the centrality of the basic structure as subject. 
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In response to this objection, I want to return to the response made in §2.3.2. There, I argued that 
the global structure is constituted by norms that bind governments whereas the basic structure is 
constituted by norms that bind individuals. Because of this, I think it is wholly appropriate that 
we evaluate the decisions of governments as occurring within a global context. However, that 
does not mean that we should evaluate the basic structure as within a global context.17  
 So, the core argument of §3.1 distinguishes institutions generally from the basic structure 
in the same way that it distinguishes actions from the institutions those actions occur within. 
Principles within a context should be sensitive to the particularities within that context, but 
principles that apply to whatever establishes that context (whether an institution or system of 
institutions) should not be so sensitive. Our assessment of college entrance exams, for example, 
needs to be sensitive to the larger context set by the education system. The basic structure is 
distinct as a moral subject because it establishes a context within which our various other 
institutions and practices are situated. For this reason, the principles that apply to the basic 
structure will be distinct from those that apply to other institutions. Principles for other 
institutions need to be sensitive to the moral context established by the basic structure within 
which they fit, but principles for the basic structure do not need to be.
3.2.3 The basic structure and the informal structure
Now, it is of course true that institutions are not the sole determinate of the content of ethical life, 
and this might seem to warrant an objection to the view. Recall that any conception of the basic 
structure will need to distinguish the basic structure from the various informal norms and 
generalized expectations within a society. These norms and expectations might not rise to the 
level of “institutions,” but they still have profound and pervasive effects on social life. Call these 
various features of social life, the “informal structure” of society. 
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17 We should also bear in mind that the idea that a state represents the interests of its citizens in international 
relations is itself part of the basic structure of society. In this way, the features of the global structure are, in part, 
best understood as within a context of basic structures (rather than the other way around).
 Now doesn’t the informal structure of society have as much affect on the content of ethical 
life as the more formal institutions of the basic structure? Couldn’t we also say that institutions 
occur within a context set by the informal norms of a society? It seems just as important that a 
good society have the right mores as that it have the right institutions. Since these norms establish 
a moral context as well, their assessment seems formally similar to the assessment of institutions--
if we need to distinguish principles for the basic structure because they establish a moral context 
for other institutions why wouldn’t we distinguish principles for our basic mores on the same 
basis? If these are so similar, then why wouldn’t the principles that apply to one also apply to the 
other?
 The appropriate response to this criticism is to focus our attention on the difference 
between systems of rules and patterns of behavior. As discussed in Chapter 1, we should 
understand social rules as ostensibly binding. There are behaviors that are identified as right or 
wrong by appeal to these rules. By contrast, the informal norms of society do not have this 
bindingness. They undoubtedly have influence as persons aim to either adhere to flout those 
norms, but they are not rule-like. If persons in society generally celebrate the military, care about 
equality, or see poetry as the highest form of achievement, then that society will have certain 
informal norms. It is not until persons recognize rules that specify how they ought to act that 
such norms becomes rules.
 Because of this difference between rules and informal norms, we can ask what rules we 
should have without directly asking how persons ought to choose. By contrast, our concern with 
the informal structure is fully captured by our concern with how individuals should choose. Now, 
deciding how individuals should choose will always be dependent upon their own social context 
and the complexities of their situation. In deciding how the basic structure ought to be, we 
develop principles that apply to the institutions that determine and institutional context whereas 
principles for the informal structure must apply within an institutional context. 
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 For example, if a basic structure gives parents the prerogative to choose private schools or 
public schools, certain patterns will emerge wherein certain groups--the rich, the religious, the 
artistic--might tend to enroll their children in private schools more often. If these patterns 
become sufficiently embedded, they could be considered part of the informal structure. In this 
case, one might say that persons ought to choose to send their children to public school. This 
would then seem to be a principle that applies to the informal structure. However, it is quite 
difficult to make this claim independent of the social context. It will depend on the quality of 
education as well as its fit with philosophical and religious views. It will depend on the structure 
of society--with democracies perhaps giving stronger reason--and the norms within family life. It 
will also depend upon how that choice is viewed amongst persons, whether it will be seen as 
elitist and selfish or as selfless and encouraging excellence. The particularities of a social context 
seem highly relevant to determining how particular individuals should choose. 
 So, the objection is addressed by carrying through the original distinction that this 
argument is based upon. While individual choices and the informal structure do affect the 
structure of ethical life, the principles that apply to individual choice and the informal structure 
will need to be principles that apply within ethical life because individual choices always occur 
within a social context and the informal structure is constituted only by individual choices. The 
basic structure, as a system of rules, can be assessed outside of a particular social context. 
 Of course, none of this is to say that individual choices should not take into consideration 
their effects of the structure of ethical life. In a society where women are viewed as having a 
particular role in the family and in the workforce, then women and men ought  to recognize that 
their own choices have an effect on either reinforcing or overriding those traditional ideas. 
Individuals need to recognize that their personal choices have influence on the structure of 
ethical life. However, recognizing this does not mean that no women ought  to pursue traditional 
roles if that is their life-plan. To make such a broad claim would be insensitive to the complexities 
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of ethical life. Such a principle might be appropriate in some societies, but it will not be in many 
others. Each person should take their effect on ethical life into consideration, but other concerns 
also need to be considered. The point is only that the principles that apply to individual choices 
will, in the end, need to be principles that apply within the particular context of an ethical life. 
The principles that apply to the basic structure should not be.
3.3. Contrast with the Moral Division of Labor
In Equality and Partiality, Thomas Nagel gave an influential justification for developing distinct 
principles for the basic structure that centered on the distinction between principles for 
individuals and principles for institutions. Specifically, he argued that it is appropriate to 
distinguish the two because of a fundamental difference between two moral perspectives--one 
personal and one impersonal. When institutions were assessed by appeal to the values of a 
impersonal perspective, it allows individuals to pursue those values that are particular to the 
personal perspective. By dividing institutional and individual principles in this way, we create a 
“moral division of labor” under which we are better able to pursue our personal concerns secure 
in the knowledge that our impersonal concerns are secured by our shared institutions. The choice 
to develop principles specifically for the basic structure was justified by this kind of moral 
division of labor.
 While it was meant as a defense of the Rawlsian focus, Nagel’s interpretation set the terms 
of the debate in ways that were quite favorable to Rawls’s opponents. To many, Nagel seemed to 
say that institutions were to take care of the requirements of justice so that individuals did not 
have to. Famously, G.A. Cohen argued that the focus on the basic structure licensed capitalistic 
avarice in personal decisions because institutions and not individuals were charged with 
promoting equality. Liam Murphy tried to show that such a distinction was ultimately 
unsustainable due to the challenges it faced in non-ideal theory. Even Nagel was not fully 
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enthusiastic about the approach he argued for because it did not fully avoid conflicts between our 
values, leaving the possibility of a dissociated self.
 Recognizing these difficulties, Samuel Scheffler offered a new argument on behalf of a 
moral division of labor. This time, he was sure to emphasize that the division between 
institutional principles and individual principles was not justified on the basis of the pursuit of 
self-interest. Instead, he argued from a kind of value pluralism. He started from the recognition 
that we have many important values, some are more “small-scale” and some are more “large-
scale.” The small-scale values are typically related to interpersonal interaction and individual 
responsibility. The large-scale values are more typically related to impartial concerns like equality, 
justice and fairness. Prima facie, there seem to be conflicts between these kinds of values because 
acting for the sake of one might frustrate acting for the sake of another. This conflict can be 
represented in two kinds of cases. First, persons might live their lives in accordance with the 
small-scale moral values, but feel that they are failing to adequately respect the large-scale values. 
For instance, a strong dedication to family success might draw resources away that could be used 
to benefit the world’s worst off. Second, one might focus on respecting large-scale values and 
thereby neglect small-scale values. For instance, a dedication to global justice might take one 
away from one’s family or community in ways that seem not to respect small-scale values. 
 One solution to these possible conflicts is to try and explain one set of values as arising 
from the other. If this were possible, then one could grant deference to the more basic set of 
values in any possible conflict. This deference might go in two possible ways. First, if the rules of 
interpersonal interaction are explained in terms of the large-scale values, then we know that 
ultimately we ought to act on behalf of the large-scale values in any ostensible conflict. Scheffler 
identifies consequentialism as taking this approach by explaining small-scale values in terms of 
the large-scale value of universal happiness. Second, if the large-scale values can be addressed by 
proper adherence to small-scale values, then the conflict is likewise resolved. Scheffler similarly 
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identifies libertarianism as taking this approach and being unconcerned with any large-scale 
values, such as equality or social welfare, that are not addressed by proper respect for small-scale 
values. 
 Scheffler seeks to avoid both of these approaches and to avoid explaining one kind of 
value in terms of the others. To do so, he recommends a division of moral labor, which he 
identifies with egalitarian liberalism. Such a theory properly respects small-scale values in 
interpersonal relations and large-scale values in the design of institutions. Accordingly, we assess 
individual action predominantly by small-scale values and institutions by large-scale values. 
Whereas Nagel explained the division of labor as grounded in two aspects of the self, Scheffler 
explains the division of labor as grounded in a single capacity to recognize diverse values. It is our 
responsiveness to both small-scale and large-scale values that explains why we would distinguish 
principles for institutions from principles for individuals. This allows us to respect both kinds of 
value. 
 The reason why Scheffler’s view counts as a “division of labor” is because he recognizes a 
guiding aim that we ought to jointly accommodate our values, both large and small-scale. What 
justifies the division of labor is that it is the best way of accomplishing this guiding aim. By 
dividing labor amongst individuals and institutions, we best accommodate this guiding aim 
similarly to how we most efficiently produce pins by dividing labor according to the different 
aspects of the pin-making process. Scheffler does not suppose that there is some one measure by 
which our accommodation of values can be maximized, so this guiding aim is not like the typical 
consequentialist aim. However, it is nonetheless the effectiveness in accommodating value that 
justifies Scheffler’s division of moral labor. 
 Upon first look, it might not be immediately obvious what kind of distinction Scheffler 
means to draw in dividing “small-scale” from “large-scale” value. If we interpreted small-scale 
values as those that are particular to a local community and large scale values as those that are 
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general across communities, then his arguments would be much closer to my own. Under such an 
interpretation, the small/large distinction would be similar to the practice-dependent/practice-
independent distinction that I draw. However, this is not how Scheffler wants to divide these 
values. Instead, he identifies small-scale values as those that apply to micro-phenomena like 
interpersonal interactions. By contrast, large-scale values are those that apply to macro-
phenomena like patterns of distribution. For example, he identifies small-scale values with 
libertarian concerns over interpersonal transactions and identifies large-scale values with 
utilitarian concerns for total welfare. While Scheffler does not give an exact specification for 
which values are small or large, he seems to have something like the micro-phenomena/macro-
phenomena distinction in mind. Instead of being focuses on micro/macro-phenomena, I rely on 
a distinction between ethical considerations that are relevant within an institutional context 
contrasted with those considerations relevant for evaluating the institutions that establish that 
context. 
 What makes my distinction possible is the way in which institutions establish obligations, 
rights, and powers. What makes Scheffler’s distinction possible, is a commitment to value 
pluralism. His distinction matters because we have a plurality of irreducible fundamental values, 
some of which more directly apply to micro-phenomena and others which apply to macro-
phenomena. Now, it is important to identify the specific kind of pluralism that Scheffler here 
appeals to because there are at least three ways in which we tend to use the phrase. First, we might 
recognize “principle pluralism,” which holds that there are distinct principles that legitimately 
apply to different subjects. Both my argument and Scheffler’s support “principle pluralism.” After 
all, we both seek to explain why the evaluation of the basic structure is distinct from the 
evaluation of individual conduct. Neither of us, however, argue from principles pluralism because 
that would be begging the question. Principle pluralism is the conclusion and not a premise. 
Second, another kind of pluralism is  “pluralism of the good,” which holds that (a) different 
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people can hold different conceptions of what matters in life and (b) these different conceptions 
can be equally worthy of respect. Scheffler, myself and Rawls all accept pluralism of the good. 
However, our acceptance of this pluralism is unrelated to current arguments. This variety of 
pluralism has much more to do with an argument for liberalism than with an argument for the 
division of labor. Third, the last kind of pluralism is “meta-normative pluralism,” which holds that 
our moral and ethical justifications are ultimately grounded in a plurality of fundamental values. 
According to this view, our justification ultimately bottom out in a plurality of irreducible value. 
Now, neither myself nor Rawls argues from meta-normative pluralism, but Scheffler does. It is his 
commitment to meta-normative pluralism that grounds his moral division of labor. He supposes 
that there are a plurality of principles and the moral division of labor is justified because it best 
allows us to respect our different values without reducing them to one another. This justificatory 
strategy requires a commitment to pluralism that neither mine nor Rawls’s own strategy require.
 For this reason, Scheffler’s approach requires more substantive presuppositions than my 
own argument requires. I only need claim that our institutions establish obligations, rights, and 
powers whereas Scheffler needs meta-normative pluralism to be the best account of ethics. Even if 
this is not a significant advantage for my argument--as I think it is--it is nonetheless a clear 
contrast between our approaches. 
 To better understand this contrast, we should recognize the ways in which meta-
normative pluralism relies on a set conception of our values whereas I argue that many of our 
values are dependent on our social context. The fact that we live in a specific social world will 
tend to bring out certain values that would not be the same in another social world. How we 
ought to act will be sensitive to those context-dependent values, and not merely the set 
conception of values with which we began. I suspect that any fundamental values that Scheffler 
might appeal to would be too abstract and amorphous to adequately function in our deliberation 
and justifications. To take a Hegelian point, our abstract values always need to be made real, and 
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they are only made real to us within a particular social structure. We need a linguistic community 
to differentiate values, to identify them with concrete particulars, and to discuss their nuances 
with. We need shared practices and activities through which to mutually understand one another. 
Only within a social world does it make sense to identify some abstract and amorphous value 
without the boundaries of a particular word or practice. For that value to function as part of a 
justification, it needs to be given a content that can only exist in a social world. In different social 
worlds, the particular and real values that are the shared objects of deliberation will be different--
even if those real values are ultimately explained as valuable due to their connection with a set 
catalogue of abstract values. By contrast, Scheffler’s argument presupposes that our values are 
sufficiently specified prior to a social context such that they could themselves justify a moral 
division of labor. It seems to me that such a justification requires a much more concrete 
conception of values than would be available independent of a social context. 
 To see the present point in a specific example. It seems that Scheffler would like to include 
the values we associate with specific relationships within the range of small-scale values. In this 
regard, he might include the relationship between parent and child, between husband and wife, 
between sisters or between old friends. When we use these relationships as justifications, we 
appeal to the value of these specific relationships. We appeal to parent-child relationships or the 
nature of friendship. Yet, in many ways, these relationships are based on conventional terms. The 
fact that the family or friendship takes the form that it does is not a necessary aspect of human 
life, but exists within the particular form of life that we occupy. Accordingly, there is a clear way in 
which the contours of our social structure shape those values we think relevant for individual 
choices. It is not that there was a value of family prior to and always independent of social 
structure such that it can be used to justify the shape of our social and normative life. Instead, the 
shape of the social world makes the family values we care about particularly understandable and 
valuable. It is true that the value of such relationships is crucially important for personal choices 
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in a way that it is not important for the assessment of institutions, but we cannot say that is 
because there is some determinant value of friendship that is always important such that we 
should structure social life to make it part of personal choices. 
 So, the core problem with the division of labor argument provided by Scheffler is that it 
appeals to meta-normative pluralism with a static conception of fundamental values. He justifies 
the division of moral labor--and a normative/institutional scheme more generally--by the joint 
accommodation of a determinate and static set of values. Yet, the values that serve as justifications 
for us are much more dynamic. They change with the social structure, with culture and with the 
existing normative structure. The argument that I appeal to is much more fitted to recognize such 
dynamic values.
 We live in a particular social world, and in the particular social world there are certain 
specific things that matter to us and the people around us. Accordingly, the justification of actions 
within that social structure will need to take the specifics of our social world into consideration. If 
it does not do so, it ignores the thick and nuanced ways in which we live ethical life. This will 
differentiate the ethical assessment of actions within our social structure from the ethical 
assessment of actions outside of that structure. Within the structure, we need to pay attention to 
the particular form that our values take, but outside of that structure it would not be as 
appropriate to do so. Insofar as Scheffler’s account relies on a conception of values that are fully 
independent of our social structure, his account seems problematic. 
3.4 Moral Distinctiveness
In the introduction, I set three tasks for my account. First, it needed to explain what the basic 
structure is. Second, it needed to explain why the assessment of the basic structure is morally 
indispensable. Third, it needed to explain why the assessment of the basic structure is morally 
distinct. Accomplishing these three tasks will show why the basic structure is a centrally 
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important ethical subject without relying on any claims about the nature of justice. The first two 
chapters accomplished the first two tasks, and this chapter accomplishes the third. In summary, 
the assessment of the basic structure is morally distinct because we need to differentiate the 
assessment of actions (and institutions that are within a moral context established by systems) 
from the assessment of the practices those actions happen within. Since the particularities of the 
basic structure institutions establish much of the moral context for assessing individual action 
and the non-basic institutions, we need to differentiate the assessment of the basic structure. 
 These arguments should be widely acceptable across any moral theory that recognizes 
how practices can establish an institutional context. Most simply, we need to recognize that our 
ethical life is best understood as embedded within a complex of practices. The assessment of 
actions needs to be sensitive to the particularities of the practices they occur within, and the 
assessment of practices needs to be sensitive to the particularities of the practices that those 
systems are formed within. 
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Chapter 4
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local 
“That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of the virtue of justice, 
its intimate connection with social practices so often noted by idealists. When Bradley says 
that the individual is a bare abstraction, he can be interpreted to say, without too much 
distortion, that a persons’ obligations and duties presuppose a moral conception of institutions 
and therefore that the content of justice institutions must be defined before the requirements 
for individuals can be set out.”                  
- John Rawls, Theory of Justice, 95
The three preceding chapters have sought to show (1) what the basic structure of society is, (2) 
why it is indispensable as a moral subject, and (3) why its evaluation is distinct from the 
evaluation of other subjects. I argued that the basic structure is the set of institutions that 
establishes our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. In order to evaluate our 
actions, we often need to evaluate the practices that those actions contribute to. Likewise, in order 
to evaluate our practices, we often need to evaluate the systems that those practices contribute to. 
The institutions that belong to the basic structure constitute the system that specifies our role as 
member of society, so we will need to evaluate the basic structure as a whole in order to properly 
evaluate the institutions that belong to it. How we evaluate these institutions should be quite 
different from how we evaluate individual action because individual actions occur within the 
social context established by these institutions. Our evaluation of individual action should be 
sensitive to this social context whereas our evaluation of institutions should not be. 
 Recently, the focus on the basic structure seems to have fallen out of favor amongst 
political theorists, many of whom have been convinced by G.A. Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls. Now, 
Cohen offers a number of arguments and there is no single response that shows all of them to be 
mistaken. However, the arguments of the last three chapters both provide responses to many of 
Cohen’s arguments and present a perspective from which to respond to others. First, Cohen 
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challenges the possibility of distinguishing the basic structure from aspects of the informal 
structure such as an egalitarian ethos. In response, Chapter 1 showed the way in which to 
distinguish them. Second, Cohen seems to think that there is no reason to focus exclusively on 
the basic structure if justice--as an ideal--does not uniquely adhere to the basic structure. In 
response, Chapter 2 shows why an evaluation of the basic structure is morally indispensable 
regardless of one’s conception of justice. Third, Cohen often claims that we cannot distinguish the 
fundamental principles that evaluate the basic structure from those that evaluate individual 
action, but Chapter 3 shows a deep difference between the evaluation of institutions and the 
evaluation of individuals. 
 The value of these arguments, however, does not lie exclusively in their reply to Cohen. 
The arguments also give a broader perspective for the importance of the basic structure of society 
in moral and political philosophy. Even when we recognize a universal or absolute foundation for 
our moral claims and obligations, we should still appreciate how our contingent practices affect 
the particularities of ethical life. In order to appreciate our particular place---with its specific 
obligations, claims, powers, virtues, relationships and values--we need to appreciate the 
significance of our participation in social practices. In order to properly evaluate our choices 
within these practices, we also need to evaluate these practices. This perspective shows why it is 
important to focus on the basic structure as subject. To evaluate some of the most influential 
practices--those that establish our claims as members of society--we need to evaluate the basic 
structure that they are part of. 
 The goal of this chapter is to better motivate this broader perspective in moral theory and 
thereby further support my claim that we should focus on the basic structure. In §4.1, I want to 
better specify (a) what my core argument relies on, (b) it’s core conclusion, and (c) how it differs 
from similar arguments. Then, in §4.2, I will emphasize the range of moral theories for which my 
arguments are relevant. There are undoubtedly some moral theories, like Act Consequentialism, 
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that deny the premises upon which my arguments rely. However, my argument fits with a broader 
range of moral theories than it might at first seem. Following this, I give a broader motivation for 
the perspective that I advocate. In §4.3, I argue that treating the basic structure as moral subject 
can contribute to a reconciliation between two seemingly opposed impulses in moral and ethical 
theory. The arguments of this dissertation provide a way to respect both the universal and local 
features of moral and ethical life. In recognizing the way in which our practices specify the 
particularities of our ethical life, I respect the local features of morality. However, I also respect 
the universalizing features in requiring that these practices stand in need of justification outside 
of an institutional context. 
§4.1. What do I claim?
To summarize my core argument in a sentence, we can say “those who accept a limited form of 
moral conventionalism should recognize the primacy of the basic structure as a distinct moral 
subject.” In §4.1.1, I explain what I mean by “a limited form of moral conventionalism.” One 
accepts “conventionalism” if they recognize that moral demands or claims can be established by 
contingent practices. Conventionalism has a bad name in moral theory because people think that 
it either (a) seeks to explain all our obligations and claims as part of social practices, or (b) is 
some form of relativism. Yet, the form of conventionalism that I argue from accepts (a1) only 
some of our obligations and claims are explained as part of social practices, and (b1) that those 
practices be morally justified by appeal to practice-independent values. In this way, I argue from 
a limited form of conventionalism.
 In In §4.1.2, I argue from limited conventionalism to the “primacy of the basic structure 
as a distinct moral subject.” As I use the phrase, a moral problem has “primacy” when we must 
first address that moral problem in order to fully address other moral problems. I argue that the 
basic structure has primacy because we need to evaluate it before we can fully evaluate certain 
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individual choices and institutions. The basic structure is a “distinct” subject because we cannot 
evaluate the basic structure with the same principles used to evaluate all others subjects.
 Finally, in §4.1.3, I will show how the argument from limited conventionalism to the 
primacy of the basic structure differs from similar arguments for the Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure. First, I return to a claim made in the introduction that my argument does not rely on 
any conception of justice. Second, I explain how my argument differs from the “moral division of 
labor” argument offered by Scheffler and Nagel. Third, I differentiate my view from one which 
identifies the basic structure as instrumentally necessary for social cooperation. While I do not 
make any claim that these arguments are wrong, I think they require more contentious 
commitments than my own arguments. 
4.1.1. What does the arguments rely on?
My arguments rely on a commitment to, what I call, “limited conventionalism.” Here, I 
characterize conventionalism as the view that social practices can determine the particularities of 
moral and ethical life. While there is a tradition that exclusively uses the phrase “convention” to 
refer to strict coordination games, I use it in the broader sense to refer to any practice structured 
by rules. So understood, there can be a wide range of conventionalist theories. Some are fully 
relativist in that there is no part of ethical or moral life beyond our contingent way of life. My 
argument relies on a very different form of conventionalism. In this section, I want to better 
explain what this limited form of conventionalism requires
 First, I do not claim all obligations, rights, and powers are practice-dependent. For 
example, the argument is consistent with practice-independent obligations to tell the truth1 or to 
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1 Of course, we could recognize assertion as a social practice and then asserting what you take to be true or what 
you take to be false would be practice-dependent in some sense. Yet, even if assertion is practice-dependent, this 
does not mean that every form of indicating beliefs is practice-dependent, so lying (or indicating that you have 
beliefs that you do not have) could perhaps exist without assertion or other social practices.
help others.2  Whether any particular aspect of ethical life is practice-dependent will always be 
open to debate. For example, the demands of promise-keeping and the family may or may not be 
practice-dependent. The demands involved in line-waiting seem to be conventional but there is 
always the possibility of an argument that they are not. 
 My argument need not show exactly which features of moral and ethical life are or are not 
practice-dependent. However, I do suppose that a property system, legal system, political 
constitution and economic structure are examples of practices that establish obligations, rights, 
and powers. Whether our practices create these demands and claims ab nihilo or whether they 
specify our vague pre-existing rights does not need to be settled by my current claim. I do not 
need to claim that all obligations, rights and powers are established by social practices in order to 
claim that these institutions establish new obligations, rights, and powers. 
 Second, I do not claim that “if a practice gives rise to new claims, then it is part of the 
basic structure.” I recognize the possibility of practices, like line-waiting, that are morally 
significant and are not assessed as part of the basic structure. Whether line-waiting is a good 
practice does not depend on how it contributes to the system of claims we have as members of 
society in the way that the major social institutions do. 
 Third, I have not claimed that there is one and only one moral theory that can ground 
practice-dependent claims. I have not exclusively appealed to the principle of fair-play, a consent 
theory, or a conception of our roles3  in order to ground practice-dependent claims. Instead, my 
arguments are consistent with any of these ways to ground practice-dependent claims and many 
others. So long as a theory can explain why practices change our moral demands, that is sufficient 
for the view I hold. 
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local 
- 133 -
2 For more on this perspective, see Herman, Barbara. "The Scope of Moral Requirement." Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 30.3 (2001): 227-256.
3 For an example of the last type, see Michael Hardimon’s "Role Obligations." The Journal of Philosophy (1994): 
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 All together, a moral theory is “conventionalist” insofar as it recognizes that social 
practices can give rise to new moral demands, and it is “limited” insofar as it recognizes that there 
are features of moral and ethical life that are not explained by social practices. My argument relies 
only on limited conventionalism as a feature of complete moral theories and it does not itself 
require a particular moral theory. Kantians, Intuitionists, Hegelians and even some varieties of 
consequentialism might accept limited conventionalism, and my argument will apply to those 
theories. 
4.1.2 What is the core conclusion?
From a commitment to limited conventionalism, I argue that the basic structure has primacy as a 
distinct ethical subject. The “primacy” of the basic structure refers to the way in which we must 
evaluate the basic structure in order to evaluate the actions and practices that are part of the basic 
structure. In this section, I will better explain how the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3 support the 
primacy of the basic structure as a moral subject. 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that in order to fully evaluate individual action, we often need to 
evaluate the practices of which that action is a part. If this is the case, then the evaluation of the 
practice has primacy over the evaluation of the individual action that is part of the practice. In 
this sense, primacy identifies an “order of evaluation;” in order to fully evaluate individual action, 
we first need to evaluate practices. Likewise, in order to fully evaluate certain practices, we first 
need to evaluate the systems of which they are a part. The major social institutions are part of the 
system that is the basic structure, so the basic structure has primacy in the order of evaluation. 
First, we evaluate the basic structure, which allows us to fully evaluate the major social practices, 
which in turn allows us to fully evaluate the actions that are part of these institutions. The basic 
structure has this kind of primacy, and it is because it has this primacy that it is an indispensable 
subject. 
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 Importantly, this order of evaluation is only needed for a “full evaluation” of individual 
action. We can surely assess action in some way without assessing the practice of which it is a 
part, but any such evaluation would be incomplete. For a full evaluation of the individual action 
we need to see how it contributes to the social practices it is part of. Since these practices will have 
moral effects that are not reducible to the moral effects of individual action, we need be 
concerned with how individual actions contribute to these practices. Likewise, an evaluation of 
practices will be incomplete if we do not consider how that practice fits with others in a system. In 
order to properly evaluate actions and practices, we need see them as contributing to broader 
practices and systems. 
 To see the significance of the primacy of the basic structure, I want to return to an issue 
discussed in Chapter 3. G.A. Cohen has recently argued that those who hold equality to be an 
important aspect of social justice should be concerned with how individual actions (and not only 
institutions) impact equality . Many egalitarians have jobs that provide them with incomes that 
far exceed a society’s median income. In accepting these wages, we seem to be contributing to 
inequality in some way. If persons were willing to forgo these inegalitarian incentives, wouldn’t we 
have a more equal world? Doesn’t our concern for equality give us reason to reject higher wages 
when our receiving those wages does not promote equality?
 According to my argument, we cannot merely look at the individual choice to accept 
inegalitarian incentives and then evaluate it outside of its social context. Our decision to accept 
higher wages is situated within a set of institutions, the most prevalent of which is a labor market. 
In theory, A labor market promotes efficiencies by (generally) distributing labor to the places 
where it can produce the greatest monetary value. If persons generally refused inegalitarian 
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wages, it is not clear that a labor market could do this as well.4  This raises questions about the role 
of a labor market in society. Is it a justified institution? Do its advantages in efficiency justify its 
inegalitarian effects? Is the individuality that it encourages an advantage or disadvantage? When 
our action, as part of a well-functioning labor market, is ultimately justified depends--in part--on 
our moral assessment of the labor market. Moreover, we cannot adequately assess the labor 
market in isolation. Instead, we need to see how it works alongside our educational system, 
unemployment system, tax system, and much else. A labor market in one society might be 
morally heinous whereas it’s bad effects might be offset by other institutions in another society. 
Accordingly, our moral assessment of the labor market depends on our evaluation of the basic 
structure of which it is part. It is in this sense that the basic structure has evaluative primacy. In 
order to fully evaluate our actions in the labor market, we need to first evaluate the labor market 
of which it is a part. In order to fully evaluate that labor market, we need to first evaluate the basic 
structure of which it is part. 
 With this example, we can also return to the distinctiveness of the basic structure as 
subject. Our evaluation of individual action should be sensitive to the social context determined 
by institutions like the labor market. Whether a person acts rightly depends on the obligations, 
rights, and powers established by institutions. Our evaluation of certain practices should be 
sensitive to the social context in which those institutions are situated. Our evaluation of the labor 
market, for example, needs to be sensitive to other features of the basic structure. By contrast, our 
evaluation of the basic structure should not be sensitive to such social context. Since it influences 
so much of our social context, it needs to be justified separately from this context. In this sense, it 
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should be distinct from our assessment of individual actions and practices that are part of 
systems. 
 This argument only puts a minimal bar on the ways in which the basic structure is distinct 
as a moral subject. Given the normative structure of social practices, we should distinguish the 
assessment of the basic structure from the assessment of particulars that are part of practices or 
systems. There will be other reasons to distinguish the basic structure even further as a moral 
subject. These further reasons, however, will be specific to particular moral theories. Depending 
on what one thinks is important, the basic structure might be importantly distinct in other ways. 
If, for example, one thinks that coercion is a distinct moral problem, we should recognize that 
that use of coercion is part of (not a defining characteristic of) the basic structure. Our coercive 
institutions would be justified as part of the basic structure, and the basic structure would be 
distinct for that reason as well.5  If one is concerned with, say, society progressing according free 
and fair agreements between persons, then one will be concerned with background fairness.6  
Insofar as the basic structure uniquely effects background fairness, the basic structure will be a 
distinct moral subject for that reason as well. If one has a particular conception of justice that 
identifies the basic structure as a particularly important site of distributive justice, then that is 
another reason for the basic structure to be distinct. My argument does not exclude these 
additional reasons to distinguish the basic structure. They are merely more specific to particular 
moral theories than my argument is. 
 If one is committed to limited conventionalism, then one should accept the primacy of the 
basic structure as a distinct moral subject. In order to fully evaluate individual actions and major 
social institutions, we need to first evaluate the basic structure of society. This makes the basic 
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structure a crucially important moral subject for addressing a broader range of moral problems. 
Moreover, how we should evaluate this subject is distinct from how we should address these other 
moral problems in at least one respect; the basic structure should not be assessed as within a 
particular social context. 
4.1.3 How Does this Argument Relate to Similar Arguments
There have been a range of recent arguments made on behalf of the Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure, but the above approach is unique in relying on claims about the normative structure of 
social practices. I do not need to show that these other arguments are wrong to show why mine is 
correct, but I nonetheless want to draw a contrast with three recent alternatives. For each, I want 
to highlight the additional assumptions that the alternative approach needs to succeed. 
 The most typical argument for the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure relies on claims 
about the nature of justice. These arguments develop a conception of justice that is explicitly 
institutional. Arguments claim, for example, that justice is an institutional virtue or that publicity 
is a condition on justice.7  Implicit in these views, as I understand them, is an understanding that 
(a) the basic structure is morally indispensable because justice is morally indispensable and (b) 
the basic structure is morally distinct because justice is morally distinct. Accordingly, the basic 
structure has primacy as a distinct moral subject because justice has primacy as a distinct moral 
concern. 
 I offer this as the most “typical” argument because it is the one that I think is most often 
ascribed to Rawls as the basis of arguments.8  It is also the interpretation of Rawls that I take 
Cohen to be primarily concerned with. Accordingly, it seems to form a sort of “starting point” for 
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both criticisms and defenses of the focus on the basic structure. Defenders might try to show why 
an institutional conception of justice is appropriate while critics show it to be inappropriate. 
 My argument does not rely on any conception of justice. In this way, it tries to go beyond 
the more typical argument. It is possible that someone will object to my view from a particular 
conception of justice, but I leave that issue until Chapter 6. My argument transcends a particular 
conception of justice because it shows the importance of the basic structure as a moral subject 
regardless of what one’s conception of justice is. Whether justice is a concern relevant for or the 
regulative ideal for the basic structure does not change the fact that the basic structure has 
primacy as a moral subject. The importance of the basic structure does not depend on whether 
justice is specifically an institutional virtue. 
 I have avoided making an argument from a conception of justice because I doubt that 
those with substantively different moral views will agree on a such a conception. What 
determines whether one thinks that a particular conception of justice is the correct conception 
will depend on how that conception fits with their broader views on moral methodology, on the 
nature of justification, and on their substantive convictions. It is undoubtedly an important part 
of moral and political theory that we argue about what justice requires. At the least, it facilitates 
discussion between persons with wholly different approaches. However, I doubt that I will be able 
to convince the reader about the primacy of the basic structure on the basis of a conception of 
justice. Instead, I think it is better to show how the primacy of the basic structure fits with more 
widely acceptable views. I think I am more likely to get agreement on limited conventionalism 
than I am about a particular conception of justice. 
 A second approach that has been used to defend the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure 
is an argument from a “moral division of labor.” Both Thomas Nagel and Samuel Scheffler have 
developed versions of such an argument, each relying on remarks that Rawls makes in “The Basic 
Structure as Subject.” According to both versions of this argument, not all of our values are best 
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local 
- 139 -
applied to all moral problems. Rather, some values are best understood as applying to institutions 
whereas other values apply to individuals. 
 For Nagel, the difference is between personal values, which are recognized from our first-
personal perspective, and impersonal values, which are recognized from a third-personal 
perspective. We best reconcile these two moral perspective when we assess institutions in terms of 
impersonal values and assess individual choice in terms of personal value. For Scheffler, the 
difference is between small-scale and large-scale values. He sees the failure of utilitarianism as 
trying to explain small-scale values in terms of large-scale values, and he sees the failure of 
libertarianism as trying to explain large-scale values in terms of small scale values. By contrast, he 
recommends the liberal-egalitarian perspective that can respect both kinds of value without 
reducing on to the other. 
 The moral division of labor argument works particularly well to explain why the 
principles that apply to the basic structure of society would be distinct from those that apply to 
individual action. That is why I drew an extensive contrast with these views in Chapter 3. The 
division of labor argument claims that principles should be distinct because the values that apply 
to these subjects are fundamentally distinct. On its own, however, the argument is incomplete in 
two ways. First, it does not identify what the basic structure is in a way that distinguishes it from 
other institutions. After all, even if we recognize a distinction between institutional and 
individual principles, why should we distinguish institutional principles that apply to the basic 
structure from principles that apply to other institutions (including global institutions)? Second. 
the moral division of labor argument does not show why the basic structure is indispensable as a 
moral subject. It shows why the principles that apply to it would be distinct from principles for 
individual action, but it does not show why we need principles for the basic structure as a moral 
subject.
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 However, one interpretation of the moral division of labor argument does address this 
second gap. If we understand the moral division of labor argument as showing us (a) that justice is 
an institutional value, and (b) that the basic structure is uniquely related to justice, then this 
argument would show that the basic structure is indispensable as a moral subject. The moral 
division of labor argument would then be a type of the “conception of justice” argument. It would 
be an argument for why justice is specifically an institutional value. Insofar as one wants to 
interpret the moral division of labor argument as an argument for the primacy of the basic 
structure as moral subject, this is the way in which I think it should be interpreted. It gives us 
clear reasons to think of justice as uniquely tied to the assessment of institutions, and it is because 
the basic structure is uniquely tied to justice that we should focus on the basic structure. 
 Yet, I do not advocate the “moral division of labor argument for a conception of justice” 
approach. Such an argument might add additional support to my argument through an 
accompanying conception of justice, but I do not need such an argument. Specifically, I do not 
need to claim anything about a fundamental distinction in our values. Instead, I merely claim that 
social context is important for the evaluation of actions and practices. I claim that a proper 
evaluation of individual action will oftentimes require seeing that action as part of a social 
practice and evaluation of such practices will oftentimes require seeing those practices as parts of 
a system. It might also be the case that the proper evaluation of individual action is sensitive to 
individual values and the proper evaluation of institutions should be sensitive to institutional 
values. That seems completely feasible to me, but it goes beyond the requirements of my 
argument. Instead, I only need to claim that our practices/systems make certain considerations 
relevant for evaluating actions or practices that would not be relevant outside of that practice/
system.
 A third approach for defending the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is the idea that 
the basic structure is understood as the set of institutions that are instrumentally necessary for 
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social cooperation. The importance of social cooperation as an end then explains the importance 
of the basic structure as necessary for bringing that end about. As an example of this argument, 
one might read Samuel Freeman as offering an interpretation of Rawls that appeals to this 
“instrumental-necessity” reading. Freeman writes that, 
“it’s not the coercive enforcement of social rules themselves that distinguishes 
basic institutions from other institutions. After all, if everyone freely accepted the 
application of the rules all the time, coercion might never be needed. Rather it’s 
the reason for coercion, namely that basic institutions are essential to social life. 
The distinctive feature of the basic social institutions that constitute the basic 
structure is that they are, in some form or another, necessary for productive social 
cooperation, and hence for the continued existence of any society, particularly any 
relatively modern one.”9
In this passage, Freeman distinguishes a concern with the basic structure from a concern with 
coercion, and he does so on the basis of the relationship between productive cooperation and the 
basic structure. Aresh Abizadeh explicitly reads Freeman as offering this “instrumental necessity” 
interpretation in “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion.” There, Abizadeh argues that 
such a justification cannot justifiably limit a concern with distributive justice to a domestic basic 
structure.10
 However, I do not think that this “instrumental necessity” interpretation is the only way to 
understand the relationship between the basic structure and social cooperation. The phrase 
“necessary” in Freeman’s remarks might be read in two different ways. First, it might be that the 
basic structure is instrumentally necessary for social cooperation; it is because the basic structure 
creates certain conditions that people can engage in social cooperation. Second, it might be that 
the basic structure is conceptually necessary for social cooperation; we understand “social 
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cooperation” as the kind of cooperation that persons who live in a society engage in with one 
another. In this way, whether Freeman understands the basic structure as instrumentally 
necessary for social cooperation depends on how we understand “necessary.”
 In §1.6, I argued for the view that the basic structure is conceptually necessary for social 
cooperation. Social cooperation consists in the cooperation between members of a society in 
following the rules of the major social institutions. It is because we understand “social 
cooperation” as this specific kind of cooperation that we recognize a basic structure as 
conceptually necessary for social cooperation. One cannot have social cooperation without a 
basic structure to cooperate in following the rules of. 
 The challenge in thinking that the basic structure is instrumentally necessary is that one 
must articulate a conception of social cooperation that requires there to be a basic structure. How 
should we think of social cooperation? If social cooperation is coordination on fair terms, then 
we do not need the basic structure to cooperate on fair terms. If social cooperation is 
coordination between strangers, then social norms alone may be sufficient for that. Moreover, 
does this view identify the basic structure as only those institutions that are necessary for social 
cooperation? After all, there could be seemingly justified institutions--such as universal health 
care--that are not necessary for social cooperation but might nonetheless be part of the basic 
structure. 
 Importantly, I recognize that these challenges to the instrumentally-necessary approach 
could be overcome, but they do highlight a contrast with the conceptually-necessary approach 
that I advocate. I have tried to present a view that sees social cooperation as the kind of 
cooperation that results in society. This cooperation creates obligations, rights, and powers for 
persons as members of society. The complex social world in which we live takes these obligation, 
rights and powers as setting the background for free interaction. Our following these rules allows 
us to live and plan more stable lives. We define the basic structure as the institutions that persons 
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follow the rules of as members of society. In this way, the basic structure is conceptually necessary 
for social cooperation. 
 Altogether, I claim that it is limited conventionalism that explains the primacy of the basic 
structure as an ethical subject. It is not a particular conception of justice, a division of moral 
labor, or the independent importance of social cooperation. It is because the major social 
institutions establish new obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society. In 
order to fully evaluate these institutions and the actions that occur within them, we need to first 
evaluate the basic structure of society. 
§4.2. The Scope of the Argument across Moral Theory
My argument relies on limited conventionalism, which not all moral theorists will accept. 
However, a much broader range of moral theorists can (and should) accept limited 
conventionalism than one might think. In §4.2.1, I explain the conditions under which a 
foundationalist moral theory is consistent with my arguments. In §4.2.2, I focus on the deeper 
significance that my arguments have for constructivist moral theories. All this will set the stage 
for the broader arguments offered in §4.3, which seeks to better motivate the approach that this 
section claims is widely accessible across moral theories. 
§4.2.1 First principles and limited conventionalism
As I understand “foundationalism,” it is the view that all justifications must ultimately appeal to 
some first principle or set of first principles. With such a view, the primary task of moral theory is 
to identify the first principles and then determine how they relate to particulars. There is not 
anything about foundationalism, per se, that necessarily supports or undermines the argument I 
offer. Whether foundationalism is consistent with limited conventionalism will depend on the 
specific foundational principles that one advocates. Certain foundational principles will allow 
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institutions to establish obligations, rights and powers. Other foundational principles will not. In 
this section, I want to better explain the difference. 
 To begin, let me give two toy examples of foundationalist theories that are consistent with 
limited conventionalism. First, imagine a moral theory that identifies self-realization as the end of 
all ethics, however, the self that is realized is a socially-determined self in a specific social world. 
This moral theory resembles the view that Bradley sketches in the “My Station and Its Duties” 
chapter of Ethical Studies. Here, there is a single foundational moral principle: realize your self. 
Yet, the institutional context created by our institutions is centrally important in specifying the 
self that needs to be realized. At least part of ourselves is determined by our role in social life, so 
the specifics of our role are significant for morality and ethics. Second, imagine a theory that 
consists of a number of foundational principles, one of which is the Principle of Fair Play. This 
principle requires individuals to follow the rules of those social practices that are (a) fair to each 
participant, and (b) advance their interests. According to this moral theory, what particular 
obligations we have will be partly determined by which social practices exist in our society. In this 
way, the particular institutions that exist will affect what obligations we have. In either of these 
two examples, we have moral theories that ultimately justify any judgment on the basis of 
foundational principles and are consistent with limited conventionalism. 
 What allows these theories to support limited conventionalism is that some particular 
judgments are justified indirectly (rather than directly) by the foundational principles. For 
example, if my particular social role includes being a participant in a democracy, then either 
example theory could (potentially) explain why I have an obligation to vote. According to the 
first, we could explain my role as citizen as part of my identity. Realizing my self would then 
require that I fulfill the part of my identity that is consistent with being a citizen, and I should 
then take up the duties of citizenship. If I were to live in a different form of government, however, 
I would not have these same duties. According to the second view, we can understand a 
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democratic form of government as a particular social practice that advantages the citizenry. In 
order to support this practice, I owe a contribution that is specified by the rules of the practice. If 
the political system requires citizens to vote, then I should vote in order to support the system. 
Again, if there were a different political system, I would not have these same obligations. In both 
cases, I have obligations that are particular to my social context, and these obligations are 
grounded indirectly by fundamental principles of self-realization and Fair Play that are applied to 
my particular political structure. 
 By contrast, there are also versions of foundationalism that are inconsistent with limited 
conventionalism. For example, Act-Consequentialism (AC) does not explain how social practices 
could establish obligations, rights, or powers. For the sake of argument, let us define AC as the 
view that an action is right if that action promotes the best consequences. Undoubtedly, AC can 
recognize that a practice can change which actions are those that promote the best consequences. 
In this way, the fact that an action takes place within an institutional context can change our 
evaluation of that action. However, our evaluation is not changed because the action is part of a 
practice but because the prevalence of a practice has changed the causal path by which we can 
promote the best consequences. 
 To see this point more clearly, recall that AC does not really recognize an obligation to 
follow the rules of property. It can say that we should often follow the rules of property, but it is 
not because we have an obligation to follow the rules. Rather, we should only do that which a 
property system requires when we promote the best consequences by doing so. When we do not 
promote the best consequences, we do not have moral reason to follow the rules of property. 
According to AC, it might be good that persons think they have such an obligation, and it might 
also be good that persons have a disposition to follow the rules. AC can even claim that it is good 
that property rules are coercively enforced and good when coercion is used against someone who 
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acts rightly in breaking the rules of property. All these claims are consistent with AC, but it is not 
consistent with AC to claim that we have an obligation to follow the rules of property. 
 AC would reject limited conventionalism because, according to AC, practices do not 
change our obligations, rights, and powers. Practices can change the causal paths by which to 
satisfy our single obligation, but it does not change our obligations. According to AC, thinking 
that our obligations change is a fundamental mistake. Perhaps we take our laudable dispositions 
too seriously or have bought into a noble lie. The feature of AC that explains why it is inconsistent 
with limited conventionalism is its view that whether any particular action is right is determined 
by directly appealing to the foundational principle. 
 Act-Consequentialism is not the only version of foundationalism that is inconsistent with 
limited conventionalism. We can imagine any number of foundational principles that do not 
make a social context morally relevant. If all particular judgements are justified by direct appeal 
to foundational principles, then social context will be irrelevant in the way that it is irrelevant for 
Act-Consequentialism. Suppose I recognize four foundational principles; (1) promote autonomy, 
(2) promote well-being, (3) promote equality, and (4) promote knowledge. Suppose that any 
particular judgement is justified by directly applying these four principles. Whether a person is 
good or bad will depend on whether they promote autonomy, well-being, equality, and 
knowledge. Whether an action, institution, practice, or disposition is appropriate will likewise 
depend on promoting these four values. This form of pluralist foundationalism will also be 
inconsistent with limited conventionalism unless promoting one of these values explains how 
social practices establish obligations, rights, and powers.
 If a version of foundationalism conflicts with limited conventionalism, then whether we 
should accept foundationalism or my argument will be determined by much more holistic 
considerations. I doubt that any single argument can show such a version of foundationalism to 
be wrong, and I do not attempt to give one here. After all, a fully committed foundationalist could 
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even give up their commitment to the truths of logic if they needed to. Instead, the best argument 
for or against any moral theory will be holistic. How does the theory really fare as a whole? My 
arguments only show a moral theory to be wrong insofar as the approach seems to better provide 
what we want from a moral and political theory. 
 Yet, even if some forms of foundationalism can accept the primacy of the basic structure, 
this might seem like a trifling conclusion for the foundationalist. What matters for the 
foundationalist is ultimately first principles, which are then applied to all moral problems--
including the evaluation of the basic structure. For any moral problem, we look to see how the 
fundamental principles bear on that problem. What, then, is the significance of saying that we 
should “focus” on the basic structure? 
 For versions of foundationalism that accepted limited conventionalism, the focus on the 
basic structure is quite significant. It identifies a particular moral problem to which only 
foundational principles are applied. The evaluations of practices and actions within the basic 
structure will need to be sensitive to those non-foundationalist considerations that are 
determined by an institutional context. By contrast, there are no non-foundationalist 
considerations that are relevant for evaluating the basic structure. This makes the distinctiveness 
of the basic structure as moral subject significant even for the foundationalist. It is a subject to 
which foundational principles are not applied indirectly, but only directly. 
 Of course, the distinction between the basic structure and other moral problems might be 
significant for other reasons beyond this. Versions of foundationalism might recognize some 
foundational values as relevant for evaluating the basic structure that are not relevant for 
evaluating individual practices or actions. As I understand it, the Division of Moral Labor 
argument advocates for such a version of foundationalism. The argument understands 
justifications as appealing to foundational values, but it also supposes that some foundational 
values are appropriate for evaluating institutions whereas others are appropriate for evaluating 
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individual conduct. According to this form of argument, the distinctiveness of the basic structure 
will be significant for two reasons. First, only certain foundational values apply to the basic 
structure. Second, the foundational values that apply to the basic structure apply to it directly 
rather than indirectly. 
 I suspect that both Nagel and Scheffler would want their views to be consistent with 
limited conventionalism, but they do not argue from such a commitment. The argument of this 
dissertation differs from theirs in arguing from limited conventionalism rather than a particular 
form of foundationalism. I do not need to claim that a particular form of foundationalism is the 
true moral theory but only that the true moral theory, whatever it is, needs to accept limited 
conventionalism. I think this is especially important for understanding Rawls’s own argument for 
focusing on the basic structure because he is not a foundationalist. Instead, he is a constructivist. 
In the next section, I want to emphasize the deeper significance of my argument for constructivist 
theories. 
§4.2.2 Constructivism and limited conventionalism
Foundationalism may be the most intuitive form of moral theory, but it is not the only form. 
Rawlsian Constructivism is one example of a non-foundationalist moral theory, and the 
conclusions of my argument are much more significant for such non-foundationalist theories. To 
draw this out, I want to first highlight a feature of Rawlsian constructivism; the procedure that 
warrants principles is “problem-dependent.” By this, I mean that constructed principles are always 
constructed to address a particular moral problem (rather than providing general first principles). 
Insofar as constructivism’s procedures are problem-dependent, the primacy of the basic structure 
will be even more significant. 
 To see this point, we should notice that some versions of constructivism will be 
foundationalist. By this, I mean that the relevant procedure (or perspective) will be constructed to 
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warrant a foundational principle or set of principles.11  For example, there are attempts to justify 
act-utilitarianism12  and rule-utilitarianism13  by appeal to constructivist reasoning. Likewise, a 
constructivist reading of Kant would identify him as using a constructed procedure to warrant the 
categorical imperative, which some might read as being a fundamental principle. In these cases, 
constructivism is used to warrant foundationalism. Whether they are consistent or inconsistent 
with limited conventionalism will then depend on the specific foundational principles as I 
discussed above. In this section, I am concerned with forms of constructivism that are not 
foundationalist. 
 Rawls’s considered view is the most prominent example of non-foundationalist 
constructivism. Persons in the original position do not agree to a set of principles that settles all 
moral questions. Rather the original position is designed to settle a particular moral problem; 
“what are the fair-terms of social cooperation?” The arguments of Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism are directed towards this particular problem, and Rawls says relatively little about how 
the constructivist approach would be applied to different problems. However, Rawls does develop 
a different constructive procedure in Law of Peoples, and that procedure is specified for a very 
different problem than determining the fair terms of social cooperation. Likewise, Rawls also 
suggests that different procedures would be necessary to settle questions about justice in 
associations.14  
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practical perspective rather than a constructed procedure. Street, Sharon. "What is Constructivism in Ethics and 
Metaethics?." Philosophy Compass 5.5 (2010): 363-384.
12 See Gibbard, Allan. Reconciling our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. (Oxford University Press, 2008).
13 See Hooker, Brad. Ideal Code, Real world: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. (Oxford University Press, 
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14 i.e. “To illustrate: for churches and universities different principles are plainly more suitable. Their members 
usually affirm certain shared aims and purposes as essential guidelines to the most appropriate form of 
organization. The most we can say is this: because churches and universities are associations within the basic 
structure, they must adjust to the requirements that this structure imposes in order to establish background 
justice.” (Rawls,  Political Liberalism, 261)
 The few remarks we get about Rawlsian constructivism suggest that any legitimate 
procedure will need to generate principles that (a) respect persons as free and equal and (b) 
satisfy a practical need. In a slogan, Rawls suggests that, according to his view, “free and equal 
moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful guidelines for moral reflection in view of 
their need for such organizing principles and the role in social life that these principles and their 
corresponding subjects are presumed to have.”15  In this articulation, principles are always 
constructed with the “need for such principles” and their “social role” in mind. This is what I 
meant to refer to in saying that the procedure that warrants principles is “problem-dependent.” 
The specifics of the procedure are determined by the particular problem that principle is 
developed to address. The construction that warrants the two principles of justice, for instance, 
was constructed specifically for the problem of identifying the fair terms of social cooperation.
 When a form of constructivism is problem-dependent in the way that Rawlsian 
Constructivism is, the primacy of the basic structure as a distinct subject has a greater 
significance for two reasons. The rest of this section will be spent explaining the two ways in 
which my conclusions are especially significant for such views.
 First, the nature of the basic structure as subject influences the content of the principles 
that apply to it. When a form of constructivism is problem-dependent, the principles that evaluate 
the basic structure are developed specifically to apply to the basic structure. Accordingly, the 
particularities of the basic structure are crucially important for the development of the principles. 
We do not merely apply first principles to the identified subject. Instead, the nature of the subject 
determines the principles.
 This feature of Rawlsian constructivism is well-represented in the phrase, “the correct 
regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing.” Rather than merely 
applying a fundamental principle to a particular subject, Rawls means to develop principles in 
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ways that make them suited to that subject. This phrase appears in Theory of Justice when Rawls 
offers a quick rejoinder against the utilitarian conception of justice; 
“whereas the utilitarian extends to society the principle of choice for one man, 
justice as fairness, being a contract view, assumes the principles of social choice, 
and so the principles of justice, are themselves the object of an original agreement. 
There is no reason to suppose that the principles which should regulate an 
association of men is simply an extension of the principle of choice for one man. 
On the contrary: if we assume that the correct regulative principle for anything 
depends on the nature of that thing, and that the plurality of distinct persons with 
separate ends is an essential feature of human society, we should not expect the 
principle of social choice to be utilitarian”
In Theory, this is only a brief and relatively unexplored contrast between justice as fairness and 
utilitarianism, but I think that it is an important one. It argues that, given a certain 
methodological perspective, we can see a central problem for the utilitarian. Utilitarianism is 
modeled on the rationality of a single individual in maximizing their own utility, which is 
extended to model the rationality of a social choice to maximize total utility. Yet, the choice over 
how society is structured is distinct from how a single individual ought lead their life, so it seems 
odd to suppose that one can be addressed by merely extending the other. A utilitarian conception 
of justice seems to violate the methodological perspective that any regulative principle should 
depend on the nature of that which it regulates. For Rawls, our recognition of the basic structure 
as a distinct moral subject is significant because our conception of the subject influences the 
principles that appeal to that subject. In moral theory, our principles should fit with our 
understanding of a moral problem. We should not try to make our understanding of the problem 
fit our principles.
 The second reason why the primacy of the basic structure has a greater significance for 
problem-dependent forms of constructivism is due to a way in which such theories can explain 
moral unity. One might think that a problem-dependent form of constructivism is condemned to 
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local 
- 152 -
disunity amongst its principles. If we accept foundationalism in some form, then it is easy to see 
how our various judgements form a unity; they all express our commitment to foundational 
principles. Yet, there is no such unity for a problem-dependent form of constructivism; each 
principle is developed for the specific problem it addresses. This might seem to result in a 
hodgepodge of principles, each principle merely meeting the conditions for its own use and 
failing to express any deeper moral vision.
 In “The Basic Structure as Subject,” Rawls recognizes this problem in a section titled 
“Unity by Appropriate Sequence” and offers a solution. He writes, 
At first sight the contract doctrine may appear hopelessly unsystematic: for how 
are the principles that apply to different subjects to be tied together? But there are 
other forms of theoretical unity than that defined by completely general first 
principles. It may be possible to find an appropriate sequence of kinds of subjects 
and to suppose that the parties to a social contract are to proceed through this 
sequence with the understanding that the principles of each later agreement are to 
be subordinate to those of all earlier agreements, or else adjusted to them by 
certain priority rules. The underlying unity is provided by the idea that free and 
equal moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful guidelines for moral 
reflection in view of their need for such organizing principles and the role in social 
life that these principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have.16
In this passage, Rawls supposes that contractualist theory can still be unified through an 
“appropriate sequence.” This is a methodological sequence as principles are agreed to by appeal to 
principles that have been previously developed. For each principle in the sequence, the principles 
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are those that free and equal moral persons would agree to. If such a process were completed, a 
problem-dependent form of constructivism would express a kind of unity.17  
 Rawls does not say much more about how this sequence would proceed beyond this 
passing remark. However, there are two features of Rawls’s theory that seem to fit well with this 
perspective towards unity. First, he orients questions about global justice and justice between 
generations as being addressed after developing an account of domestic justice. In “Law of 
Peoples,” he writes 
Typically, a constructivist doctrine proceeds by taking up a series of subjects, 
starting, say, with principles of political justice for the basic structure of a closed 
and self-contained democratic society. That done, it works forward to principles 
for the claims of future generations, outward to principles for the law of peoples, 
and inward to principles for special social questions. Each time the constructivist 
procedure is modified to fit the subject in question. In due course all the main 
principles are on hand, including those needed for the various political duties 
and obligations of individuals and associations.”18
In this passage, Rawls appeals to his methodology of approaching a range of subjects in an 
appropriate sequences; first, principles of justice for a closed society, then global justice and 
justice between generations, and eventually explicating personal obligations as members of 
political organizations or associations. Likewise, in Theory of Justice, Rawls appeals to a four-
stage sequence in addressing questions of justice for a closed society. A conception of justice 
does not itself determine the answers to all the relevant political questions. We not only need first 
principles of justice, but must also appeal to those principle that (a) evaluate constitutional 
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18 Rawls, Collected Papers, 532.
arrangements, (b) evaluate legislation and policies, and (c) evaluate particular instances. For each 
question, Rawls constructs an appropriate perspective from which to reason about the relevant 
issue, but each perspective is constrained by acknowledgment of the principles decided in earlier 
stages. For instance, he writes, “In framing a just constitution, I assume that the two principles of 
justice already chosen define an independent standard of the desired outcome. If there is no 
standard, the problem of constitutional design is not well-posed.”19  Likewise, one cannot judge 
the justice of law without knowledge of the constitutional procedures within which they are 
developed and one cannot judge particular acts without knowledge of the laws from which they 
follow. As such, the four-stage sequence models the way in which principles are developed for 
specified contexts in a way that relies upon prior principles, but does not suppose that the prior 
principles can be easily applied to new contexts. Instead of an appeal to an overarching general 
principle that addresses each of these diverse concerns directly, Rawls appeals to developing these 
principles in an appropriate sequence, each relying on the preceding development of principles.
 Yet, what is it that makes an appropriate sequence appropriate? With the four-stage 
sequence, it makes sense why this sequence would be as it is. At each level, the relevant 
contractors have more and more information about the society in which they live, so there is a 
natural order to the progression. Yet, what would make any particular sequence more appropriate 
than another beyond this? What makes certain subjects the ones that should be addressed before 
others? We cannot appeal to moral principles to settle this issue because the order of the sequence 
will likely influence our moral principles. We cannot appeal to moral facts because the 
constructivist denies such moral facts. How should the appropriate sequence proceed? The 
answer to this question is far from apparent in Rawls’s own writings. What would be an 
appropriate argument to show that one starting place is more appropriate than another?
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 I take the argument of this dissertation to show why we would think that the basic 
structure has primacy in such an appropriate sequence. I do not think it shows that the basic 
structure is the first subject in such a sequence, but it does show why it should precede other 
subjects. Perhaps it only shows why the basic structure is the primary subject of justice.20  To 
appropriately evaluate particulars, we often need to evaluate them within a particular social 
context. This requires that we have some prior way to evaluate the social context. This gives a 
reason for the primacy of the basic structure that does not appeal to moral principles or to moral 
facts. Instead, it appeals to intuitions about the normative structure of social practices. Those who 
accept limited conventionalism have reason to accept the primacy of the basic structure in an 
appropriate sequence.
§4.3 A Mooring for Ethical Life
So, those who accept forms of foundationalism and constructivism can accept the primacy of the 
basic structure as subject. In this section, I want to better motivate both limited conventionalism 
and the deeper moral importance of the basic structure. Instead of showing the relationship 
between limited conventionalism and the basic structure, I want to show how a central concern 
with the basic structure provides a way to reconcile the localizing and universalizing impulses in 
moral theory. 
 There is a consistent conflict between those who see ethical life as grounded in universal 
principles that apply to all and those who see ethical life as particular to social context. We can see 
this conflict between universal and local in arguments from Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, 
Sidgwick and Bradley, and Rawls and Walzer. While I would not claim a focus on the basic 
structure settles this conflict, I do believe it can contribute to a moral theory that respects both 
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the universal and local in moral and ethical life. I want to motivate my approach by showing how 
it combines the best features of both perspectives.
 Limited conventionalism recognizes that our moral obligations, rights, and powers are 
often grounded by contingent social practices. In §3.2.3, I argued that such practices likely 
influence our values, virtues, relationships and self-conceptions. The view does not, however, 
require that all values, virtues, relationships, self-conceptions, rights and obligations are grounded 
by such practices. In fact, limited conventionalism needs to appeal to some universal principles in 
order to explain why practices have this influence on moral and ethical life. Accordingly, there is 
already some balance between the local and universal in the theory. Some moral demands and 
claims will be particular to our social context whereas others will be universal across social 
contexts. Which are which is an issue that needs to be settled by a moral theory. 
 Limited conventionalism also recognizes that, in order to change our moral demands, 
social practices must be morally justified. Not every practice can establish new obligations; only 
morally justified practices can. At times, whether a practice is justified will be determined by 
universal principles. At other times, a practice will be justified by its social context. According to 
the view here, when a practice is part of a system, we will need to evaluate the system in order to 
evaluate the practice that it is part of. This adds another way in which our evaluation is particular 
to a social context. Whether a practice is justified will often depend on the social context that 
practice occurs within.
 With this view, the basic structure of society is a moral subject at the nexus between the 
local and the universal. Many of our particular claims will be explained by the practices that they 
belong to. For many practices, whether they are justified and give rise to genuine claims will be 
determined by how they fit within a basic structure. So, the basic structure is quite central for our 
local evaluations--we often need to evaluate practices by how they fit within a basic structure. 
However, the evaluation of the basic structure itself does not appeal to our social context. There is 
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no larger practice or system that the basic structure is part of. Instead, it is evaluated by appeal to 
more universal principles. 
 To show how this approach can reconcile the localizing and universalizing features of 
ethical life, I will rehearse one of the most appreciated Hegelian objections to Kantian moral 
theory. This will allow me to contrast a concern with the practice-dependent aspects of ethical life 
with a concern for the practice-independent aspects. Then, I will suggest a middle ground that 
recognizes the importance of both these aspects of ethical life. Since a focus on the basic structure 
is part of this middle ground, such a focus respects both the practice-dependent and practice-
independent features of ethical life. 
4.3.1 The Hegelian criticism
Hegel’s most (in)famous criticism of Kant has been the claim that his argument for the categorical 
imperative amounts to nothing but an empty formalism. In §135 of Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
writes, 
“However essential it is to give prominence to the pure unconditioned self-
determination of the will as the root of duty, and to the way in which knowledge of 
the will, thanks to Kant’s philosophy, has won its firm foundation and starting-
point for the first time owing to the thought of its infinite autonomy, still to adhere 
to the exclusively moral position, without making the transition to the conception 
of ethics, is to reduce this gain to an empty formalism, and the science of morals to 
the preaching of duty for duty’s sake. From this point of view, no immanent 
doctrine of duties is possible; of course, material may be brought in from outside 
and particular duties may be arrived at accordingly, but...no transition is possible 
to the specification of particular duties.” 
For Hegel, true freedom occurs only when we recognize that our freedom is not a freedom of 
indeterminacy but a freedom as a particular individual, an individual who is understood as 
occupying a particular social position. We are raised within a particular social atmosphere and 
our own identity and interests are reliant upon the particularities of that social atmosphere. 
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Accordingly, the material through which we determine our duties and goals is drawn from that 
atmosphere. To abstract away from this material is to abstract away from all material that could 
establish our duties. An ethical theory that arises from the idea of the will as pure indeterminacy 
will be empty and formal, but an ethical theory that arises from the idea of a will as embedded in 
a social position will have the material through which to recognize the fullness of ethical life.21  
 Now, there are many related and overlapping aspects to Hegel’s criticism, and I do not 
mean to address them here in full. Much of the literature hangs on Hegel’s internal criticism of 
Kant that the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) cannot warrant any moral judgment on its own. 
Much has been written about whether this criticism shows a mistake in Kant’s reasoning, but my 
concern is with Hegel’s point as an external criticism. Is Hegel right to think that any account of 
ethics is inadequate if it ignores the particularities of our social atmosphere? The FUL might not 
be empty, but Hegelians will still argue that Kantian theory is flawed because it ignores the 
importance of our being socially embedded. Most specifically, Hegelians can argue that no 
Kantian view adequately represents individual freedom. The individual will is not a pure 
abstraction of indeterminacy but a particular will embedded in a social environment. For a 
particular will to truly be free, it needs not will any arbitrary ends but will the ends that are 
identified as its own particular ends. 
 A similar external criticism is used by many of the contemporary Communitarian 
thinkers, but they need not be tied to Hegel’s own metaphysical and methodological 
commitments. These thinkers have focused specifically on the ways in which the self is socially 
embedded without taking the detour through the conditions for freedom or the claim that the 
FUL is empty. 
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 For Hegel and Kant, the contrast between them is well-represented in their differing 
conceptions of freedom, but the contrast between communitarians and liberals is not as clear. As 
Will Kymlicka points out,22  the contemporary Liberal does not deny that the self is socially 
embedded. Instead, liberals only deny that there is no single socially determined feature of 
ourselves that is not open to possible revision. The woman raised in a misogynistic society might 
see herself as lesser than the men around her, but she has the capacity to critically engage with 
that view and change her self-conception overtime. Alternatively, a religious person might 
fundamentally identify himself with his religion and remain orientated around it throughout his 
life, but he could revise his commitments. His commitment is made more significant by the fact 
that he could change it and does not.
 So, all sides in the contemporary dispute can recognize that selves are socially embedded, 
so that cannot be where the dispute really lies. Even Kantians can recognize that the self is 
socially-embedded and merely maintain the freedom consists in rational willing rather than self 
realization. What, then, grounds the conflict between communitarian and liberal views?
 I want to suggest that these two perspectives differ in their identification of the source of 
ethical ends and principles. Both sides might recognize that the self is socially embedded but they 
significantly differ in interpreting how this matters for morality and ethics. For the 
Communitarian, what determines the content of ethics and morality are the particularities of our 
social structure and culture. Rather than distinguishing themselves by appeal to the claim that the 
self is socially embedded, I suggest that they distinguish themselves by the claim that the content 
of ethical life is dependent upon the particular practices of a society. In short, Communitarians 
claim that ethical life is substantially practice-dependent.
 The Hegelian agrees with this Communitarian commitment, though Hegel understands 
there to be a rational development of ethical life through time. For him, the content of ethical life 
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is practice-dependent, but the practices of our society can be explained by the rational 
development of human freedom. Despite this difference, the Hegelian and Communitarian are in 
agreement that the content of ethical life and morality is predominantly practice-dependent and 
local.
 
4.3.2 The Reconciliatory Response
To say that the two sides are divided by the extent to which they identify the content of ethical life 
as practice-dependent or practice-independent undoubtedly seems too rough; it ignores the 
nuance on the two sides. However, a rough contrast can nonetheless be helpful and track a real 
difference. The contrast can help highlight a better view by seeing the inadequacies of these two 
contrary positions. We should not think that the sole source of our ethical ends and principles is 
our local particularity, and we should not think that the sole source is an independent ethical 
perspective. The former would ignore any objective grounding for the importance of socially 
determined concerns, and the later would ignore the richness of ethical life provided within a 
community. 
 To transcend the inadequacies of either view, we need only combine them. We can 
recognize that the source of some ethical ends and principles is the social structure, and the 
source of other ethical ends and principles is an independent ethical perspective. In short, we 
should recognize that there are practice-dependent values and practice-independent values. We 
can accept a kind of limited conventionalism. Any adequate ethical theory need recognize both. I 
think that most Hegelians, Communitarians, Kantians and Liberals recognize this. Limited 
conventionalism provides a form for this reconciliation.
 The way in which to recognize both aspects of ethical life is to recognize that the 
contingencies of our social practices have a profound effect on ethical life, but the non-contingent 
aspects of ethics and morality do as well. While many of our values, virtues, relationships and 
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obligations will be explained by particular features of our social context, others will not be. For 
instance, it is due to conventional aspects of our professional structure that we have the kind of 
relationships with co-workers that we have. It is because of our particular form of government 
that we have the political obligations we have. Yet, one might think that we should not deceive 
others regardless of the particularities of society. Or, one might think that knowledge is always 
valuable. Which aspects are explained by which is not easily decided, and different theories will 
explain different aspects. What matters is that we can recognize contingent features of our social 
context as determining some aspects of ethical life just as we can recognize non-contingent 
aspects as well. 
 Most importantly for my concern, practice-independent principles or values will have a 
central role in evaluating our social context itself. Even if the content of ethical life was 
predominantly determined by contingent social practices, practice-independent values would 
have a role in assessing those practices. To support the communitarian aspect of his view, F.H. 
Bradley appeals to a quotation from Hegel that is actually more aligned with my conclusions than 
Bradley there recognizes. The full quotation comes from §153 of The Philosophy of Right; 
“to be moral is to live in accordance with  the moral tradition of one’s country; and 
in respect to education, the one true answer is that which a Pythagorean gave to 
him who asked what was the best education for his son, If you make him the 
citizen of a people with good institutions”
In this we can recognize that living a good life means living the life of a member of particular 
society, and the particularities of a people determine the specifics of how one should live. Even 
when Hegel recognizes that our ethical life is partly determined by our social context, he 
recognizes that it is important to have good institutions. To determine which institutions are good, 
I maintain that we need some practice-independent perspective. So, practice-independent values 
are important not only as part of the content of ethical life, but in assessing those practices that 
determine the content of ethical life.
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 Hegel is likely referring to an actual Pythagorean in the above passage, but his additional 
comments show that he also had Rousseau in mind. Rousseau did not dispute the ways in which a 
social context had a profound and pervasive influence on a people’s aims, relationships and values 
but he was not fully communitarian in his outlook. Instead, he reached towards features of 
human nature that were independent of any particular social context as part of a social critique. 
Likewise, even while Bradley argues that ethical life consists partly in fulfilling one’s “stations and 
its duties,” he can recognize that it is only the stations and duties of a good society that we should 
honor. Here, the good society is one that is justified by appeal to values that are independent of 
that society. For Rousseau, that was human nature. For Hegel, it was human freedom. In this way, 
the quotation that Bradley used to support his view comes closer to that which I argue for. I 
merely emphasize that we need a way of determining what counts as a “good” institution, and that 
is done by appeal to practice-independent values.
 From this perspective, we can agree with Hegelians that an account of ethics that is fully 
reliant on a formal conception of the self would be inadequate for ethical life. We can recognize 
that much of the substance of our values, virtues, relationships, self-conception and obligations 
come from the particularities of our social context. Yet, this recognition does not lead us to think 
that there is no practice-independent ethical values, instead those practice-independent values 
are merely insufficient. Hegel was right to suppose that a practice-independent perspective would 
be insufficient but a practice-independent perspective is still necessary for a full grounding of 
ethical life. In particular, practice-independent principles are appropriate for evaluating our social 
structure, which grounds the particularities of our form of ethical life. 
 It is with this view in mind that we can see how a concern with the basic structure of 
society can respect both the practice-dependent and practice-independent aspects of ethical life. 
First, it respects the practice-dependent parts of ethical life by recognizing the profound and 
pervasive influence of the basic structure. We recognize that our values, virtues, self-conception, 
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relationships and obligations change. Second, it respects the practice-independent parts of ethical 
life by both holding the basic structure up to appraisal by practice-independent values and by 
recognizing that not all of our values, virtues, self-conception, relationships and obligations are 
practice-dependent. 
 It is in this way that a morally justified basic structure acts as a mooring for ethical life. In 
living with others, our particular form of life will be influenced by the contingencies of our 
culture and history. Like a boat atop the water, we will be moved in one direction or the other by 
the winds and tides. A form of ethical life that is evaluated only by it’s local and practice-
dependent values is adrift, but a society with a justified basic structure is bound to solid ground. 
We will still move with the winds and tides of culture and history, but our drift will have limits. 
Ethical life will always be sensitive to the particular practices we live within, but living within a 
justified basic structure keeps us tethered to the solid ground that our practice-independent 
values provide.
4.4 What is Still to come
In the remaining two chapters, I want to address two potential criticisms of my argument. I have 
chosen to address these two objection specifically because each draws on deeper convictions 
that might lead to a philosophical impasse. By discussing these objections, I hope to bring these 
deeper convictions to the surface and explicitly address them. The objection of Chapter 5 
appeals foundational commitments regarding the role of moral principles, and the objection of 
Chapter 6 appeals to convictions about justice as an ideal.
 As I argued in 4.1, it is no problem if a moral theory rejects limited conventionalism. 
While there will then be a conflict between that moral theory and my conclusions, we then need 
to settle whether that moral theory or one that accepts limited conventionalism is the best moral 
theory. What is a problem is an argument that shows a fundamental problem with limited 
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conventionalism. In Chapter 4, I introduce an argument that tries to show this. This argument 
seeks to show that all justifications must appeal directly to first principles that are fully general 
across moral subjects. I call such a view a commitment to “generalism.” If generalism is right, then 
limited conventionalism is wrong. Limited conventionalism requires that some justifications 
appeal to an institutional context and thus indirectly to first principles. Insofar as generalism 
supposes that all valid justifications appeal directly to first principles, those who are committed to 
limited conventionalism are mistaken. Accordingly, I argue against a commitment to generalism 
in Chapter 5. 
 From the introduction, I have contrasted my argument for a focus on the basic structure 
with an argument that appeals to a particular conception of justice. One might try to show the 
identity, moral indispensability, and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure by arguing that 
justice is uniquely related to the basic structure. Such an argument uses the indispensability and 
distinctiveness of justice to ground the indispensability and distinctiveness of the basic structure. 
I did not argue against this approach except to suggest that we are unlikely to settle our 
disagreement by appeal to a conception of justice alone. We need to argue to--and not from--a 
conception of justice.
 By contrast, the objections that I am concerned with in Chapter 6 start from a particular 
conception of justice. First, one might claim that my approach necessarily misrepresents the 
nature of justice. Insofar as we take the principles that apply to the basic structure as principles of 
justice, we then represent justice as consisting of that principle. If the demands of justice are wider 
than this, we misrepresent justice by taking its total demands to be those that are specific to the 
basic structure. Second, one might claim that we can only determine how the basic structure 
should be if we first determine what justice requires. Accordingly, this objection supposes that I 
have confused the order of evaluation.  In Chapter 6, I will respond to these two objections. 
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Excursus: Rawls, Hegel and the basic structure as subject
As a final note, I want to better support the argument of §4.3.2 through an interpretation of 
Rawls’s own reason for taking the basic structure as subject. There is good reason to suppose that 
Rawls saw his focus on the basic structure as providing a response to Hegel’s criticism of 
liberalism much as I suggest such a focus can reconcile the local and universalizing impulses in 
moral theory. In discussing Hegel in his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Rawls writes, 
A second criticism of liberalism is that it fails to see, what Hegel certainly saw, the 
deep social rootedness of people within an established framework of their political 
and social institutions. In this we do learn from him, as it is one of his great 
contributions. But I don’t think that a liberalism of freedom is at fault here. A 
Theory of Justice follows Hegel in this respect when it takes the basic structure of 
society as the first subject of justice. People start as rooted in society and the first 
principles of justice they select are to apply to the basic structure.
In this passage, Rawls recognizes that Hegel is correct to focus on the social-rootedness of 
persons, and argues that his own theory does this as well. Specifically, it does so by developing 
principles for the basic structure of society.
 What is clear from this passage is that Rawls thinks treating the basic structure as 
subject properly recognizes the social rootedness of persons, but what is less clear is why he 
thinks this. His additional remarks in the lecture do not help, but he does spend more time on 
this issue in an unpublished lecture titled, “The Contingencies of Social Dependence.”23  In a 
revealing passage, Rawls starts with the fact of social rootedness. He argues that our conception 
of ourselves, our aims, our relationships and our values are all influenced by our social context. 
Following this, Rawls concedes the typical communitarian point that these aspects of our 
personality are not chosen, but he them explains why this does not undermine liberalism. For 
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Rawls, our freedom is a capacity to survey and revise our ends, which does not require radical 
self-determination. He goes on to argue that--given the fact of social rootedness--any adequate 
conception of social justice must establish the social conditions within which that conception 
of justice is acceptable to citizens. It is for this reason, he argues, that we should take the basic 
structure as the first subject. In advocating principles for the basic structure, we recognize the 
importance that our social context plays in shaping our character and self-conception. Insofar 
as a conception of justice is feasible only when the basic structure supports a social milieu in 
which persons accept that conception, we ought be primarily concerned with developing 
principles for the basic structure to support that social milieu.24
 What Rawls does not make explicit--but follows from this argument--is that the fact of 
social rootedness makes it appropriate to use the abstract (Kantian) conception of the person to 
develop principles for the basic structure. Yes, the Kantian conception of the person is abstract 
and does not represent determinate individuals in all their particularity. However, given that 
the contingencies of the basic structure profoundly effect the particularity of persons, it would 
be inappropriate to determine how the basic structure ought to be on the basis of the particular 
interests and values of persons within a determinate social context. As Rawls writes in 1977, to 
allow the determinate interests of individuals to effect the principles of justice would be “to 
allow the disparate and deep contingent effects of the social system to influence the principles 
adopted.”25  In order to develop principles that are free of an idealogical justification, their 
determination ought reach beyond the particularities of the social structure they are to be 
applied within. For this to occur, we must represent persons in the original position abstractly. 
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beyond setting up our conception of the good; it also sets the possibility of our achievements. In this way, the 
contingencies of the basic structure are influential in two deep ways. All this is on pages 12-14 of the manuscript.
25 Rawls, John. “The Basic Structure as Subject” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 1977), 161.
Insofar as we recognize persons as free and equal persons with the two moral powers, then we 
model them only as free and equal persons with the two moral powers. While the moral 
construction does not recognize persons as determinate individuals, the profound and 
pervasive effects of the basic structure so affect the content of our identities that it would be 
inappropriate to use a less abstract conception of the self. 
 The final step of the analysis is to point out that what is inappropriate for determining 
principles for the basic structure is not inappropriate for determining principles for other 
subjects. The fact that Rawls appeals to a Kantian conception of the person for assessing the 
basic structure does not commit him to appealing to this abstract conception for all ethical 
questions. In determining principles that apply within a particular social structure, it will be 
more appropriate to appeal to the particularities within that social structure. The principles for 
interpersonal interaction, for example, will need to be sensitive to the particular ideals, virtues, 
relationships and conventional obligations in that society. In specifying his “four-stage 
sequence” for applying the principles of justice, Rawls makes this clear. While we start from 
principles in an original position under a thick veil of ignorance, the following stages include 
more and more information about the particular society that the principles apply to. In this 
way, the particularity of a social context bears more and more importance as the stages of the 
sequence proceed. 
 This all gives Rawls the tools to address the Hegelian criticism because he can cede the 
Hegelian’s point without effecting his own theory. It might very well be the case that the 
Kantian conception of the person would not be adequate for addressing all the concerns of 
ethical life. In our personal life, we would need a moral theory that respects our particularity; it 
needs recognize our social place and individual character. Since Rawls does not claim that his 
version of Kantian Constructivism appeals to the Kantian conception of the person for 
addressing all these concerns, he need not show that the Kantian conception of the person is 
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local 
- 168 -
fully sufficient. For Rawls, the principles we ought follow are determined by a construction that 
treats persons as free and equal. If we integrate his comments from “The Contingencies of 
Social Dependence,” we see that the construction treats persons as free, equal and 
determinate.26  We are not noumenal beings but social creatures within a particular social world. 
In developing principles for the basic structure, what it means to develop principles that 
express our nature as free, equal and determinate persons is that the construction abstract from 
our particularities. In other cases, principles can only express our nature as free, equal and 
determinate persons by representing us in our particularity. When our particular ideals, 
virtues, relationships and obligations bear on the choice, then ignoring our particularity would 
not treat us as determinate persons.
 If this is all correct, then we ought treat the principles that apply to the basic structure 
of society differently from other moral subjects. The principles that apply to the basic structure 
ought not be specific to the particularities within a social context, whereas many other 
principles ought be. The difference between these principles is not explained by a difference 
between individual and institutional principles, but between principles that influence the 
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located in Papers of John Rawls; Harvard Archives, HUM 48, Box 26, Folder 1). There, Rawls handwrites a 
number of themes of the article. For the second such theme, he writes: 
“2. The attempt to adjust a K[ant]ian view so that it takes account of the fact that people 
originate at some definite social place in their society and with certain endowments. K[ant] is 
moved by the idea that people must each make themselves whatever they are from the 
n[oumenal] P[oint of] V[iew], whether for good or evil, and themselves effect what they are or 
become (cf. General Observation to Religion Book I). This is one (but only one) way to see 
perhaps why he thinks of us as  noumenal beings etc. But any such view seems likely to Fall into 
Fantasy. So what to do? Hence adopt notion of the P[ersons in the ]O[riginal ]P[osition]’s as 
representing determinate persons and trying to work this notion into a K[ant]ian view while at 
the same time avoid K[ant]’s difficulties. cf. contra Williams: “Persons, Character and Morality” 
in ed. A. Rorty: Identities of Persons (1976)
While the Williams article that Rawls mentions does not identify itself as arguing a Hegelian point, it fits well with 
the empty formalism objection. Moreover, Rawls seems content to suppose that Hegel’s internal criticism of Kant 
is on the mark insofar as he supposes the the FUL requires that Rawls introduce the notion of “true human needs” 
into the Kantian theory in order for the procedure to result in appropriate content. See Lectures in the History of 
Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 2000), 173-176. 
particularities of a social context and principles that apply within those particularities. As 
Rawls writes in Theory of Justice, 
“That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of the 
virtue of justice, its intimate connection with social practices so often noted by 
idealists. When Bradley says that the individual is a bare abstraction, he can be 
interpreted to say, without too much distortion, that a persons’ obligations and 
duties presuppose a moral conception of institutions and therefore that the content 
of just institutions must be defined before the requirements for individuals can be 
set out.”  
In this passage, we see Rawls emphasizing the relationship between the primacy of the basic 
structure, the Hegelian criticism of a Kantian conception of the person, and the way in which 
social institutions shape our obligations and duties. Rawls recognizes the “social nature of the 
virtue of justice” by first developing principles that apply to the basic structure. 
 Now, one need not be a Rawlsian to appreciate the distinction that Rawls is making 
between principles that apply to the basic structure and principles that apply to other subjects. 
This is a distinction that any moral theory can recognize the importance of, and it is the 
distinction that I think is important to take away from Rawls’s argument. Any moral theory has 
reason to recognize the difference between moral judgments within the structure of ethical life 
and judgments of the structure of ethical life, so any moral theory has reason to treat the basic 
structure differently. We can hardly imagine making personal moral decisions without thinking 
about our social context. The particular values, virtues, relations and obligations that 
characterize our social context as central for understanding morality and ethics. In 
distinguishing the basic structure from other moral subjects, we respect this aspect of morality. 
The basic structure of society has profound and pervasive effects on the structure of ethical life, 
so it ought be treated differently than those moral subjects that are relevant within ethical life. 
Both within and without Rawlsian theory, this gives us reason to distinguish principles that 
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apply to the basic structure from principles that apply to other subjects--and this justification 
relies neither on creating space for self interest nor a pluralist division of moral labor.
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local 
- 171 -
Chapter 5
Against Generalism 
The fallacy in these versions of the same idea is perhaps the most pervasive of all fallacies in 
philosophy. So common is it that one questions whether it might not be called the 
philosophical fallacy. It consists in the supposition that whatever is found true under certain 
circumstances may forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions. Because 
a thirsty man gets satisfaction in drinking water, bliss consists in being drowned”
     -John Dewey, Human Nature and Social Action, p. 175
As mentioned in the last chapter, my argument relies on a commitment to limited 
conventionalism, and not all moral theories will accept this commitment. So, not all moral 
theories will accept my arguments. That, in itself, is not problem. What would be a problem is an 
argument that showed that limited conventionalism must be false. If someone could disprove 
limited conventionalism, then much of my argument would be disproved along with it. 
 In this chapter, I want to focus on a possible argument that claims to disprove limited 
conventionalism. The argument seeks to show that a particular perspective towards justification 
must be correct, and then to show that limited conventionalism conflicts with that perspective 
towards justification. I identify this perspective as a commitment to “generalism.” According to 
generalism, any adequate justification appeals directly to first principles that are applied generally 
across all moral problems. The arguments that I am concerned with in this chapter seek to show 
that generalism must be true. They seek to show that any justification must appeal directly to fully 
general first principles. 
 Generalism conflicts with limited conventionalism because it leaves no room for 
institutional context. Limited conventionalism claims that we should often look towards the 
particular practices and systems we act within to justify a particular judgement. It is because our 
practices affect the content of ethical life that we need to differentiate the principles that apply 
within a moral context from those that do not. First principles might aid our understanding of 
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ethical life, they might direct our reforms of the social world, and they might settle some 
particular conflicts, but they do not settle all moral and ethical conflicts on their own.  In this way, 
limited conventionalism and generalism are opposed. If an argument shows that we should be 
committed to generalism, then we should not be committed to limited conventionalism.
 The name, “generalism” refers to a family of foundationalist moral theories, but it does not 
refer to all foundationalist theories. Act-utilitarianism is one view that is committed to 
generalism; it explains legitimate justifications as appealing only and directly to the fundamental 
principle that we should promote happiness. There are also non-consequentialist versions of 
generalism. Such theories explain all legitimate justifications as appealing to fundamental values 
like autonomy, equality, and happiness.1  Not all versions of foundationalism, however, are 
committed to generalism. As mentioned in §4.2.1, a moral theory might recognize the Principle 
of Fair Play as a fundamental principle and thereby recognize legitimate justifications as those 
that appeal to the particular rules of social institutions (and only indirectly appeal to the 
foundational Principle of Fair Play). Or, one might understand respect for autonomy as requiring 
that we respect the particularities of persons as determined by their social environment. We 
might even recognize a consequentialist form of conventionalism if it meets the right conditions. 
Any of these views might be foundationalist but they would not be committed to generalism. 
 In being concerned with arguments for generalism, I am specifically concerned with those 
who are committed to the view that “institutional context cannot matter for individual principles 
because all judgments are justified directly by first principles.” In addressing generalism, I both 
address the consequentialist and non-consequentialists versions. I mean to combat the view that 
all legitimate justifications must appeal directly to fully general principles--whatever form those 
principles take. 
Against Generalism: The Principles for the Basic Structure as Fundamental Principles
 - 173 -
1 Oftentimes, G.A. Cohen seems to adopt such a pluralist foundationalism, but it is not clear whether he would 
allow for indirect appeals to foundational values like those required by limited conventionalism. 
 My argument will proceed in four sections. In the first, I want to emphasize the 
significance of a commitment to generalism by showing how it motivates Liam Murphy’s 
objections to Rawlsian theory. I will first reconstruct Murphy’s argument from “Institutions and 
the Demands of Justice” to show how it ultimately relies on a commitment to generalism.2  With 
this set-up complete, §4.2 is concerned with a historically significant argument used by J.S. Mill 
and Henry Sidgwick in favor of there being one fully general principle that can directly settle all 
moral conflicts. §4.3 then introduces three other arguments, each of which seeks to show that 
there must be a plurality of fully general first principles. I argue that each of these four arguments 
fails to show that legitimate justifications must appeal directly to first principles. With this 
defensive portion of my argument complete, I will transition to offense in §4.4. There, I argue that 
the particularities of the social world are centrally important to who we are and our relationships 
with others. Generalism fails as a moral theory because it fails to recognize the moral significant 
of our social particularity.
 Overall, this chapter should show why there is no reason to be committed to generalism, 
and it will thereby show why any argument that assumes generalism is question-begging. While 
few recognize it explicitly, a commitment to generalism is predominant in ethical theory. In many 
ways, it mimics the model of physics; we seek to find general ethical laws that justify the whole of 
our diverse ethical convictions. Given the aims of ethical theory, it makes sense to look for such 
general principles because they provide a clear way to simplify our ethical understanding. Given 
our sociology, this model makes sense because of the close ties between philosophy, logic and 
science. Yet, the goal of this chapter is to show why we should not be committed to generalism. 
We do not need to treat ethics like physics. 
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5.1 Liam Murphy and Generalism
In “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Liam Murphy criticizes the Rawlsian method of political 
philosophy for separating individual and institutional principles.3  Murphy’s concern is not that 
Rawlsians advocate guiding principles that apply to institutions and not individual conduct but that 
they advocate fundamental principles that apply to institutions and not to individual conduct. He 
claims that his view, 
“is of course compatible with the existence of specifically political principles of a non-
fundamental kind, such as the principle that taxation should be levied according to 
taxpayers' “ability to pay.” What [I reject] is any defense of such a principle by appeal 
to a fundamental one that does not also apply directly to people's conduct. It should 
therefore be clear that monism does not have the absurd implication that all morally 
defensible legal principles are ipso facto valid moral principles.4
Murphy does not explain exactly what a “fundamental” principle is, but it seems that he means a 
principle that has a foundational role in our moral, political and ethical justifications. While it is an 
interpretive jump, I will assume that a “fundamental principle” is a principle that is not justified by 
any further principles. In this way, Murphy argues that our foundational principles--those from which 
all justifications proceed--must apply generally across both institutions and individuals. For him “any 
plausible fundamental normative principles for the evaluation of legal and other institutions” must 
also apply to “the realm of personal conduct.”5
 For ease of exposition Murphy distinguishes two views. “Dualism” is the belief that “the 
two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental 
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4 Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 254. While I will take Murphy at his word that his view does 
not have this “absurd implication,” he does not explain why it does not. I would be curious about how such an 
argument can be made that does not imply a difference between individual and institutional principles at the 
fundamental level. Are they different principles only as guiding principles?
5 More specifically, he identifies monism as the rejection “that there could be a plausible fundamental normative 
principle for the evaluation of legal and other institutions that does not apply in the realm of personal conduct.” 
While this is not the same as the commitment I articulate above, I believe that Murphy is committed to such a 
view of monism. 
level, two different kinds of practical principles.”6  Alternatively, “Monism” is defined as the denial 
of dualism. Using these terms, he wants to argue against dualism and thereby on behalf of 
monism.7  However, there are two problems with this argument, which I address in §4.1.1 and 
§4.1.2 respectively. First, Murphy implicitly uses a foundationalist model of justification that 
Rawlsians should reject. Second, Murphy wrongly imputes a position to Rawlsians about what 
our individual obligations are.
5.1.1. Fundamental principles?
One of the deeper challenges facing Murphy’s argument is that he appeals only to an intuitive 
sense of what “fundamental” normative principles are. The ways in which he uses the phrase seem 
to suggest that fundamental principles are of foremost moral importance and that they have some 
methodological primacy. While one needs to make an interpretive leap to understand Murphy 
here, it seems that fundamental principles are moral principles that are not justified by any 
other--more fundamental--principles. 
 The problem with this view is that it cannot be squared with the Rawlsian view of 
justification that Murphy argues against. Rawls does not justify principles by appealing to more 
fundamental principles, instead he appeals to a broader sense of reflective equilibrium. Whereas 
fundamental principles make sense within a foundationalist model of justification, it is not clear 
what role they play in a more holist model. One might think that the two principles of justice are 
fundamental principles that are applied to determine what institutions we ought to have, yet 
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7 These names can be misleading for two reasons, so it important to first clear up what he means. First, Murphy 
does not mean to associate his monism with the more typical use of the phrase that is committed to only one 
ultimate value or principle. For Murphy’s version of “monism,” there might be many different principles or values 
so long as they each apply to both institutional design and individual conduct. In this way, pluralism is consistent 
with Murphy’s monism, though a pluralism of scope-restricted values is not. Second, there is nothing about 
“dualism” that commits it to only two practical problems with different kinds of practical principles. In this way, 
dualism might distinguish fundamental practical principles in more ways than merely individual conduct and 
institutional design.
Rawls does not even accept that. Instead, the two principles are applied through a “four-stage 
sequence” in which the principles that are developed in the original position are then interpreted 
by representative citizens who know more about their society than do those behind a veil of 
ignorance.8  Subsequently, the particular laws that we should have are determined by 
representative citizens that interpret both the two principles of justice and the constitution 
developed. There is no strait-forward application of more fundamental principles in this broader 
story. 
 Given this complication, it is unclear exactly how one should interpret Murphy’s 
arguments. If we take Murphy’s definition of dualism on its face, Rawls is not a dualist. Murphy 
defines dualism as the view that “the two practical problems of institutional design and personal 
conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principles.” Yet, since 
Rawls does not think that these problems require fundamental principles at all, he would not be a 
dualist.9  Of course, it is clear that Murphy is trying to argue against Rawls, so this might seem like 
a nitpicky issue. However, it is unclear how Murphy could make his point at all without appealing 
to the idea of “fundamental principles.” If Murphy dropped the phrase “fundamental” from the 
definition, then dualism would immediately be recognized as innocuous. After all, Murphy does 
explicitly recognize “the existence of specifically political principles of a nonfundamental kind.”10
5.1.2. Non-Ideal Circumstances
Suppose that Murphy can overcome this difficulty, and he can articulate a view of fundamental 
principles that is consistent with Rawls’s project and does not rely on a foundationalist model of 
justification. Nonetheless, his argument against the Rawlsian method is still problematic. He seeks 
to show that any fundamental institutional principle must also apply to individual conduct. This 
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10 Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 254.
argument relies on a supposed problem that Rawlsians face in dealing with injustice in our actual 
world. As Murphy writes, 
“It seems to me that any political theory that accepts Rawls's bifurcation of the 
normative realm into one set of principles for institutions and another for people 
will yield an implausible account of what people should do in non-ideal 
circumstances. Thus there is a general reason to reject dualism.”11
The problem with Murphy’s argument, however, is that a mere commitment to dualism does not 
itself lead to an implausible account for non-ideal circumstances. In order to claim that dualism 
leads to an implausible account, Murphy wrongly attributes an additional commitment to 
dualists. This additional commitment does not follow from dualism alone, so Murphy’s argument 
relies on a non-sequitur. To see why, we can formalize Murphy’s argument into three simple steps.
1) A moral theory should not have implausible implications for non-ideal theory
2) Dualism has implausible implications for non-ideal theory
3)Thus, we ought to reject dualism
In this argument, I completely agree with (1) but disagree with (2), so I reject Murphy’s 
conclusion, (3). It is surely true that some versions of Dualism might have implausible 
implications, but it is not the case that a commitment to Dualism itself has such implausible 
implications.
   The support that Murphy gives for (2) is that dualism would mandate that individuals in 
non-ideal circumstances can only promote justice by revising institutions rather than addressing 
social problems directly. This, he argues, leads to implausible implications; 
“The case to focus on is of course a nonideal situation where it is not true that the 
best way for people to alleviate inequality or promote well-being is to promote just 
institutions. For here monism tells people to do what they can to bring about an 
improvement directly. If injustice is about inequality, people should do what they 
can to reduce it. If they can have a great impact on inequality by aiming directly at 
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its reduction than they would if they directed their energies to institutional 
reform, this is what they should do. Dualism tells a different story: even if the 
individual could do more to reduce inequality, alleviate suffering, or whatever, by 
direct action, this is not what justice requires her to do. Justice requires her to 
promote just institutions even if she is sure that the aim of the just institutions she 
is promoting would be better served if she herself pursued that aim directly. How 
could this be right?”12
To again formalize Murphy’s argument, we can identify the following steps;
a) Dualism requires persons to advance justice by promoting just institutions
b) Just institutions are justified (at least in part) by accomplishing certain aims
c) In non-ideal theory, those certain aims will sometimes be better advanced by 
direct action than through institutions
d) Thus, in non-ideal theory, dualism would be self-frustrating
e) A theory that is self-frustrating is implausible
f) Thus, dualism has implausible implications for non-ideal theory.
The most important problem with this argument is that (a) is either false or does not lead to the 
conclusion. To see what I mean, there are two ways of reading (a). First, we might read it as:
(a1) Dualism strictly requires persons to advance justice only by promoting just 
institutions
This reading would imply that there is no other appropriate way by which to advance justice than 
by promoting just institutions. Second, we might read (a) as: 
(a2) Dualism loosely requires persons to advance justice by promoting just 
institutions along with other means , 
In this case, there are other permissible ways of advancing justice beyond promoting just 
institutions, though promoting just institutions is one permissible way. While (a1) would require 
that persons advance justice only by promoting just institutions, (a2) would not. Instead (a2) 
makes the promotion of just institutions a part of the requirement of justice. 
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 Now, while Murphy seems to have (a1) in mind, it is false. A person might very well be a 
dualist and that person might be committed to only advancing justice through institutions, but 
that does not mean that a commitment to dualism requires that justice can be advanced only by 
institutional means. It is false because it supposes that a commitment to dualism implies some 
specific principle for individuals. Yet, the commitment to dualism is silent on such issues. 
dualism itself is merely the distinction between principles for institutions and principles for 
individuals, it does not say anything about the content of the principles for individuals. Since (a) 
is a principle of individual conduct, whether or not promoting just institutions is strictly required 
is determined by the principles of individual conduct and not by a commitment to Dualism alone. 
Thus, (a1) is false.
 On the other hand, (a2) might be true just in case dualism would be implausible without 
it.13  Yet, even if one must accept (a2), it does not warrant (d) because it might allow people to 
advance justice by also promoting certain aims directly. Since Dualism allows us to distinguish 
principles for individual conduct from principles for institutions, it might be that individuals 
should not promote just institutions whenever they could promote other more worthy moral 
ends. Thus, the argument to show that a commitment to dualism leads to implausible 
implications does not succeed because (a1) is false and the conclusion would not follow from 
(a2). Since Murphy cannot show that dualism leads to implausible implications, he cannot show 
that we ought to reject dualism. Murphy mistakes a commitment to dualism with a commitment 
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warrants (a2) if it succeeds at all. Murphy argues that it is a necessary commitment of dualism that individuals 
have responsibility to advance just institutions. He writes, 
“Justice may be a virtue of institutions, and we may thus be able to say that particular institutions are in 
themselves just or unjust, but people must be subject to some kind of requirement to support those 
institutions, for they cannot become virtuous and remain so all on their accord.” (Murphy, 270).
Yet, even if people must be subject to “some kind of requirement to support these institutions” this does not mean 
that they are subject to the strong requirement of (a1), which requires that people promote just institutions even to 
the exclusion of other morally worthy goals. Even if persons have an obligation to promote just institutions--as 
Rawls does require--this says nothing about them having to do so even when they might rather promote other 
morally worthy ends. Thus, Murphy needs (a1) for his argument to succeed, but only can possibly get (a2).
about what individuals ought to do in non-ideal theory. Yet, since dualism involves no 
commitment to the content of individual duties in ideal or non-ideal theory, his arguments fail. 
 Overall, Murphy’s argument fails because he confuses a commitment to dualism with a 
substantive view about the content of individual obligations. He supposes that what distinguishes 
principles for institutions from principles for individuals implies something about what our 
individual obligations are. There is no doubt that someone who is committed to dualism might 
have implausible commitments about individual duties, but a commitment to dualism does not 
entail such commitments. 
5.1.3 Murphy’s Defensive Arguments
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of Murphy’s essay is the arguments he uses against the various 
theorists who, up to that point, had argued on behalf of separating individual principles from 
institutional principles. Against Nagel’s division of moral labor, he claims that such a perspective 
might aid us in building institutions that best promote justice, but it does not give us a reason to 
distinguish principles for institutions from principles for individuals at any fundamental level.14 
Against Thomas Pogge, he claims that the idea of causing harm to those involved in our 
institutions is insufficient for distinguishing our concern with institutions.15  Against Dworkin, he 
argues that a division between the claims on a political community and the claims on individuals 
is too stark.16  Even if Murphy errs in the ways expressed in §4.1.1 and §4.1.2, these arguments 
against Nagel, Pogge, and Dworkin might seem to maintain their force.
 Yet, Murphy’s arguments themselves suffer from two mistakes that limit their effect. First, 
the argument against Dworkin supposes that dualism implies views about how individuals should 
act, which §4.1.2 has shown would not be implied by dualism alone. Second, his arguments 
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against Nagel and Pogge rely merely on shifting the burden of proof. He claims that these views 
are not sufficient to justify a fundamental distinction between institutional and individual 
principles. Yet, given the failures of his own argument outlined above, he does not offer any 
adequate argument to show that all fundamental principles must apply to both institutions and 
individuals. It is only if we suppose that Murphy has the default view that the claim that any 
argument is insufficient proves the conclusion of that argument wrong. Without an argument for 
his default position, Murphy does not give us any reason to deny that institutional principles and 
individual principles are morally distinct. 
 The arguments of the previous chapters remain untouched by Murphy’s arguments. My 
claim is that the principles that apply to the basic structure should be morally distinct because the 
principles that apply to it should be insensitive to moral context, whereas principles for individual 
action and many other institutions should be sensitive. This claim does not rely on any claims 
about differences in demands on moral agents, as (Murphy’s reconstruction of) Nagel’s argument 
does. It does not rely on any views about the unique ways in which we cause harm to persons 
through institutions, as Pogge’s argument does. Likewise, it does not rely on views about the 
unique moral relationship between members of a political community, as Dworkin’s does. In this 
way, the arguments I give are resistant to all of Murphy’s defensive arguments. 
5.1.4 The Underlying Motivation
There remains one larger point behind Murphy’s argument even after we recognize the 
problematic presupposition involved in appealing to fundamental principles,  after we show that 
Murphy’s argument against dualism fails, and even after we see the problems in his arguments 
against Nagel, Pogge, and Dworkin. Murphy also makes an intuitive claim that motivated his 
argument against separating individual and institutional principles. Put simply, whatever we are 
concerned about with institutions, we should also be concerned about for individual action. For 
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instance, the fact that equality seems relevant for both assessing institutions and individual 
conduct seems to give us reason to treat both institutions and individual conduct as applications 
of a more general principle that expresses the importance of equality. Whatever the faults of his 
explicit argument, this core motivation might still stand. Does the fact that we care about some of 
the same things for institutions and for individual conduct rightly dissolve the distinction 
between individual principles and institutional principles? 
 This motivating point only reveals Murphy’s implicit commitment to, what I have called, 
generalism. For his arguments to succeed, Murphy needs it to be the case that the concerns we 
have about our institutions are the same as those about our individual action. This would only be 
a challenge to my argument if fully general first principles directly settled all moral and ethical 
conflicts. In appealing to “fundamental principles,” Murphy is implicitly referring to a generalist 
model of morality in which conflicts are settled by first principles.  Murphy’s arguments would 
only bear out if he had a view like that of the act-utilitarians wherein our first principles directly 
applied to all moral concerns. 
 Without an argument for generalism, Murphy’s claims amount to mere burden-shifting. 
He means to show that previous arguments for the separation between institutional and 
individual principles fail. It is no surprise that those who are committed to a form of generalism 
will not find those previous arguments adequate. Murphy gives no more reason to accept 
generalism than to reject generalism. In this chapter, I mean to highlight the importance of this 
commitment to generalism and to directly address it. 
 Given the predominance of a commitment to generalism, it is no surprise that many have 
seen Murphy’s argument as important, but I mean to undercut the convictions that ground 
generalism. To do so, I now what to look at the major arguments in favor of Generalism and then 
show why each is inadequate. Doing this will show why an argument from generalism against 
those who do not accept it can only be question-begging. 
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5.2. Sidgwick’s argument for Generalism
Through this chapter, I aim to combat that view that fully general first principles are the ground 
for all legitimate justifications. By blocking this view, I defend limited conventionalism and 
thereby defend the primacy of the the basic structure as a distinct subject. In §4.2, I will be 
concerned specifically with an argument that seeks to show that there must be one fully general 
first principle that settles all moral conflict. 
 This argument is most famous from Chapter 5 of J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism17  but is most 
developed in Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics.18 There, Sidgwick argued for utilitarianism from 
the intuitive idea that any moral conflict can be definitively settled. He argued that this intuition 
could only be correct if there were a single overarching moral principle capable of settling all 
conflicts. How else could any moral conflict be definitively decidable if there were not an 
overarching principle that had authority over any conflict? If there were such a principle, then its 
requirements would always determine how one ought to act in all instances. This reasoning 
establishes an agenda for moral philosophy that many still accept: to identify the single 
fundamental principle that settles all possible conflicts. For both Sidgwick and many today, the 
argument for utilitarianism is that promoting the greatest happiness seems to be the most 
appropriate principle that could play this role. Even those who deny utilitarianism, however, 
might still be tempted to identify such a fundamental principle. One might, for example, advocate 
the Kantian principle to preserve and promote autonomy in all instances.19  
 To be more precise, the argument goes as follows. If all moral conflicts are able to be 
definitively settled, then there must be one choice that it is right to make for any two mutually 
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exclusive choices. The next step is to suppose that for one choice to be right, there must be some 
principle that can articulate what it is right to choose explicitly. Now, suppose that principle X 
determines what is right in the choice between α and β, and principle Y determines what is 
ethical between γ and δ. Now, imagine that there is some possible conflict where principle X 
justifies doing ε while principle Y justifies doing θ, where ε and θ are mutually exclusive choices. 
For our choice amongst ε and θ to be right, we must now appeal to some principle Z to ethically 
choose between what is warranted by X and what is warranted by Y. This same process continues 
as there might now be conflicts between principles Z and and some principle W, and it continues 
until there is a single fully general principle. Once we determine that single fully general 
principle, we can appeal to that principle to definitively settle all moral conflicts. If that principles 
settles all conflicts, than we need only ever appeal to that principles to determine what to do. 
5.2.1 Response from irreconcilable pluralism
One way to respond to Sidgwick would be to claim that not all moral conflicts can be definitively 
settled. One might suppose that we live amongst competing values and that we can do no better than 
to strike a balance between them in our judgments. Such a view might recognize that the 
considerations relevant within our particular moral contexts are amongst these competing values. 
With this view, there is no reason to suppose that there must be some final principle that settles all 
moral conflicts. We might develop principles that balance values relevant for our institutions and we 
might develop principles that balance values relevant for individual actions, but we do not need to 
suppose that there is anything beyond our competing values that unifies them.
 I take it that whether one believes in irresolvable value conflicts is one of the major 
dividing lines between contemporary ethical theorists. For some, the project of ethics is to 
determine the structure of ethics that resolves these conflicts, and for others the project is to start 
from the fact of irresolvable conflict. For figures such as Isaiah Berlin, Michael Walzer and 
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Bernard Williams, to start an argument from the assumption that there must always be a rational 
way to resolve a moral conflict is to construct a bad argument. As Williams writes, 
“It is my view, as it is Berlin’s, that value-conflict is not necessarily pathological at 
all, but something necessarily involved in human values, and to be taken as central 
by an adequate understanding of them. I also think, though Berlin may not, that 
where conflict needs to be overcome, this ‘need’ is not of a purely logical character, 
nor a requirement of pure rationality, but rather a kind of social or personal need, 
the pressure of which will be felt in some historical circumstances rather than 
others.”20
Here, Williams emphasizes value conflict is an inherent part of our lives, one that should not be 
explained away or avoided. Importantly, the fact that not all conflicts in value are rationally 
reconcilable does not mean that no conflicts of value are rationally reconcilable.21  Reflection, 
understanding and revision of our values might go some way towards resolving these conflicts, 
and ethical philosophy might have an important role in doing this.22  Yet, one makes a mistake if 
one assumes that all conflicts must be resolvable. For those who follow a perspective like 
Williams, the argument from the demands of practical reason to generalism does not even get off 
the ground.
5.2.2 Response from Constructivism 
While this kind of intuitionism is one plausible response to Sidgwick, those on the other side of the 
dividing line than Williams will find it inadequate. If one believes that our moral conflicts can be 
definitively settled, then we need to appeal to something beyond a balance of intuition. John Rawls 
recognized this, and he drew a response to Sidgwick’s arguments from a constructivist interpretation 
of Kant’s moral philosophy. In his lectures on Kantian Constructivism, Rawls writes,
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“Sidgwick overlooked [the possibility of constructivism] because of a second 
limitation: he failed to recognize that Kant’s doctrine...is a distinctive method of 
ethics...Since Kant’s view is the leading historical example of a constructivist doctrine, 
the result once again is that constructivism finds no place in Methods [of Ethics].”23 
The fact that constructivism finds no place in Sidgwick’s argument is significant because the method 
of constructivism provides a way to definitively settle moral conflicts, and this method does not rely 
on a single fundamental principle. Instead, the principles that settle moral conflict are determined by 
an appropriate constructive procedure.24  It is not a more fundamental principle that justifies our 
institutional and individual principles but the pedigree of their constructive procedure. 
 It is by appeal to a constructivist method that one can address Sidgwick’s argument and justify 
the possibility that principles can be distinct at a deep level. According to Sidgwick’s argument, our 
various principles are all justified by a substantive first principle. Once we recognize this, we see the 
variety of principles we might use merely as a variety of principles that guide us in satisfying the first 
principle. The picture is quite different according to constructivist reasoning. According to this view, 
our principles are justified by whether an appropriate procedure would result in those principles.25 If a 
principle is so justified, it maintains its own authority as a principle. It’s authority is not merely that it 
guides us towards satisfying a more fundamental principle. After all, the procedure is constructed to 
result in principles that have such authority. These principles are constructed as fundamental 
principles, and we should not look past them towards anything more fundamental. After all, they are 
not justified as satisfying some deeper principle but from the pedigree of their procedure. In this way, 
a commitment to constructivism can justify a plurality of fundamental principles, so long as each 
would result from an appropriate procedure. 
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 This point might be better seen by comparing three different constructivist views. First, in 
Rawls’s version of Kantian Constructivism, fundamental principles are justified as those that express 
our nature as free and equal moral persons. In determining the principles of justice, we accept the 
principles that persons would agree to under specified conditions because those principles respect our 
nature as free and equal. The principles resulting from such procedures are not merely applications of 
a first principle to a particular context but are themselves constructed as first principles. Second, T.M. 
Scanlon’s contractualism warrants those principles that no one could reasonably reject. If we come to 
recognize that a moral principle could not be reasonably rejected, then we accept it as one of many 
fundamental principles. We do accept these principles as applications of a first principle or as guides 
for how to act in ways that no one could reasonably reject. Third, those who read Kant as a 
constructivist can explain our principles as those that can be willed as universal law. Only those 
maxims that align with these principles will be free of empirical determination, so only those actions 
in accordance with such principles are truly autonomous. In each of these three cases, the 
constructivist procedure results in a plurality of fundamental principles rather than applications of a 
first principles or mere guiding principles. 
 Once we appreciate this aspect of constructivism, we can see why Sidgwick’s argument is 
mistaken. We can recognize that moral conflicts can be definitively settled without an appeal to a 
single first principle. Rather than any one fundamental value--such as the greatest happiness or 
maximal coextensive autonomy--constructivists recognize a plurality of principles that fit with one 
another and settle any moral conflict.
5.2.3 Responses from Conceptions of Rationality
Finally, we could recognize the possibility of other moral theories that accept neither 
constructivism nor that moral conflicts cannot be definitively settled. Implicit in Sidgwick’s 
argument is a typical claim that a decision between two options can be rational only if there is a 
single scale on which they can be compared. Another response to Sidgwick’s argument can deny 
that this is a condition of rational choice.
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 Once example of such a theory is offered by Elizabeth Anderson in Value in Ethics and 
Economics. There, Anderson argues against the view that there is a single overarching standard of 
value. She identifies the appeal of this view in that it can satisfy two demands of practical reason, 
that “reason can settle all question about what to choose” and “that reason requires the global 
maximization of value.”26  If there is only one standard of value, then these two demands can be 
settled by reference to that one value; Reason settles all questions by appeal to maximizing that 
single value. In this way, she recognizes the appeal of a single standard of value as similar to the 
intuition behind Sidgwick’s argument, it allows us to settle any possible value conflict. 
 Anderson argues against this view by rejecting the notion that the values of states-of-
affairs can be globally compared, opting for more contextual guidance in decision-making. 
Practical reason can still settle all questions about what to choose (as it needs to), but we do not 
need to suppose that it does so by reference to some global value. Instead, it only needs to settle 
specific questions within determinate contexts, which it can do by being responsive to relevant 
contextual features. In this way, Anderson gives an example of a third way in which all moral 
conflicts can be settled that does not appeal to constructivism. Specifically, she relies on the 
determinate values that are relevant within a context to settle what to do. 
 Similarly, Henry Richardson offers another example of how practical reason can settle 
value conflicts. In Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, he argues for a kind of reflective 
equilibrium that supports our principles.27  When we recognize that any two principles conflict, 
we should revise one or both principles. We might revise them in any number of ways, but we see 
the conflict as reason why our principles are in need of revision. We do not search for a single 
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foundational principle that resolves all conflict but instead revise our principles for coherence 
amongst themselves.
 So, the most daunting argument against the claims of Chapter 3 is Sidgwick’s view that, if 
all moral conflicts can be definitively settled, then there must be a first principle that is capable of 
settling any conflict. In response, I have first shown that many will deny Sidgwick’s starting 
premise that all conflicts can be settled. Second, I have shown that even those who do not deny 
this starting premise can explain how conflicts are definitively settled without appeal to first 
principles. Constructivism provides a way of settling conflict by appeal to the principles that are 
licensed by an appropriate procedure. Also, nothing blocks more alternative conceptions of 
rationality like those of Anderson’s and Richardson’s, both of which show the problems with 
Sidgwick’s assumption about rationality. Together, these arguments show why we do not need to 
accept a single fully general first principle. 
5.3 Other Arguments for Generalism
Even those who do not think that all moral conflicts can be definitively settled might still think 
that any judgement must be justified by appeal to fully general first principles. For some, this does 
not mean that there is a single first principle; there are many. In this section, I treat three 
arguments that seem to support the idea that there must be first principles from which all 
judgments are justified. The first argues from simplicity, the second from unity and the third from 
our attempts to explain our various moral judgments. In each case, I show that the arguments are 
inadequate to ground generalism. 
5.3.1  Scientific Simplicity
First, one important advantage to broad explanations in science is that they allow us to easily 
understand and apply those explanations. As Quine wrote, “Simplicity also engenders good 
working conditions for the continued activity of the creative imagination; for, the simpler a 
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theory, the more easily we can keep relevant considerations in mind.”28  This might be one reason 
why both laws of nature and ethical principles should be sufficiently broad. By articulating fully 
broad principles that relate to all domain-specific principles, we have “good working conditions” 
for solving our ethical problems.  
 Yet, this is only a point about the advantageousness of simple theories, and does not give 
reason for us to suppose that the simple theory is more correct or reasonable. If Newtonian 
mechanics is simpler or easier to understand than Quantum Mechanics, that is no reason to 
believe that Newtonian Mechanics is true. While we surely have reason to prefer simple and 
broad explanations, there is little reason to suppose that all explanations must be simple and 
broad. Rather, the most important question is whether our explanations adequately explain, 
regardless of whether they are complex and narrow or simple and broad. We might think that the 
simplicity of Kepler’s models defeated Copernicus’s use of epicycles, but the simplicity would not 
count in Kepler’s favor unless its predictions were also more accurate.
 The tendency to suppose fully general ethical principles probably developed from the 
general appreciation of the scientist’s ability to provide simple and broad explanations for our 
observations of the world.  Yet, on what basis can one defend this tendency in ethics? Why would 
we suppose that ethical questions are best answered by broad and simple principles rather than 
restricted or complicated principles? Since the values in life are so diverse and multifaceted, why 
would our ethical principles be any less complex than ethical life itself? Surely, if one asks the 
question, “what is the foundation for all ethics,” one invites an answer that is maximally broad, 
but the tendency to ask that question assumes a view under which it can be answered. While it is 
possible that the best way to treat all these ethical subjects is to find some maximally broad 
principle, it does not need to be the only way. Without some other argument for their similarity, 
we should not assume that the model for physics is appropriate for ethics.
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 Overall, we should recognize that a simple explanation of any complex phenomenon is 
bound to be wrong. Human life is complex, so ethical theory should be hesitant about simplicity. 
Think of all the different pursuits that persons engage in and all the different relationships we 
have. Think of all the different tradeoffs we might face and all the persons we might become. 
Think of all the different responsibilities that might direct us, opportunities that might open to us, 
and understandings that might close to us when we pick one path in life over another. Now think 
of all the lives we could have led had our social world or material conditions been different. 
Human life is astoundingly complex in its subtleties and possibilities. With so many ways of 
engaging with the world and only a single life within which to do so, we should recognize the 
complexities of ethics.
 In science, a simple theory can be elegant but fail to explain the evidence. It would be nice 
if all matter were composed of four elements but, when we use such a theory in the world, the 
world pushes back. When we use our elegant and simple theories for ethics however, the world 
does not push back. Instead, we just see the world in terms of that simpler theory; we see our 
actions as means to happiness or choices as instances of autonomy. What tells against simplicity in 
science does not do so in ethics, so we need to be extra careful of our own theoretical preference 
for simplicity in the case of ethical theory.
5.3.2 The Unity of Ethics
Second, one might argue in favor a broad principles on the basis that they would explain the unity 
of our practical judgments. Typically, we think that our ethical judgements should form a 
coherent whole and an appeal to fully broad principles or values would explain that unity. 
Regardless of the role that such unity plays in resolving conflict, we might take it to be a basic 
condition of ethics that all values form some kind of unity. It is because general principles express 
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a unity amongst our various commitments, that our commitment to ethical unity would lead us 
to think that broad principles have a greater authority. 
 Yet, a commitment to broad first principles is not the only way to explain a unity amongst 
our ethical commitments. Even if we recognize the importance of some unity in ethical 
judgements--which many might not recognize--we do not need to suppose that general principles 
are part of that unity.  For example, Elizabeth Anderson explains the unity of judgments as arising 
from the active constitution of our identities and ideals. She says, “When a person’s psychological 
states are rationally justified, or come tolerably close, they bear expressive relations to one another 
that give them an internal coherence and unity.”29  Alternatively, as we saw in 4.2.2, Rawls 
understand the unity of constructivism as consisting in an appropriate sequence of subject. For 
him, “The underlying unity is provided by the idea that free and equal moral persons are to 
construct reasonable and helpful guidelines for moral reflection in view of their need for such 
organizing principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have.”30  The important 
thing to notice is that both Rawls and Anderson provide alternative ideas of what makes unity 
possible in ethics without general first principles. Both appeal to more contextual judgments but 
Anderson unifies these judgments by appeal to the unity of self while Rawls does so by a practical 
procedure. While fully general principles may provide one way of unifying our ethical 
commitments, general principles are not necessary for such unity. 
 An argument from unity has recently been used by Ronald Dworkin in Justice for 
Hedgehogs, and it might seem like his argument could be used on behalf of fully general first 
principles. After all, Dworkin appeals to an ideal of dignity--the constituent parts of which are 
respect towards others and responsibility for oneself--as defining the unity of all value.31  Yet, we 
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need to be careful to separate the whole of Dworkin’s positive proposal from his specific argument 
for unity.32  This specific argument arises from Dworkin’s understanding of morality and ethics as 
independent of the scientific world of brute facts. As he says in the introduction, “Value 
judgments are true, when they are true, not in virtue of any matching but in view of the 
substantive case that can be made for them.”33 Since our values depend upon the cases that will be 
made for them, our justification will depend on other values. It is from this that Dworkin now 
supposes that an ideal--fully responsible--agent’s values would be fully complementary and 
mutually supporting. The core idea is that our arguments for our values depend on our other 
values, so a fully worked out conception of value must bring our values into a broader unity.34 
Since there is no realm of value independent of our argument for our values, we cannot say that 
the fully harmonized conception of value gets anything wrong. It can only fail to make the case 
for itself. 
 While I find Dworkin’s argument about the independence of morality and ethics quite 
appealing and tend to agree that the vindication of a value judgment depends only how it is 
supported by other values, I do not see how this argument could be used in favor of fully general 
first principles--or even in favor of the unity of value. The reason why it could not favor fully 
general first principles is because that would prejudge the final interpretation of how our values 
hang together. Why would we think that our values must ultimately support one another through 
fully general first principles? Whether we ought to accept such principles depends on whether our 
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acceptance of them is supported by our other values. Even if his arguments show that value 
judgments cannot conflict, there are other ways of resolving conflicts than by appeal to fully 
general first principles--as the arguments against Sidgwick show. Even if Dworkin’s argument gets 
us unity, it does not get us unity through first principles. That comes only through the more 
arduous task of showing what understanding of morality and ethics is best. 
 A second problem goes closer to the core of Dworkin’s project. He argues from (a) the 
idea that value judgments depend on their supportability by other value judgements, to (b) the 
mutual supportability of value judgments for a fully responsible moral agent, 35  to (c) the fact that 
values do not conflict, to (d) the unity of value. For the sake of argument, I will assume that (c) 
and (d) are mutually interchangeable; I assume that the unity of value is nothing more than the 
fact that values do not conflict. If they do differ, then I see no argument that would get from (c) to 
(d). This is worth pointing out because it emphasizes the way in which “unity,” for Dworkin, is 
nothing more than a lack of conflict. With this point aside, my bigger concern is with the move 
from (b) to (c); I see little reason to suppose that the mutual supportability of values supposes the 
lack of conflict between values. We can--and Dworkin does--imagine a scheme of values whereby 
there is no principled way to settle conflicts. There is nothing that rules out this possibility, and 
Dworkin even acknowledges this when he writes, 
“There is another possibility. It might be that for some reason the best 
interpretation of our values requires that they conflict: they serve our underlying 
moral responsibilities best if we conceive of them in such a way that from time to 
time we must compromise one to serve another. Values don’t conflict just because 
they do, but because they work best for us when we conceptualize them so that 
they do. That is a conceivable view, and perhaps someone might make it seem 
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plausible...It would provide an interpretation that reconciles values in a different 
way: by showing conflict as deeper collaboration.”36
In this passage, Dworkin recognizes a possible view that would block the move from (b) to (c). If 
we see conflict between values as the best way to show the mutual supportability of our values, 
then we do not get to the fact that values do not conflict. This is an odd passage because Dworkin 
does not explain why this view would be implausible and he does not say why this interpretation 
of values would be a “deeper collaboration.” To what end would our values then be collaborating? 
We can only suppose that they are working together if we assume the unity of value, but that is the 
very thing that this view blocks the argument towards. 
 My suggestion is that our commitment to the mutual supportability of values does not 
license a commitment to the lack of conflict in values. Accordingly, Dworkin lacks an argument 
for value unity. It is of course true that his full view presents a picture of of ethics that is unified, 
and his picture might end up being the very best. However, his arguments do not show that we 
should accept the unity of value unless we accept his whole view. 
 As a final point in favor of my argument, I want to point out the incongruity between the 
unity that Dworkin supposes is in ethics and the disunity that he supposes in interpretation. In 
order to make sense of interpretation in all its guises, Dworkin gives a disunified conception of 
interpretation. What makes for a good interpretation depends on the particular genre within 
which the interpretation is given. What makes for an interpretation of the law substantially differs 
from an interpretation of Hamlet. In each case, what makes for interpretation depends on the 
values implicit in the practices of that genre.37  In this story, Dworkin gives a disunified 
conception of interpretation in order to best interpret it. What would block the same kind of 
disunified conception from being the best interpretation of our values?
Against Generalism: The Principles for the Basic Structure as Fundamental Principles
 - 196 -
36 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 120.
37 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 130-144.
4.3.3 The “Why?” question
While broad first principles are not necessary for unity across ethics, these principles do seem to 
satisfy a different need for explanation. Suppose we could show a consistent set of range-limited 
principles that adequately captured our moral convictions and gave us guidance in our decisions. 
Still we would wonder why these principles were adequate, and why they were adequate for their 
particular ranges. This would seemingly require some general principle that could explain why a 
principle is fit for a particular range. Henry Sidgwick presses this intuition in Methods of Ethics 
when he writes, 
Even granting that these rules can be so defined as perfectly to fit together and 
cover the whole field of human conduct, without coming into conflict and without 
leaving any practical questions unanswered,--still the resulting code seems an 
accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in need of rational synthesis. In 
short, without being disposed to deny that conduct commonly judged to be right 
is so, we may yet require some deeper explanation of why it is so. From this 
demands springs the third species or phase of Intuitionism, which...to get one or 
more principles more absolutely and and undeniably true and evident, from which 
the current rules may be deduced.”38
In this quotation, Sidgwick emphasizes that it is not the need to avoid practical conflict alone that 
leads us towards first principles from which judgments can be deduced, but also the need to 
answer why the principles we accept are the right principles. It might seem like fully general first 
principles can adequately answer this why question. 
 In his book, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Henry Richardson focuses on 
Sidgwick’s claim, trying to understand exactly why Sidgwick aims to find fully general first 
principles in order to put ethics on a rational basis. To be more particular, Richardson imagines 
two principles of limited scope that do not conflict and asks why Sidgwick would demand that 
these two principles be explained by a broader first principle. As an example, he uses the two 
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principles “benevolence towards one’s friends, implacable justice to strangers” because there is no 
conflict in what the principles require. Richardson points out that Sidgwick seems to suppose that 
an adequate answer to the “why?” question must provide a reason that “(a) is of wider scope than 
the two subordinated principles because it concerns itself with what should happen on both sides 
of the scope restriction (in our example, with both friends and strangers), and (b) can soundly or 
appropriately override each of these two subordinated principles.”39  In this way, Richardson views 
the Sidgwick model as proposing a kind of “judicial” model of practical reasoning wherein 
“Principles of superior validity thus sit in judgment over lesser principles, overruling them when 
necessary and settling their boundaries.”40
 Richardson’s arguments against Sidgwick are primarily challenges to this judicial model of 
practical reasoning. After all, his ultimate concern is to understand the structure of practical 
reason, so Sidgwick’s claims about practical reason are his primary concern. He makes two 
separate points against this model, both of which are important to see for us to reject broad first 
principles as answering the why question. First, Richardson points out that we are rarely as 
confident with our general and broad principles as we are about our beliefs about particulars.41 
So, why would we think that we would get an more authoritative verdict by appealing to the 
broader principle we are less confident in? Second, Richardson argues that it involves a 
problematic dissociation to the self. If one set of our values pulls in one way, and a different set of 
our values pulls in another way, then in settling the issue by appeal to a superior authority, we 
distance ourselves from the values that pull us. As Richardson puts it,
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41 “Among normative judgments that stand most firm are some quite concrete, even particular ones--about the evil 
of the Holocaust or the My Lai massacre, about the admirable character of Mother Theresa’s work with the poor 
and sick of Calcutta....Similarly, an author may be more firmly attached to the project of writing a particular books 
that to any description of his or her ends in so doing...In both the moral and practical arenas, then, the most 
concrete propositions are among the firmest.” (ibid., 138)
“It would be an oddly dissociated person who generally felt a distance from his 
competing desires and commitments as a judge is supposed to be from parties 
who come before her...How can you decide a case fairly when you are sleeping 
with both the plaintiff and the defendant?”42
The basic idea in this criticism is that thinking of fully general principles as fully authoritative in 
practical conflicts would not adequately recognize the particular cares we have that give rise to 
the conflict.43  Deliberation, for Richardson, is more about finding a way to adequately respect 
both sides of the conflict, to “meet in the middle,”44 than it is to look towards principles outside of 
the concerns themselves. Both these reasons seem to suggest that the judicial model is not an 
appropriate understanding of our practical reasoning. 
 If the judicial understanding is not a proper understanding of practical reasoning, then 
what reason do we have to think that a fully general principle would answer the why question of 
ethics any better than principles that are not fully general. If we had some proof of a moral theory 
that consisted of first principles, which grounded all other principles, then we would have reason 
to think that such first principles justified all others. Yet, it would be the proof of this moral 
theory that answered our why question and not that fact that they are general principles. Any 
such proof of this moral theory could not rely on the claim that first principles better explain all 
our other principles--as Sidgwick’s argument does. Yet, barring such proof, we cannot suppose 
that the best answer to our why question would necessarily involve general first principles. One 
might appeal to simplicity or unity to make that argument, but I have already shown why we have 
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“the problem of dirty hands”. There Walzer argues that the politician ought to get his hands dirty, but that he ought 
to suffer the punishment for doing so. This is the proper way of valuing both the reasons for getting his hands 
dirty and the reasons against it. To suppose that the dirty hands politician is right to dirty his hands and therefore 
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44 Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, 140. 
no reason to suppose that ethical life is simple or that general principles are the only way to get 
ethical unity. 
 So, without an appeal to simplicity, unity, the structure of practical reason or a proof of 
valid first principles, the argument that first principles explain our moral principles best is 
ungrounded. We have no reason to think that first principles would better answer the why 
question than would an account that did not rely on any such principles. 
5.3.4 Defending Against Generalism
Without an argument from simplicity, unity, or explanation, it is not clear how one can ground 
the claim that broader principles have greater authority. So, it is not clear why someone who is not 
committed to the greater authority of broad principles can be convinced of it. We are left with a 
distinction between those committed to a theoretical intuition, and those not committed to it. 
 I know of no ways by which this difference can be settled than by showing that one moral 
theory does better for what we want a moral theory to do than another. Until I am shown a 
reason why a moral theory that involves broad first principles does better than any that do not, 
then I see no reason to be committed to such a view. However, I do think there are prima facie 
reasons why a moral theory that relies on general first principles to directly settle all moral 
conflicts would do worse than moral theories that do not. Explaining these prima facie reasons is 
the goal of the next section.
5.4 Objection to Generalism
I’ve defined generalism as the view that fully general first principles directly settle all moral and 
ethical conflicts. The most common form of generalism is act-utilitarianism, but we can likewise 
identify certain forms of Kantianism or value pluralism as also committed to generalism. My 
remarks in §4.2 and §4.3 are meant to block various arguments that might seem to show that one 
must be committed to generalism, but I have not given any reason to reject a commitment to 
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generalism. The goal of this section is to give one brief reason why I think such a commitment is 
morally problematic. 
 One alternative to generalism--and the alternative that I am concerned with defending in 
this dissertation--is the view that our social context affects the moral principles that appropriately 
regulate our actions. If persons generally recognize a practice of property that can be sufficiently 
justified, then persons have an obligation to follow the rules of property. If persons generally 
recognize a legal system, then persons have an obligation to follow the law. If flaunting certain 
norms would express disrespect, then persons ought to follow those norms. It is true that a 
generalist can often explain why we should respect property, obey a law, or follow etiquette in any 
particular instance by arguing that some fully general principle applied to the circumstances 
would show that we should do that which respects property, obeys a law, or follows etiquette. 
They might even say that, given the facts, it will generally be the case that we should do these 
things,  so “respect property,” “follow the law,” and “follow etiquette” will be good heuristics for 
guiding our action. However, the generalist cannot make sense of our having an obligation to 
respect property, follow the law, or follow etiquette. Doing so would mean that not all legitimate 
justifications appeal directly to first principles. In such a case, we would need to appeal to the 
rules of our social practices as legitimately determining how we should act. Our moral conflicts 
would be settled by the particularities of our social context. Such a view would no longer be 
generalist. 
 To focus on one example, one could either explain the obligation to respect property as 
either (a) a natural obligation, (b) not really an obligation, or (c) a practice-dependent obligation. 
If (a), then one must claim that property, in all its specificity, is a natural obligation. Even if one is 
willing to bite this bullet for property, there is a wider range of obligations that seem 
conventional, which one would also need to explain as a natural duty. For example, if one 
recognizes a citizen’s obligation to vote, this would need to be justified as a natural duty as well. If 
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(b), then one claims that it is only the case that we often should respect property claims, and not 
that we truly have an obligation to do so. This is the act-utilitarian route. I have claimed that the 
best option was (c), which requires that we recognize our obligation to respect property as 
contingent; they rely on the general recognition of norms of property. When such a system is 
adequately justified, we have reason to respect property. 
 Here, I want to expand on this argument and better explain why I think option (c) is the 
best way to think about obligations like property. As I also indicated in the last two chapters, there 
are many more aspects of social life beyond obligation that I think are dependent on the 
particularities of a social structure. The virtues that we aspire to, the values that direct our 
activities, and relationships that we care about are also given their particular form within a social 
context. So, my argument is meant not only to defend practice-dependent obligations, like 
property, but practice-dependent values, virtues, and relationships. 
 The first step of my argument is to point out the ways in which contingent features of our 
social world are important to us. Many of our goals only make sense as goals within a particular 
society; for example, the goal to get tenure or to write a particular book. How we think of our 
selves is also tied to the social roles we occupy or our particular hobbies; to see oneself as 
American, or as an academic, or as someone who likes to sail or paint. Moreover, many of the 
norms that we have internalized are conventional. We can recognize that a morally seamless life, 
in which our aims our integrated with appropriate moral constraints, is an ideal. Yet, this ideal 
only occurs when we have internalized moral constraints into our daily behavior, and this will 
often mean integrating conventional constraints--such as our respect for property. Once 
internalized in this way, these norms are important to who we are and how we live. In all the 
various ways that we plan our life, we plan it against a background of social expectations. We rely 
on the fact that there are authorities, such as judges, that decide conflicts. That we feel obligated to 
such an authority may be contingent, but it is nonetheless an important part of how we plan our 
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lives. In many more ways than I can go into here, the contingencies of our social life specify what 
matters to us.  
 The second step of the argument is to insist that the right view of morality must respect 
what is important to us and--more importantly--what is important to others. Beginning in the 
1980s, there was a swath of philosophical articles and books that stressed the ways in which 
morality should not be over-demanding.45  Samuel Scheffler expressed this point as arguing that 
morality should be human; it should fit with the kinds of creatures that we are.46  A morality that 
did not respect what was important to us and important to others would be burdensome to us, 
but it would also be inhuman in other ways. We are social creatures, who build our lives with 
others according to conventional rules and contingent norms, and morality ought to be sensitive 
to the ways in which our lives are socially embedded. How we understand ourselves, our lives and 
our relationships with others are influenced by the contingencies of society. A morality that was 
not sensitive to these contingencies would not be a human morality. This is apparent from a first 
person perspective because we would not want to be bound by a morality that did not fit with the 
lives we lead, but it is even more apparent in how we should live with others. We do not want to 
treat others according to moral norms that do not respect what is important to them.47 
 With these two points established, the problem with the generalist view is that it does not 
respect what is important to us and others because it does not respect the contingent features of 
our moral context. According to this view, how we ought to choose is directly determined by 
fundamental principles that hold across all social contexts. The generalist might recognize 
particularities of our society as social facts that bear on the application of general principles, but it 
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47 All this is even more true if we recognize that any moral argument we make must, ultimately, link up to what 
persons would choose. No moral argument, no matter how rooted in natural or metaphysical fact, would do the 
job of convincing one how to act if it did not seem to fit with an agents core concerns. 
does not treat the practices of society as having any significance for us. Once we see who we are 
and what we care about as crucially linked to the particularities of our social structure, this makes 
generalist morality quite alienating. The fundamental principle of the generalist are imposed 
upon us and our society rather than being a manifestation of who we are. 
 By contrast, a theory that recognizes contingency in ethical life can properly respect the 
way that particularities of the social structure are important to us. If our claims to property and to 
other conventional rights are important to us, a conception of morality that puts our property 
claims and conventional rights on a firm foundation respects what is important to us. I have 
throughout argued for a view of morality that is sensitive to our social context, partly because 
such a view of morality better expresses who we are. 
 The obvious objection to this view is that it seems too relativistic. To admit this kind of 
contingency in ethical life might seem to say that all of ethics and morality is contingent. To say 
that are social structure establishes certain values, virtues, relationships and obligations might 
seem to say that all there is to ethics is a particular social structure. 
 If the only way to develop such a view were to accept relativism, then I would recognize 
that this would be an objection to the view. I recognize that relativism is inadequate as a moral 
theory. Yet, saying that ethical life is sensitive to the particularities of our society is not to say that 
it is fully determined by the particularities of our society. A view of ethical and moral life that is 
sensitive to our moral context does not deny that there are many obligations, values, virtues are 
relationships that are directly justified by absolute principles. For example, it might be immoral in 
any society to deceive or murder. It also does not deny that there are certain obligations, values, 
virtues and relationships that are justified by absolute principles but need to be specified within a 
particular social context. For example, Barbara Herman has argued that the imperfect duty of 
beneficence is specified into particular moral requirements only in a society.48 Others might think 
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that there is a natural right to property, but that right is specified within particular social 
communities. In either case, the absolute principles that surpass any particular community are 
still an important element of ethical life. 
 The broader point of this dissertation is to show why the view developed here is not 
relativist in yet another sense. The particular practices that explain much of the contingency in 
ethical life are themselves open to assessment. The fact that they establish certain obligations, 
values, virtues or relationships does not make those practices any more prima facie justified. It 
remains the case that our assessment of these institutions will often be sensitive to the moral 
context those institutions are set within--as argued in §3.2.2. Yet, our assessment of the basic 
structure institutions does not occur within any moral context. They are the institutions that the 
vast majority of our practices occur within, so they establish a moral context rather than being 
situated within one. Accordingly, the proper way to assess the basic structure institutions is by 
values that are outside of moral context. We ought to assess these institutions by appeal to 
absolute moral principles that are independent of social particularity. From there, we can assess 
the various institutions within a moral context that is justified by absolute moral principles. It is in 
this way that the basic structure acts as a mooring for ethical life. As argued in Chapter 4, the 
particularities of our society and culture will swash the content of ethical life one way or another, 
but our ethical life stays tethered to non-relativist moral ground so long as our basic structure is 
justified by absolute principles,
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Chapter 6
The Concept of Justice 
“Plainly we cannot grapple adequately with the issue if we see it as one concerning the 
proprieties of linguistic usage. For what really is at stake is the comparative merit of a wider or 
narrower concept...If we are to make a reasoned choice between these concepts, it must be 
because one is superior to the other in the way in which it will assist our theoretical inquires, 
or advance and clarify our moral deliberations, or both.”                            
      -H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 209 
With the work of the past four chapters complete, we can now return to the topic of justice. I have 
defended the claim that “the basic structure has primacy as a distinct moral subject,” but the more 
typical Rawlsian claim is that “the basic structure is the primary subject of justice.”1  I choose to 
make the former claim because the value of taking the basic structure as subject transcends any 
particular view about justice. Our political and moral theory should recognize the primacy of the 
basic structure regardless of our particular understanding of justice as an ideal. 
 Most objections to the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure come from alternative 
articulations of justice that show why the basic structure is not the primary subject of justice. 
Unfortunately, these arguments are unlikely to resolve any conflicts. More often than not, one’s 
views about justice are fitted to our broader moral and theoretical commitments. We do not share 
significant agreement over what justice is such that appeals to justice could settle our 
disagreements. Arguments about the nature of justice might provide helpful contrasts between 
moral views, but they are unlikely to settle the deep disagreements that typically divide 
philosophers. So, I have sought to construct an argument that appeals to notions that are less 
contentious than a conception of justice. In particular, I have tried to show that those who accept 
a limited form of moral conventionalism should recognize the primacy of the basic structure as a 
distinct moral subject.
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 Yet, I cannot merely ignore those arguments that start from a conception of justice. While 
I do not think that arguments about the nature of justice are the best way to vindicate the primacy 
of the basic structure, others think that arguments about the nature of justice are the best way to 
defeat the primacy of the basic structure. I need to address claims about the nature of justice 
insofar as they are an objection to the view I defend. That is the central task of this chapter. 
 In particular, I am concerned with two objections that begin with a claim about justice. 
According to the first, we misrepresent justice by focusing on the basic structure of society. 
Suppose we recognize that the basic structure should be just, and we set out to determine moral 
principles that apply to the basic structure. We are then likely to conceive of the principles we 
come to accept as principles of justice. This, in turn, is likely to skew our perspective towards 
justice more generally. We will think that the moral demands on the basic structure indicate the 
moral demands of justice tout court. Thereby we run the risk of misrepresenting justice by 
associating the broader ideal with its limited application to the basic structure. As an example, 
suppose that justice requires equality of treatment, and we determine that a just basic structure 
equalizes each person’s opportunities for securing social goods. It would misrepresent justice if we 
took it to require equality of opportunities for social goods. We would be representing the 
demands of justice as more limited than they really are. More generally, if justice requires X and 
this requires that a basic structure meet condition Y, it would be wrong to understand justice as Y. 
We would misunderstand an application of justice as justice itself. In this way, one’s focus on the 
basic structure might be objectionable because it misrepresents justice. 
 The second objection claims that we must determine what justice requires in order to 
determine the correct principles for the basic structure. While I have argued that the basic 
structure has primacy as a moral subject, one might claim that articulating an ideal of justice has 
greater primacy. After all, such an ideal is necessary to properly understand how the basic 
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structure could be just. Accordingly, we should primarily be focused on articulating what justice 
requires and not on how the basic structure should be organized. 
 If these objections relied on a particular conception of justice, then they would not be that 
problematic. The objections would then only be offering a contrast between conceptions of 
justice. What makes these objections more forceful is that they seek to identify standards that any 
conceptions of justice must meet. They do not start from such premises as “justice consists in 
equality” or “justice consists in respect for natural rights.” Instead, they appeal to the way that 
justice figures into our practical reasoning and moral debate. The first objection supposes that any 
adequate conception of justice is broader than the demands it places on the basic structure. The 
second objection supposes that any adequate conception of justice has justificatory primacy. In 
this way, the arguments start from conditions on the concept of justice. These two objections start 
from premises about how the idea of justice fits within our moral deliberation and debate. 
 Since the objections start from claims about the concept of justice, my response offers a 
perspective towards how we should think about the concept of justice. I do not argue against any 
conception but against the concept of justice that these objections appeal to. To do so, I will 
contrast two ways that the ideal of justice figures in our deliberation and debate. A concept of 
justice might be “unified” or “disunified.”
 If one conceives of the concept of justice as “unified,” then one supposes that the demands 
of justice can be articulated as a single moral demand across the various objects that might be 
considered just or unjust. We could, in theory, identify a single property that all just institutions, 
persons, actions, dispositions and societies have. In this way, a unified concept of justice is 
Platonic in that it identifies justice as having a particular essence instantiated in each just thing. 
By contrast, a “disunified” concept of justice holds that the demands of justice differ from one 
subject to the next. What makes for a just law is different than what makes for a just person, and 
what makes for a just basic structure can be different from what makes for a just action. In this 
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way, a disunified concept of justice is like a deontologist’s concept of rightness; what is “right” is 
determined by a principle that applies in that circumstance rather than by a single principle that 
applies across all circumstances. Likewise, what is “just” is determined by a principle that applies 
to that subject and not by a single principle that applies across all subjects. 
 In response to the two objections, I argue for a disunified concept of justice over a unified 
concept. Instead of thinking that “a particular is just if it instantiates a unified and general ideal,” 
we should think that “a particular is just if it satisfies a principle of justice that applies to it.” 
Beyond the formal property of satisfying a principle of justice, I argue that there does not need to 
be a single property that makes all just things just.2  To determine whether something is just, we 
need not look for a single, unified and fully general principle of justice. Instead, we look to see 
whether that object satisfies a principle of justice.
 If one accepts a disunified concept of justice, then neither of the two above objections is a 
problem. First, focusing on the basic structure would not misrepresent justice. Determining how 
the basic structure should be does not influence how we should think about justice more 
generally because we can recognize that the principles of justice for the basic structure might be 
distinct from a principle of justice for other subjects. In determining how the basic structure 
should be, we could be seen as determining an appropriate principle of justice for the basic 
structure without making claims about justice as a whole. Second, we would not need to first 
articulate the demands of justice in order to determine how the basic structure should be because 
there is no single demand of justice for all subjects. We do not obviously reason from a prior and 
broad ideal to the instances of that ideal. 
 My primary concern is in responding to these two objection, but a disunified conception 
of justice also allows me to better explain why the basic structure could be “the primary subject of 
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justice.” It might seem odd to make this claim once we accept a disunified concept. After all, if 
something is just when it satisfies a principle of justice, then why would one subject of justice be 
more primary than another? However, I argue that it is the primacy of the basic structure as a 
moral subject that makes the basic structure the primary subject of justice. The particularities of 
our basic structure have profound and pervasive effect on our moral context, and this makes it a 
primary concern. In this way, the arguments of the past four chapters combine with a disunified 
conception of justice to show why the basic structure might be properly understood as the 
primary subject of justice. 
 The argument of this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I motivate the importance of 
the argument in §6.1 by showing the ways in which G.A. Cohen’s most developed criticism of 
Rawls relies on a unified concept of justice. Over the years, Cohen has made a lineage of 
arguments against Rawls, and they end with an argument that the Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. Those who are not interested in seeing how 
Cohen’s argument developed between 1992 and 2009 can skip ahead to §6.1.3. There, I show how 
Cohen’s most developed arguments rely on a unified concept of justice. By arguing on behalf of a 
disunified concept, this chapter addresses the most developed form of Cohen’s argument. 
 In §6.2, I give two arguments against a unified concept of justice. My first argument seeks 
to show how a disunified concept can better capture the argument between those who offer 
alternative conceptions of justice because it allows for both unified and disunified conceptions of 
justice. My second argument seeks to show that a disunified concept is more aligned with the way 
in which we treat justice as having a kind of “preeminence.” The fact that something is often 
means that it is as it should be, and a disunified concept can more easily fit with this feature of 
justice. I end my argument in §6.3 by responding to an important objection. My response to this 
objection allows me to explain how the basic structure might be rightfully identified as the 
primary subject of justice. 
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 I do not doubt that there is a strong intuitive pull towards thinking about justice as a 
single unified ethical demand. Much about our use of the idea pulls us to articulate a single sense 
of justice that explains why all things are just. What I mean to show here is the problem with 
thinking that justice must be a single moral demand. There is nothing conceptually necessary 
about treating justice as a unified and general moral demand, and I think we can give a better 
conception of justice that is not unified and general.
6.1 The Development and Force of Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: A Review
The lineage of arguments represented in Cohen’s 2009 book began with his 1992 Tanner Lectures 
titled “Incentives, Equality and Community.”3  In these Tanner Lectures, Cohen took issue with an 
intuitive motivation for Rawls’s difference principle. The difference principle justifies inequalities 
when they are to the advantage of the worst off, and such justified inequalities are typically 
thought possible only because persons work harder when incentivized to do so, thereby yielding 
benefits for all. Yet, Cohen points out, this only occurs when the incentivized hold their hard 
work hostage for the incentive; the worst off could be even better off if the incentivized were 
willing to work hard without the incentive. Cohen emphasizes that if persons really accepted the 
difference principle, then they would not demand such incentives. In this way, Cohen argued that 
mutual acceptance of Rawls’s difference principle requires a much more egalitarian society than 
most recognize; it requires a society of persons who work to the advantage of the worst off 
without requiring incentives to do so.
 This line of argument was sharpened in a 1995 article where Cohen argues against Brian 
Barry’s argument for the difference principle.4  Barry’s argument comes in two steps; we start 
from a prima facie commitment to the justice of equality, and then recognize that each is made 
better off in a society structured by the difference principle. Accordingly, even the worst off 
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prefer a society structured according to the difference principle rather than equality. Yet, 
echoing his earlier argument, Cohen replies that a society organized in accordance with the 
difference principle is preferable only because the well-situated choose to act unjustly. If 
equality is prima facie just, then those who demand incentives to work towards the 
improvement of the worst off are working against equality, and thus against justice. 
Accordingly, Barry’s argument “accedes to injustice in its account of what justice is.” Yet, even if 
Cohen’s argument stands against Barry’s view, it does not stand against Rawls’s. Rawls does not 
recognize equality as a prima facie just starting point, and Rawlsians should not do so. 
Accordingly, this 1995 article plays a minor role in Cohen’s substantive argument against Rawls. 
 Cohen’s more important argument was published in 1997 and titled “Where the Action is: 
On the Site of Distributive Justice.” There, Cohen is centrally concerned with responding to a 
Rawlsian objection to his original 1992 argument. The conclusion of the original argument was 
that acceptance of the difference principle should lead members of society to refuse those 
incentives offered to make the worse off better off. Yet, the Rawlsian can respond that the 
difference principle applies only to the basic structure of society, and so its acceptance would not 
have any impact on personal decisions. To extend the difference principle to individual choices 
would be like supposing that if one accepts that (a) governments should not favor a particular 
religion, they should accept that (b) individuals should not favor any particular religion. In this 
way, the Rawlsian appeals to the distinction between principles for individuals and principles for 
institutions.
  What has made Cohen the primary interlocutor in the arguments of this dissertation is 
how he responds to this distinction between individual and institutional principles. He offers a 
number of different responses that I have addressed at various points in my arguments. 
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6.1.1 The first argument: profound and pervasive effects
In “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,”5  Cohen argues that any principle that 
applies only to the basic structure is problematic because there was no way in which the Rawlsian 
could adequately distinguish the basic structure from individual choices. He writes, “a major fault 
line in the Rawlsian architectonic not only wrecks the basic structure objection but also produces 
a dilemma for Rawls’s view of the subject of justice....The fault line exposes itself when we ask the 
apparently simple question: what (exactly) is the basic structure?” Cohen recognizes two ways of 
answering this question; the basic structure is understood as the coercive structure or it is not. If 
defined as the coercive structure, it conflicts with the Rawlsian aim of assessing those aspects of 
society that have profound effects because more than the coercive structure has such effects. If it 
is not defined as the coercive structure, then it must necessarily involve personal choices, which 
would make the difference principle apply to personal choices. Given this dilemma, the basic 
structure cannot be distinguished as subject. Since it cannot be distinguished as subject, the 
Rawlsian cannot reply that the difference principle applies only to the basic structure. Thus, if the 
difference principle is an appropriate principle of justice, it must be applied to individual choices.
 After the publication of Cohen’s 1997 article, the Rawlsian responses to Cohen’s criticism 
proliferate and Cohen’s arguments against these responses proliferate in return. The three above-
mentioned articles form the first three chapters of Cohen’s 2009 book, and the remaining chapters 
of the book develop the argument further. We do wrong, however, to think that Rescuing Justice 
and Equality is merely a clarification and extension of the views expressed in “Where the Action 
is.” In fact, there is a significant alteration of his argument stated in an 2008 appendix to the 1997 
article and corroborated by an important change in the text. In 1997, the second horn of the 
dilemma is based on the claim that there is no way to distinguish the basic structure from 
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individual choices, but the 2008 appendix admits that there is a way to distinguish structure from 
individual choice. He writes, 
“Actions are, in general, no part of the basic structure, because a structure, in the 
present sense of the term, is a set of rules, and actions are not members of sets of 
rules. So the relevant customary actions...are nevertheless not themselves a set of 
rules. My point is not that daily behavior, including ‘individual market behavior,’ is 
part of the basic structure but that it is so closely related to what must on pain of 
arbitrariness be included in the basic structure, to wit, the informal structure 
demanded by justice, that it too, that is, daily behavior, comes under the same 
principles of justice that judge structure properties of justice.”6
Read alongside the 1997 article, this is an odd passage. In 1997, the second horn of Cohen’s 
dilemma relies on the claim that there is no adequate way of distinguishing the basic structure 
from personal choice. Yet, in the above passage, Cohen admits that there is a way of doing this 
because “a structure...is a set of rules and actions are not members of sets of rules.” In this way, he 
seems to undermine his argument from 1997.
 However, this is no issue for Cohen because he has a new argument. In 2008, the claim is 
that the informal structure of society must “on pain of arbitrariness” be included in the basic 
structure. Yet, if the distinction between the basic structure and personal choices is a real one--as 
he admits in the passage--then why would distinguishing the two be arbitrary? Cohen here relies 
on another implicit argument to show that the distinction between the basic structure and 
personal choice might be possible but is nonetheless ethically arbitrary. The distinction could be 
made, but it could not be justified. 
 Why would this distinction be ethically arbitrary? Cohen gives two different answers in 
Rescuing Justice and Equality. The first answer is contained in a 2008 change to the text of “Where 
the Action is.” There, Cohen argues the distinction is ethically arbitrary because any reason to be 
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concerned with the basic structure is likewise a reason to be concerned with personal choices. In 
a passage added in 2008, he writes, 
“Structure and choice remain distinguishable, but not from the point of view of the 
applicability to them of principles of justice (at any rate when, as it is ex hypothesi 
the case here, they are thought to apply because of the fateful consequences of that 
to which they apply: you cannot bring the informal norm into the compass of 
justice for that reason without also bringing within its compass the action that 
gives the norm substance and that account for much, if not most, of the effect).”7
For Cohen, if our reason to be concerned with the basic structure is the profound effects they 
have on our life, we must also be concerned with personal choices because they have similar 
effects. The distinction would be ethically arbitrary because our grounds for concern with one 
also grounds a concern with the other. Readers will notice that in making this argument in 2008, 
his treatment of the second horn of his dilemma is now the same as his treatment of the first 
horn. Whether the basic structure is defined coercively or not, distinguishing the basic structure 
from personal choice is ethically arbitrary because both have profound effects. Accordingly, 
Cohen’s 2008 argument is that Rawls cannot justify a focus on the basic structure from an appeal 
to profound effects. There is no longer any dilemma for Rawls, but this single argument. 
 Yet, this argument relies on a mistaken reading of Rawls, and Cohen’s concern with 
profound effects is only a distraction. Appeal to profound effects was not meant to explain why 
Rawls focuses on the basic structure rather than other aspects of society. It was instead meant to 
explain why the organization of the basic structure is of such ethical importance. In comparing 
this concern with the basic structure to other ethical concerns, the basic structure is of such high 
importance because it has profound and pervasive effects. In short, the appeal to profound and 
pervasive effects is not meant to answer the question “what distinguishes the basic structure from 
other ethical concerns?” but to instead answer “why is the concern with a basic structure primary 
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amongst ethical concerns otherwise distinguished.”8  The organization of the basic structure has 
profound and pervasive effects, so it is ethically important that we address it. The informal 
structure of society also has profound and pervasive effects, so it is ethically important that we 
address it as well. Yet, the fact that both the informal structure and basic structure are ethically 
important is no reason to address them together as a single subject.
6.1.2 Cohen’s second argument: the scope of justice
Since Rawls does not appeal to the “profundity of effects” criterion9  to distinguish his concern 
with the basic structure, Cohen’s first argument to show that this distinction is ethical arbitrary 
does not succeed. However, Cohen has a second argument. This second argument is contained 
neither in the 1997 article nor in the 2008 edits, but it runs through the remaining chapters of 
Rescuing Justice and Equality. According to this second argument, the reason why we should not 
distinguish the basic structure is because doing so is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. To 
make this point, Cohen turns his attention to clarifying the nature of justice. Once we see what 
kind of requirement justice must be, we can see why it is arbitrary to distinguish structure and 
choice from the perspective of justice. 
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 To show what kind of requirement justice must be, Cohen appeals to a theory of 
justification.10  He argues that all justification proceeds by appeal to more fundamental ethical 
principles. While the justification of any particular act, judgment or principle might go in many 
stages--appealing to still more fundamental principles at each stage--this process bottoms out at 
fundamental normative principles. These fundamental normative principles express our core 
ethical commitments, which are often implicit and cannot themselves be justified. 
 Cohen uses this model of justification in two related arguments. First, in Chapter 6,  “The 
Facts,” Cohen argues against those theorists who ground a conception of justice on certain facts. 
The basic argument is that any principle that is based on certain facts can only be justified if a 
more fundamental principle shows those facts to be morally relevant. For example, the utilitarian 
might support a moral principle that we ought to protect religious freedom, and she might argue 
for this moral principle based on the fact that doing so would promote happiness. Yet, this fact is 
only relevant because of her acceptance of the more fundamental principle that we ought to do 
that which promotes happiness. Since facts are only relevant because more fundamental 
principles make them so, the most fundamental principles cannot be based on facts. In short, 
fundamental ethical principles must be fact-free. 
 The second argument where Cohen uses his model of justification is against 
constructivism about justice in Chapter 7. In this chapter, Cohen argues that constructivism 
mistakes “rules of regulation” for fundamental normative principles. He defines rules of 
regulation as rules we adopt to order our choices, and this distinguishes them from fundamental 
principles because rules of regulation are chosen whereas fundamental normative principles are 
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unchosen. Cohen argues one determines “how the basic structure ought to be organized” by 
choosing a rule of regulation that addresses this question. Since we choose such a rule of 
regulation, we will need to justify that choice. To do this, we need to (eventually) appeal to a 
fundamental normative principle. Moreover, if we think that rule that applies to the basic 
structure is a principle “of justice,” then we must appeal to a fundamental normative principle “of 
justice.” 
 Accordingly, Cohen concludes that even Rawlsian constructivists must be committed to 
fundamental principles of justice. In order to justify a rule of regulation for the basic structure, 
the Rawlsian needs to implicitly use a fundamental principle of justice. Bringing Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 together, Cohen claims that all Rawlsian constructivists must ultimately be committed 
to a fundamental and fact-free principle of justice. Rawls’s two principles of justice are merely 
rules of regulation, which need to be ultimately justified by such a fundamental principle of 
justice. 
 This argument allows Cohen to identify why the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is 
arbitrary from the perspective of justice. Justice is the expression of a fundamental normative 
commitment, and as such, it is general across all things that might be just. If we justify a global 
norm, constitution, economic scheme, law, social norm or individual action as being just, we 
make ultimate appeal to the same fundamental principle of justice. Yet, given that this 
fundamental principle is fully general across all these subjects, it is arbitrary to focus merely on 
the basic structure. Accordingly, the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is ethically arbitrary. 
Even if the basic structure can be distinguished from daily behavior, it should not be.
 Yet, the Rawlsian should not be any more worried by this second argument for ethical 
arbitrariness than she should be worried by the first.  In this second argument, Cohen tries to 
show that the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrary on the basis of his model of 
justification, but every Rawlsian should deny Cohen’s model of justification. Put simply, Cohen is 
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a foundationalist but Rawls is a holist. Cohen supposes that all justification must ultimately 
appeal to fundamental normative principles, but Rawls argues that all justification ultimately 
appeals to a reflective equilibrium. Accordingly, moral principles are not justified by more 
fundamental normative principles for Rawls, they are justified by their fit with our considered 
convictions. Thus, Rawlsians do not need to ultimately appeal to fact-free principles (though, they 
can) and they do not need to appeal to any fundamental principle of justice. Instead, they appeal 
to a broad range of considered convictions, both about generalities and particulars. For Cohen’s 
argument against Rawls to succeed, he would thus need to invalidate reflective equilibrium as a 
model of justification and show the necessity of his own foundationalism. Without doing so, his 
criticism gets no grip against Rawlsians. 
 Just as Rawls’s model of justification shows that Cohen’s arguments are insufficient against 
the Rawlsian view, so does Cohen’s model of justification show certain Rawlsian arguments to be 
insufficient against his own view. In explaining justice as a particular fundamental principle, 
Cohen is not committed to the priority of justice. For him, being just is merely one consideration 
that counts in favor of some option, and other considerations will often be more significant. If 
justice requires one choice over another, it is not necessarily the case that we ought to choose 
what justice requires. Likewise, the fact that one institution would be more just than another does 
not necessarily mean that we ought to establish the more just institution. Instead, Cohen views 
justice as one competing fundamental value amongst others. We might sometimes rightly act in 
accordance with justice, and sometimes rightly act against it. As he says in Chapter 6, “Justice is 
not the only value that calls for (appropriately balanced) implementation: other principles, 
sometimes competing with justice, must also be variously pursued and honored.”11
 This commitment protects Cohen from any argument that claims that his view of justice 
does not take some important value into consideration. After all, he can merely distinguish that 
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other important value as expressed by a different fundamental principles than justice. For 
instance, some might respond that Cohen’s conception of justice is odd because it would lead to 
“leveling-down.” According to Cohen, the society in which each has equal welfare is more just 
than a society in which all have higher welfare but some have much more than others. Yet, Cohen 
can respond and say that the more unequal society is indeed less just but might still be preferable. 
In that case, we are merely sacrificing justice for welfare, and that might be okay.12  A second 
example of this response occurs in Chapter 8, “The Publicity Argument.” There, he treats an 
objection from Andrew Williams that requiring individuals to promote equality does not satisfy 
the demands of publicity. To this Cohen can merely deny that publicity is a requirement on 
justice, though it might be a concern grounded by a different fundamental principle. In a third 
instance, others might argue that Cohen’s conception of justice is problematic because it ignores 
the importance of personal projects.13  If justice requires each individual to pursue equality in 
their personal choices, then persons would not have the opportunity to pursue those projects 
important to themselves Yet, Cohen can again respond that persons can pursue personal projects, 
but they are merely sacrificing justice to do so. While doing so might be unjust, it might not be 
wrongful. Sometimes, we should sacrifice justice for personal pursuits. Since Cohen does not 
suppose that we should always do the most just course of action or that we ought to live in the 
most just society, these kinds of arguments would not force Cohen to give up his view. For some, 
this commitment might cut against Cohen’s view, but it is not argument against Cohen, given the 
role he assigns justice in his model of justification. It seems that we have reached a stalemate.
6.1.3 The broader argument
However, even if Cohen’s arguments in Chapter 6-7 of Rescuing Justice and Equality do not 
succeed in invalidating the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure, they still make an important 
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point. To see why, we can deconstruct the form of Cohen’s argument, which goes in two basic 
steps. The first step is establishing that justice must be a unified ethical requirement that is general 
across all contexts. By referring to justice as a unified ethical requirement, I mean that something 
can rightly be considered just only when it is related to a single conception of justice, which is the 
same across all contexts. For contrast, justice would be “non-unified” if there were some object for 
which the properties that warranted calling that object “just” were wholly different from the 
properties that warranted calling some different object “just.”14  By referring to justice as general 
across all contexts, I mean that this unified requirement is relevant across a broad range of 
subjects; institutions, laws, choices, dispositions, etc. Cohen’s theory of justification is meant to 
show why justice must be unified and general; it must be so in order to be a fundamental 
normative principle. 
 The second step of the argument is to show that, since justice is a unified and general 
ethical requirement, the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrarily restrictive. Rawls’s two 
principles of justice are not unified and general, so they cannot be principles of justice. 
Accordingly, the basic argument can be expressed as follows:
1) Justice is a unified ethical requirement that is general across all contexts
2)The Rawlsian focus is restricted to the justice of the basic structure
3)Thus, the Rawlsian focus ignores the requirements of justice in all other contexts
4)Thus, the Rawlsian focus is ethically arbitrary from the perspective of justice. 
In short, the Rawlsian goes wrong because she mistakes the nature of justice. Since justice is, by 
its nature, unified and general, any principle that artificially restricts the authority of justice is 
arbitrary from the perspective of justice.
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 Now, I have claimed that this argument is unsuccessful because Cohen has not adequately 
argued for (1); he has not shown that justice must be a unified ethical requirement general across 
all contexts. To prove (1), Cohen appeals to a theory of justification, but Rawlsians should reject 
this theory. Accordingly, Rawlsians can and ought to reject (1), and thus they ought to reject 
Cohen’s conclusion. 
 However, even if Cohen has not proved (1), persons might otherwise be committed to it; 
they might think that justice must consist in a unified and general moral requirement. In this way, 
they might treat the concept of justice as unified; for a conception to be a conception of justice it 
must offer a unified and general requirement. Someone so committed will accept (1), and 
someone who is not so committed will reject (1). Even though Cohen does not prove that we 
should have a unified concept of justice, his argument still shows why those who are committed 
to a unified concept should view the Rawlsian perspective as problematic. 
 In short, while Cohen does not show the Rawlsian position to be incoherent, he does 
show an inconsistency between the commitment to a unified concept of justice and the Rawlsian 
focus on the basic structure. Rawlsians do not need to be committed to thinking of justice as a 
fundamental, general and unified ethical value, but those who are committed to such a 
conception of justice might find the Rawlsian view problematic.
 One of the reasons why Plato’s dialogues are so intriguing is that they record the views of 
an interlocutor as they are sharpened over the course of conversation. As various issues are 
cleared away, we are often left with the core commitments of the interlocutor laid bare. The most 
invaluable aspect of Rescuing Justice and Equality is that we can likewise see how Cohen’s own 
views are sharpened over the course of a 17 year conversation. While the Rawlsian interlocutor is 
always offstage, his presence is felt as Cohen responds to objection after objection. I here mean to 
suggest that as years have cleared away various issues, we are now left with Cohen’s own core 
commitment laid bare. What began as an extension of the difference principle to individual 
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choices, eventually became an argument about the nature of justice. Cohen’s core commitment is 
a view of justice as a unified and general ethical requirement. For Cohen, Rawls’s theory goes 
wrong because it does not treat justice as it is. Accordingly, the next topic that would continue the 
conversation is whether we ought to treat justice as a fundamental, general and unified ethical 
value. 
 I argue that we cannot assume that the concept of justice is unified. Even if we ultimately 
accept a unified conception of justice, we cannot argue that any adequate conception of justice 
must present a unified and general ideal. Accordingly, Cohen’s argument that just must consist in 
an unified ideal goes wrong. Whether we should accept a unified conception of justice depends 
on whether it is the best conception of justice, and not on any conceptual necessity.
6.2 The Argument against a Unified Concept of Justice
It is difficult to know what could settle a dispute between whether the concept of justice is 
unified or disunified. If we argue about a natural fact, we look for evidence in the world to 
settle the debate. We cannot, however, look towards evidence in the world to determine the 
nature of justice. One might say that we look to the patterns of how persons use the phrase, 
“justice,” and then look towards what their implicit beliefs about what its content is. Yet, such 
an analysis would (at most) tell us what people think about justice, and we recognize that 
persons can be wrong about this. If most in a country use justice in such a way that implies that 
the death penalty is just, we would not take that to mean that the death penalty was just. 
Instead, in appealing to the idea of justice we appeal to an idea that could correct what people 
believe. In the same way that persons might be wrong about what is or is not just, persons 
could also be wrong about whether the concept of justice is or is not unified. 
 As I understand the issue, the best way to settle a debate about whether justice is unified 
or disunified is by determining which way of thinking about justice better explains the role that 
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justice plays in our practical reasoning. Justice has a particular role in our deliberation and 
moral debate, and the right concept of justice should fit that role. In other words, the terms of 
the argument should be practical. We vindicate one way of thinking about justice by showing 
that it fits best with the role the idea plays in practical reasoning and debate.
 One clear feature of how justice is used in debate is that people disagree about what 
justice requires. Even a single individual might be “of two minds” on what justice requires. In 
order to accurately represent the concept of justice, then, we need to recognize that the idea is 
not used to refer to any particular requirement(s). Luck Egalitarians, Civic Republicans, 
Libertarians, Contractualists, and Marxists all employ the same concept of justice--lest we see 
them as merely talking past one another--but they differ in what they think the requirements of 
justice are.
 For this reason, it is always helpful to distinguish the concept of justice from a 
conception of justice. We can think of a conception as an articulation of what justice requires. 
Egalitarians, Republicans, Libertarians, Contractualists, and Marxists all employ different 
conceptions of justice. By contrast, a concept of justice is that which these groups disagree 
about when they offer different conceptions of justice. The difficulty is giving a characterization 
of the concept of justice that (a) does not dissolve into a conception of justice and (b) still 
respects the ways in which justice is distinct from rightness, goodness, merit, and other 
normative concepts. 
 In the introduction, I introduced two objections to the argument of this dissertation. 
First, one might object that developing principle for the basic structure leads us to misrepresent 
justice. Insofar as we think of the principles for the basic structure as principles of justice, we 
risk understanding justice as consisting in the requirements on the basic structure if we first 
develop principles for the basic structure. Second, one might suppose that articulating a 
conception of justice has primacy over developing principles for the basic structure. Only if we 
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apply a conception of justice to the basic structure could the principles that apply to it be 
principles of justice. In §6.1, I argued that Cohen’s most developed criticism seeks to show that 
Rawls’s focus on the basic structure is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. We should notice 
that none of these arguments seems to come from a particular conception of justice. Instead, they 
come from claims about what justice must necessarily be like. Yet, these claims of necessity are 
not claims of physical or logical necessity, they are claims of conceptual necessity. They are about 
what justice is for all those who advocate different conceptions of justice. 
 The specific claim about justice that these arguments advance is that justice consists in a 
single unified and general requirement across context. In this way, they advance a “unified 
concept of justice.” If justice is not unified, then developing principles of justice for the basic 
structure would not have definitive implications for justice more broadly. If justice is not unified, 
then developing a general conception of justice would not tell us what would make a basic 
structure just. If justice is not unified, then developing principles for a particular subject would 
not be arbitrary from the perspective of justice. So, in order to respond to these three arguments, 
I want to argue against a unified conception of justice. I want to argue conceptual necessity does 
not require that all conceptions of justice be unified. 
 As an alternative to a unified concept, I offer a disunified concept. A unified concept of 
justice maintains that “a particular is just if any only if it relates to a single unified and general 
requirement.” By contrast, a disunified concept maintains that “a particular is just if and only if it 
satisfies a principle of justice.” Given this definition, it is important to ask what makes a principle 
of justice a principle of justice, and I return to that issue in §6.3. Before that, I want to argue on 
behalf of a disunified concept of justice over a unified concept. This will allow me to address the 
two objections and Cohen’s criticism.
 My argument on behalf of a disunified concept of justice moves in two stages. In §6.2.1, 
I argue that a disunified concept of justice can better explain the field of disagreement about 
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justice. Even those who favor a unified conception of justice can recognize disunified conceptions 
as rival conceptions of justice. However, a unified concept of justice fails to recognize disunified 
conceptions of justice as conceptions of justice. By contrast, a disunified concept of justice can 
recognize unified conceptions as conceptions of justice. Therefore, a disunified concept can better 
account for disagreement between rival conceptions. In  §6.2.2, I argue on behalf of a disunified 
conception of justice. This bolsters the important of the first argument by better indicating why 
we should recognize a disunified concept, but is also favors a disunified conception more 
generally.  After making these arguments, I briefly survey one possible objection from the recent 
work of Ronald Dworkin. 
6.2.1 A disunified concept better sets the space of disagreement
My first argument points out that it is meaningful for someone to wonder whether the 
requirements of justice are unified and general across context. If we accept a unified concept of 
justice, however, we cannot make sense of this as meaningful. If we suppose that justice consists 
of a unified and general requirement, then someone who wonders whether justice consists of a 
unified and general requirement must be making some kind of mistake. We would say that they 
are not wondering about justice. By contrast, a disunified concept of justice does not impose 
such a requirement. Instead, it supposes that a particular is just whenever it satisfies a principle 
of justice. Given the vagueness of what “a principle of justice” might consist in, someone could 
not wonder whether justice consists in satisfying some principle of justice in the same way. For 
this reason, a disunified concept of justice better captures the space of possible disagreements 
about justice. 
 To some, this argument might seem reminiscent of Moore’s “Open Question 
Argument,” which has been thoroughly scrutinized. This argument was used to better 
emphasize the way in which we cannot define goodness by identifying it with a property that 
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all good things have. Even if something is good whenever (and only whenever) it is pleasurable, 
we cannot define goodness with the pleasurable. This is shown in how, whenever goodness is 
defined in terms of some property P, we can always meaningfully ask, “are P things really 
good?” In this way, it is always an open question whether something is good. It cannot be 
settled by definitions alone. 
 The typical challenge to the Open Question Argument is that it only expresses the 
paradox of analysis. However, those who criticize the argument in this way interpret it as meant 
to do more than the arguments aims to do. We can recognize that the question, “is water really 
H2O?” is a meaningful question, but this does not mean that we cannot define water as H2O. 
The difference between the water case and the goodness case is that the person who claims that 
water is H2O does not merely offer it as a definition; they can also show why what we are 
looking for when we identify something as water is the same as that which we identify by H2O. 
The meaningfulness of the question does not show that water and H2O are not the same, it 
merely shows that more beyond mere definition needs to be said. The chemist who defines 
water as H2O can say more in defense of this claim, but the hedonist who defines goodness as 
pleasure cannot. Moore’s open question argument merely points out that whoever defines 
goodness as “the pleasurable,” “the natural,” or “the unified” must do more than stipulate a 
definition. The open question argument helps us to recognize that a definition is not enough, 
but it does not show that an analysis is impossible.
 A much better way to express the point that Moore gestures towards is through the 
distinction between concepts and conceptions. We can understand Moore’s target as offering a 
particular conception of goodness. For example, the hedonist offers a conception goodness as 
the pleasurable, but this hedonist goes wrong whenever they mistake their conception of 
goodness for the concept of goodness. A hedonist cannot say, “goodness consists in the 
pleasurable, that is merely a fact of definition,” because the voluntarist does not think that 
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goodness consists in pleasure. The voluntarist responds, “goodness consists in fulfilling god’s 
will, that is a fact of definition.” If both stick to their words, then they would merely be talking 
past one another. In order to makes sense of their debate, we differentiate the concept of 
goodness from the conception. The hedonist might define their conception of goodness as 
“goodness consists in the pleasurable” and the voluntarist might define their conception of 
goodness as “goodness consists in fulfilling god’s will.” Yet, they should recognize that either 
would be inadequate as the concept of the goodness. Instead, the concept need be defined in 
such a way that does not predetermine a particular conception. In order to make sense of how 
the word is used, a one cannot define goodness in terms of a conception. That is why we find 
the question, “are P things really good?” to always be an open question. Our concept of 
goodness is distinct from any articulation of good things provided by a conception. 
 Returning now to my argument, I want to point out that--what I have called--a unified 
concept of justice comes closer to being a conception of justice than a concept of justice. Of 
course, the unified concept is not itself a conception because it is consistent with different 
conceptions. Someone who thinks “justice always consists in promoting equality” and someone 
who thinks “justice always consists in promoting autonomy” both identify justice with a unified 
and general requirement, but they offer different requirements. So, it would be wrong to 
suppose that a unified concept of justice is really a concept. It is better to see the unified 
“concept” of justice as picking out a class of conceptions rather than the concept of justice. 
Conceptual necessity does not requires that justice consist in a unified and general demand. 
Instead, it is merely the case that there is a class of conceptions that posit a unified and general 
demand. 
 The fact that we can meaningfully ask, “does justice really consist in a single unified and 
general moral requirement?” shows that someone cannot merely stipulate that the concept of 
justice is unified. Someone can reasonably think that justice consists of a unified requirement 
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just as they can think that goodness is the pleasurable. They cannot, however, stipulate the 
meaning of justice so as to exclude conceptions of justice that are not unified.  
 When we have fully accepted the concept/conception distinction, we can recognize that 
one not only accepts either a unified or disunified concept of justice, they might also accept 
either unified or disunified conceptions. Oddly enough, one could simultaneously recognize 
the concept of justice as disunified while accepting a unified conception. Recall that a 
disunified concept of justice identifies any particular as just if it satisfies a principle of justice. If 
someone were to argue that the only relevant principle of justice is that “any particular should 
promote autonomy” then they can accept a disunified concept of justice while arguing for a 
unified conception. The unified conception recognizes a unified and general ethical demand--
to promote autonomy--as the best understanding of justice. However, someone who holds this 
conception might also think that when disputants disagree about conceptions of justice, they 
disagree about what the appropriate principles of justice are. They can recognize that someone 
who offers a disunified conception of justice is still offering a conception of justice.
 By contrast, I see no way in which someone can accept a unified concept of justice while 
accepting a disunified conception. If someone understands disputes about justice as disputes 
about which unified and general demand represents the demands of justice, then they will not 
recognize someone who advocates a disunified conception as offering a conception of justice. 
Since their conception of justice does not consist in a unified and general demand, it is not 
consistent with the concept of justice. Thus, there are only three positions one might hold; (a) 
recognizing a disunified concept and disunified conception, (b) recognizing a disunified 
concept and unified conception, and (c) recognizing a unified concept and a unified 
conception. 
 For this reason, the argument I use against a unified conception of justice does not 
extend to an argument against a disunified conception. Let us imagine that someone asks, “does 
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justice really consist in satisfying a principle of justice?” If this is a meaningful question then it 
shows a problem for the disunified concept as much as my argument shows a problem for the 
unified concept. Yet, is this question meaningful? The idea of a “principle of justice” is so open 
and vague that I doubt it rules out any conception of justice. 
 For these reasons, the disunified concept of justice is better able to make sense of the 
space of disagreement about justice. If one accepts a unified concept of justice, then they 
cannot make sense of a disunified conception as a conception of justice. By contrast, someone 
who accepts a disunified concept of justice can make sense of both unified and disunified 
conceptions. In this way, a disunified concept of justice better represents the role that justice 
plays in our reasoning and debate. 
6.2.2 One reason for a disunified conception
The second stage of my argument aims to give one reason why we should accept a disunified 
conception of justice. This argument plays two roles. First, it supports the first argument by 
showing why it is important that the field of disagreements about justice be able to include 
disunified conceptions of justice. Second, it gives us reason to think that any conception of 
justice that posits a unified and general moral requirement goes wrong. I don’t think this 
argument proves that a disunified conception of justice is the best one, but it meant to 
counterbalance the intuitive pull that unified conceptions might have.  
 The core claim of the second argument is that how a particular ought to be is often 
settled when we identify what would make it “just.” Likewise, if a particular is “unjust” then we 
recognize that it should not be that way. In these cases, we do not treat justice merely as a 
consideration that is balanced amongst others in making final judgements. Instead, justice 
determines how particulars should be. In this way, justice has a kind of “preeminence,” it 
authoritatively settles how something should be. Typically, we think that “if a law is unjust, it 
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should be overturned,” “if an institution is just, it should be respected” “if an action is just, it 
should be performed,” and “if a society is unjust, we must act to change it.” If these statements 
are typical of how justice figures into our deliberation and debate, then justice has a kind of 
preeminence. 
 Now, a disunified conception is better able to explain the preeminence of justice than a 
unified conception is. This is because a disunified conception has greater flexibility to pick out 
how different particulars should be. It can identify one standard for how institutions should be 
and another standard for how actions should be. In order to simultaneously maintain (a) a 
unified conception of justice, and (b) the preeminence of justice, we would need to be 
committed to (c) a single moral demand that determines how a broad range of things should 
be. My point is not that someone cannot be committed to (c), but that it is a very contentious 
commitment with high costs.15  By contrast, a disunified conception of justice identifies a 
particular as just when it satisfies a principle of justice. Since different principles of justice can 
be sensitive to different considerations in different contexts, a disunified concept has a kind of 
moral flexibility. It can identify different considerations as settling how different particulars 
should be. If justice is disunified, it does not rigidly identify some single demand as settling 
how all particulars should be. Instead, it is sensitive to differences between cases.
 To see this point, let’s start from a toy example of a disunified conception of justice. 
According to this conception, (a) a basic structure is just when it’s institutions protect basic 
rights, which includes equal political rights, (b) laws are just when they are the result of a 
democratic process within a just basic structure, (c) actions are just when are in accordance 
with just laws or promote just laws, and (d) dispositions are just when they lead persons to act 
justly. Now someone who supports a unified concept of justice would deny that these four 
principles, (a)-(d), express a conception of justice. Since they do not offer a unified and general 
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rightness.
demand that all just particulars instantiate, this disunified conception is not a conception of 
justice. Someone who maintains a disunified concept of justice, however, can recognize this toy 
conception as a conception of justice.
 With this toy example in hand, we can see the way in which a disunified concept of 
justice has greater flexibility. With such a view, we can see why the fact that a basic structure, 
law, action, or disposition is just can imply that it is as it should be.16  In each case, the principle 
of justice that applies to that particular is suited to the kind of thing--basic structure, law, act, 
or disposition--that it is. Compare this to a more unified conception of justice. If justice 
consists in promoting equality, for example, we might see why a social structure that is just is as 
it should be. However, we might doubt that actions that promote equality are always the actions 
we should take.17  Likewise, if justice consists in respecting certain natural rights, then we might 
see why actions should always be just. However, it is less clear that this conception would be 
adequate for determining how a social structure should be. After all, there are institutional 
questions that are not settled by respect for rights alone. In each of these cases, a unified 
conception does not provide the flexibility that allows for justice to be preeminent.  
 In summary, a unified concept of justice faces two problems. First, a unified concept is 
less able to make sense of all our disagreement about justice because persons might disagree 
about whether justice is unified. Second, a unified concept is less able to respect the 
preeminence of justice. A disunified conception, however, has the flexibility to make sense of 
how any particular that is identified as just is as it should be. This second arguments gives us 
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questions. It might be the case that there are some issues for which we do not think that whether something is just 
settles the issue. All that matters is that there are some issues for which justice is preeminent, and even those who 
do not think it always settles the issue can recognize that it sometimes does.
17 The force of this objection can be well represented in the development of Cohen’s own argument. In arguing for 
justice as a unified and general ideal, Cohen abandons the primacy of justice (as discussed in §6.1.2)
one reason to resist the intuitive pull of a unified conception of justice, and thereby shows the 
advantage of a concept of justice that allows for both unified and disunified conceptions. 
6.2.3 Justice as an interpretive concept
In this section, I want to treat one possible defense of a unified concept of justice. This 
argument does not come from Cohen’s own views, but from the recent argument of Ronald 
Dworkin. While I do not think that Cohen would be entitled to use these arguments, they 
might be available to someone else who would want to defend the unified concept of justice 
and then use it to object to the views I defend. 
 The defense that I have in mind argues that justice is an interpretive concept. Dworkin 
distinguishes “interpretive concepts” from both “natural-kind concepts” and “criterial 
concepts,” and shows how moral concepts like justice are best understood as interpretive 
concepts rather than natural-kind or criterial concepts.18  A natural-kind concept is something 
that has a fixed identity in nature. If one thought that justice was a natural property instantiated 
in just things that we must come to identify and articulate, then justice would be a natural kind 
concept. Since we do not think that any natural discovery will settle what justice requires, 
justice is not a natural kind concept. Criterial concepts are those defined by criteria used to 
identify something. If one thought that justice was a criterial concept, then we would share a 
concept of justice only if we agreed about which things in the world are just. Since both 
socialists and libertarians seem to share the concept of justice, justice cannot be criterial. 
Instead, justice is an interpretive concept. Interpretive concepts are identified by the practices 
we use them in--often because of the overlapping paradigms to which we apply them--and we 
interpret what is the best way to understand that concept as it figures in these practices. We, as 
Ch. 6: The Concept of Justice 
 - 233 - 
18 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 157-170.
a linguistic community, use the concept of justice in various ways, and we differ on how best to 
interpret the idea as it figures in these practices. 
 Applied to the current argument, one might make two claims from this understanding 
of the concept of justice. First, one might claim that treating justice as an interpretive concept 
can make sense of the role that justice plays in practical reasoning. Second, one might claim 
that recognizing justice an interpretive concepts shows why it must be unified. I agree with--or, 
at least, will grant--the first argument, but I disagree with the second. Even if justice is an 
interpretive concept, that gives us no reason to see it as necessarily unified. 
 In regards to the first argument, I recognize treating justice as an interpretive concept 
does not face the objections to a unified concept in §6.2.1 and §6.2.2. In fact, many of the same 
reasons that I deny a unified concept of justice are the same as Dworkin’s reasons for denying 
that justice is either a criterial or natural-kind concept. If justice is a natural-kind concept, we 
cannot make sense of the Open Question Argument. Once we have identified what justice is in 
the world, we would not be able to ask whether what we identified as just was really just. If 
justice were a criterial concept, then persons would be talking past one another in arguing 
about justice. If justice is an interpretive concept, however, we can recognize that we treat 
justice as preeminent for some concerns. Any interpretation of justice would then have to 
explain why it is preeminant for those concerns, and also why it is not preeminant for others. 
Likewise, since our practices often treat judgments of justice as the terminus of practical 
reasoning, the interpretation of justice must do the same. Dworkin’s articulation of interpretive 
concepts resolves much of the problems I have articulated above. 
 Nonetheless, accepting that justice is an interpretive concept does not give us any reason 
to suppose that justice is unified. Once we recognize it as an interpretive concept, the question 
is what the best interpretation of it is. Whether justice is unified or disunified then depends on 
which interpretation is best. The mere fact that justice is interpretive does not mean that it is 
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unified because there is nothing that compels us to interpret justice as unified.19  Given the 
range of objects that we consider just and unjust, and the range of moral concerns that are 
relevant for these judgements, it seems to me that the best interpretation would need to be 
disunified, but a complete argument would be needed to show this definitively. 
 I will grant that a person who both (a) sees justice as an interpretive concept, and (b) 
interprets justice as unified is able to overcome the objections offered in §6.2.1. Yet, this is only 
because they offer a unified conception of justice rather than a unified concept. So long as they 
recognize the possibility that a conception of justice might be disunified, they do not support a 
unified concept. Instead, they support a unified conception as the best interpretation of the 
concept. Such a view does not misrepresent how justice figures in practical reasoning. 
 Once someone grants that justice is an interpretive concept, they cannot block the 
possibility of a disunified conception of justice. Whether justice is unified or disunified then 
depends on the best arguments we can give in favor of one conception or the other. We need to 
show that a unified conception better interprets the practices in which we use justice or that a 
disunified conception does so. What is important for my argument is that one can no longer 
appeal to a unified concept of justice to block a disunified conception. Neither conception has 
prima facie authority but are instead rival interpretations of justice.
6.2.4 How a disunified concept addresses the two objections
At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced two objections that one might make against 
focusing on the basic structure from a concern with justice. First, one might argue that 
focusing on the basic structure would misrepresent the nature of justice. Second, one might 
argue that we can only determine how the basic structure ought to be by determining what 
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justice must be unified. However, his unity of value comes at a high-level. This unity only needs to show that our 
values do not conflicts when all our values are fully supported by one another. This does not mean that we need to 
articulate justice as unified but only that however we articulate justice must ultimately support how we articulate 
our other values. Moreover, it is unclear why Dworkin thinks all values must be unified--as I point out in §5.3.2
justice requires. Both these objections are defeated once we accept a disunified concept of 
justice.
 The overall reason why these objections are defeated is because we recognize that 
whether the basic structure is just is the same as whether it is as it ought to be. In arguing that 
the basic structure ought to be organized in one way rather than another, we are arguing about 
what would make it just. In arguing about the justice of the basic structure, we are arguing 
about how the basic structure ought to be. In arguing about the injustice of actions, we are 
arguing about what actions ought not to be done. So, to focus on the question of how the basic 
structure ought to be or which actions are unjust, we are neither misrepresenting the nature of 
justice nor ignoring a proper order of explanation. 
 First, we do not misrepresent the nature of justice by focusing on a principle for the 
basic structure of society because we do not claim to be offering any general conception of 
justice at all in doing so. If one determines what makes a basic structure just, that does not itself 
determine anything about what makes something else just. To figure out whether a particular 
law, action or disposition of character is just, we need to determine what the appropriate 
principle of justice for that law, action, or disposition of character is. We do not suppose that 
the same thing that makes the basic structure just makes all things just, so we do not 
misrepresent justice generally by focusing solely on the basic structure.  
 Second, we do not need to first determine what justice generally requires to determine 
how the basic structure ought to be. Instead, we determine whether a basic structure is just by 
determining the appropriate principle of justice for the basic structure; we determine how the 
basic structure ought to be. This will require that we look at the particularities of the basic 
structure and how it fits within ethical life. It is not a requirement of practical rationality or the 
order of value that we first determine a unified concept of justice and then apply it to the basic 
structure.
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6.2.5 Where the argument stands
With my major arguments in favor a disunified concept of justice complete, I want to 
summarize where I think my broader arguments stands. I have not shown that the correct 
conception of justice must be disunified. Instead, I have merely argued against the view that the 
correct conception of justice must be unified. In so doing, I have argued against a unified 
concept of justice and for a disunified concept. However, one might still argue that the best 
conception of justice--understood as a disunified concept--is unified. That is fine. I only mean 
to argue against those arguments that presume a unified concept of justice. The two objections 
surveyed in the introduction and Cohen’s fully developed criticism only get their force if we 
assume a unified concept of justice, and I mean to show why these arguments are wrong to do 
this. A conception of justice might be disunified. 
 All this leaves open the question, “what is the best conception of justice?” I think that it 
should leave this question open. I do not doubt that persons with a particular conception of 
justice might disagree with my view on the basis of that conception of justice. In such cases, we 
have a contrast between views. Whether the view I advocate or a rival is best will depend on a 
more holistic comparison between the advantages of both views and how they fit with ethical 
and theoretical commitments. 
 I only mean to block those arguments that show my argument must be wrong regardless 
of which conception of justice one accepts. I think that the argument should be about what 
conception of justice we should accept, and I hope that this dissertation contributes to that 
argument. I believe that my arguments show why the basic structure has primacy as a moral 
subject even when we do not presume a particular conception of justice, and I believe that this 
favors those conceptions of justice that are consistent with treating the basic structure as a 
primary moral subject. 
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6.3 A New Objection and the Primary Subject of Justice
I have explained a disunified concept of justice as committed to the idea that an object is 
appropriately identified as just when it satisfies a principle of justice. Yet, this only opens the 
question, “what makes a principle of justice a principle of justice.” In order for a principle to be 
identified as a principle of justice, there needs to be something that ties together all the 
principles of justice as principles of justice.20  The defender of a unified concept of justice will say 
that this issue shows why my articulation of a disunified concept only pushes the problem back 
another level. We will need some substantive unity to explain what distinguishes certain 
principles as principles of justice. 21
 Now, I recognize that I need some way of bringing the various principles of justice 
together, but I deny that we need a unified concept of justice to do this. Instead, we only need 
to explain what makes principles of justice distinct and unified as principles. This does not 
require us to represent justice as a single unified demand. So long as the various principles of 
justice have some feature in common, they can be identified as principles of justice. 
 In this section, I want to offer one candidate for a way to tie the principles of justice 
together without appeal to a unified moral demand. A full argument in defense of my 
suggestion would require a different project, so I leave it only as a suggestion for now. If my 
suggestion is plausible, then it shows how we can make sense of the basic structure as the 
primary subject of justice. If my suggestion is not plausible, then my argument serves merely as 
an example for how another account might work. To overcome the objection, it only needs to 
Ch. 6: The Concept of Justice 
 - 238 - 
20 This need is most apparent in distinguishing what is just from what is right. Both might be understood as that 
which satisfies a moral principle, but what differentiates what is just is that it satisfies a principle of justice. 
21 I suspect that Cohen would object in this way because it resembles his own argument against the Rawlsian view. 
As mentioned above, Cohen appeals to the idea that a unified concept of justice is needed to explain why all the 
just things are just (Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 291). Similarly, one might argue that the various 
principles of justice associated with a disunified concept of justice are only principles of justice if they apply a 
fundamental principle of justice, and that will need to be unified.
be the case that there is some way to bring the principles of justice together that does not rely 
on a unified moral demand. 
6.3.1 A proposal: principles of justice as specifying claims 
While a complete argument would need to better support any judgment of this type, I suggest 
that principles of justice are moral principles that deal specifically with valid claims we on our 
broader community. What makes a principle of justice a principle of justice, is that it relates to 
these claims. 
 According to this view, principles of justice might specify the claims members of society 
have or they might specify what claims persons should have. We might call the violation of 
rights unjust because it violates claims that persons have, and we might call a society that does 
not secure healthcare for all as unjust because it should do so. It is in this sense that justice can 
both be a requirement and an ideal. It is a requirement in identifying what persons have claims 
on, and it is an ideal in establishing the best systems of claims that persons could have. It is in 
this sense that justice can have both a natural component, as when we believe that persons have 
natural rights, and an artificial component, as when we think rights arise from conventional 
practices. It also differentiates the demands of justice from the morally supervenient because 
persons do not have claims on you to act in morally supervenient ways.22 
 In offering this unifying feature of justice, I follow Mill’s articulation of justice in Book 
V of Utilitarianism. There he sketches a social history of the idea and its development through 
the modern period. At the conclusion of this history he writes, 
“Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in 
breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse 
than other people who have no greater claims--in each case the supposition 
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22 Likewise, what makes a principle of justice within this view differentiates justice from the promotion of the good 
because the promotion of good is a first-personal moral ideal whereas valid claims deal with a more second-
personal stance.
implies two things: a wrong done, and some assignable person who is wronged. 
Injustice may also be done by treating a person better than others; but the wrong 
in this case is to his competitors, who are also assignable persons. It seems to be 
that this feature in the case--a right in some person, correlative to the moral 
obligation--constitutes the specific difference between justice and generosity of 
beneficence. Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and 
wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his 
moral right. No one has a right to our generosity or beneficence because we are 
not morally bound to practice those virtues toward any given individual.”23
In this passage, Mill specifically identifies justice as distinct from utility, and explains it by the 
idea of a valid claim that one has on another. Of course, Mill soon uses this notion of justice in 
order to show that we need the principle of utility because the claims that persons have often 
conflict and we need some principle by which to settle these conflicts. Yet, nothing compels us 
to accept Mill’s idea that our disputed claims need to be resolved by some fully general first 
principle such as the principle of utility. I addressed that argument in Chapter 5. Rawls also 
conceives of the problem of justice in a similar way in his early writing. In “A Decision 
Procedure for Ethics,” Rawls writes;
“the problem of justice arises whenever it is the reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the satisfaction of two ore more claims of two or more persons 
that those claims, if given title, will interfere and conflict with one another.”24
In this passage, the particular problem of justice is understood in ways that are similar to Mill’s 
understanding. In the later article, “Justice as Fairness,” Rawls specifically recognizes that his 
two principles of justice are not principles that settle all questions of justice, but are only 
“typical of a family of principles normally associated with the concept of justice.”25 Later in the 
essay, he gives an articulation of how the members of this family are related to one another,  “It 
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25 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” Collected Papers, 48.
is typical of cases of justice to involve persons who are pressing on one another their claim, 
between which a fair balance or equilibrium must be found.”26 In these passages, the idea of a 
claim is crucial for justice. A particular conception of justice will settle persons’ claims in some 
specific way. My suggestion follows Mill and Rawls’s early work in understanding the various 
principles of justice as those moral principles that specify claims and settle disputes.
 One objection to this articulation is that we have all sorts of claims that are not related 
to justice in any way. I have a valid claim that you bring me to the store if you promised to, but 
you do not commit an injustice if you do not fulfill your promise. In cases like this, not every 
valid claim relates to justice, so this articulation of what makes a principle a principle of justice 
is inadequate. 
 To answer this objection, we only need to specify that the principles of justice are not 
related to all claims that we have, but claims we have on our broader community. When we 
have a right, for example, it is a claim we have on persons generally. When someone commits 
an injustice, it is a wrong done to the larger community rather than to a particular person. So, 
the suggestion is that principles of justice relate to those claims we have on persons in our 
community generally. This overcomes the promising objection, because that is a claim against a 
particular person rather than on the members of a community generally. 
 Of course, this is only a first approximation of what unites the principles of justice, and 
it will undoubtedly need to be tweaked. Since my present goal is not to defend a complete 
account of what differentiates justice, I only offer this suggestion as a plausible idea to show 
how such an articulation may be possible and how it can aid in answering the present 
objection. I should stress that this understanding of the unifying idea of justice answers no 
substantive questions about justice. Specifically, it does not determine what valid claims we 
Ch. 6: The Concept of Justice 
 - 241 - 
26 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” Collected Papers, 54.
have or what institutions we ought to have. To answer those questions we require a complete 
conception of justice. 
 The challenge that I mean to address in this section is to show what ties the various 
principles of justice together as principles of justice. Someone who advocates a unified concept 
of justice might suppose that the only way to identify a principle as a principle of justice is to 
suppose that it relates to a single unified moral demand. By identifying the principles of justice 
as those related to valid claims, I have instead tied together the various principles of justice in a 
more formal way. By explaining the link between principles of justice with such a formal 
feature, I show why we do not need to rely on any unified concept of justice. What is most 
important for answering the objection is to show how a formal link between the principles of 
justice would be possible. Other formal links--that justice deals with distributions of 
advantages or with laws, for example--might also answer this objection. 
6.3.2 The primary subject of justice
Beyond answering the objection, the idea that principles of justice are related to valid claims 
can show us why the basic structure of society would be the “primary subject of justice,” as 
Rawls famously labeled it. To see why it would be a subject “of justice,” we only need to look 
back at how the basic structure was identified in Ch. 1. Recall that the basic structure is the 
system of social institutions that together establish our rights, obligations, and powers as 
members of society. In this way, these institutions establish the basic claims we have on one 
another as members of society. Since the institutions of the basic structure establish claims we 
have as members of society, the principles that apply to the basic structure can rightly be 
identified as principles of justice. It is not because the principles themselves represent a single 
unified conception of justice, but because they relate to our claims on the broader community 
that they can be considered principles of justice.
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 To see why the basic structure would be the “primary” subject of justice, we only need  
to recall the argument of Chapter 3. Recall all the ways in which both institutions and 
individual actions need to be understood within the moral context established by the basic 
structure. When we articulate principles of justice that do not apply to the basic structure, we 
need to recognize that the principles should be sensitive to the moral context established by the 
basic structure. Some claims that we have will be due to institutions that are not part of the 
basic structure, but which institutions we ought to have need to be sensitive to the moral 
context established by the basic structure. When claims are not specified by institutions, those 
claims still need to be sensitive to the moral context established by the basic structure. In this 
way, the various principles of justice can only be fully specified within a particular basic 
structure. 
 It is for this reason that the basic structure would be the “primary subject of justice.” In 
order to adequately develop other principles of justice, we need to have a sense of the moral 
context those principles will apply in. The basic structure forms the moral context within which 
these principles of justice can be rightly determined, but the principles for the basic structure 
should not be specific to a moral context. Thus, they have a kind of primacy amongst the 
principles of justice. The basic structure would be the primary subject of justice for the same 
reason why it has primacy as a moral subject.
6.4 The Priority of the Practical
The full argument of this dissertation, beginning with the introduction and ending here, might 
seem to involve a subtle trick. I began by saying that my arguments would not come from any 
claims about the nature of justice. In the introduction, I said that I did not defend the claim 
that “the basic structure is the primary subject of justice” but instead that “the basic structure is 
a centrally important ethical subject.” Yet, even if I have not appealed to any claims about the 
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nature of justice, my arguments do bear on our views about the nature of justice. What seems 
like a trick is that I have an argument for why the basic structure is “the first subject of justice,” 
but the argument is a pragmatic one. Rather than arising from a conception of justice, it shows 
the primacy of the basic structure as a moral subject, and then claims that this gives reason for 
us to regard it as the primary subject of justice.
 I do not claim that the basic structure is a centrally important ethical subject because 
justice is uniquely related to it. Instead, I claim that we should understand justice as uniquely 
related to the basic structure because it is a centrally important ethical subject. My argument 
for the primacy of the basic structure was made in the first four chapters, and it did not appeal 
to any broader conception of justice. Instead, it relied on a view of social institutions, their 
assessment, and the assessment of actions within those institutions. Instead of arguing from 
justice, I argued from a conception of the normative structure of social practices. This all shows 
the importance of determining how the basic structure ought to be organized, and I believe it is 
appropriate to understand this as the primary subject of justice because of its importance. 
 The core question at hand is an odd one; how should we understand our moral concepts 
like justice? Those who argue that the basic structure is not the primary subject of justice, take 
a stance not only on what is just and unjust but on how we should use the idea of justice. Yet, 
how should we settle a debate between persons who disagree about how we use the idea? I 
suggest that we should understand justice by the role it plays in our practical reasoning. Of 
course, there is no settled agreement on what role this is, but I have suggested it often plays the 
role of identifying a terminus of practical judgement. When we judge something just, we often 
seem to judge that it is as it should be rather than judging that it is good in only one respect. 
This is what, in part, blocks the claims that justice is--by necessity--a unified ethical demand. 
 Yet, even if I am wrong and there is not this, or any, pattern of use, then we can still ask 
the question of how we should use the concept of justice. Here, I believe that the central 
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importance of the basic structure is key. If we agree that the basic structure is a centrally 
important subject for ethics, then we have reason to think that the basic structure is a central 
concern of justice. Insofar as we use the idea to discuss one of the most important aspects of 
ethical life, it would be appropriate to use the idea of justice to discuss one of the most 
important questions. In this way, it is the argument for the importance of the basic structure 
that shows why it would be a primary subject of justice and not any claim about the nature of 
justice per se. In this way, it is more of a pragmatic argument about justice. How we use the idea 
should be tied to what moral problems we need to solve. 
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Afterword: Social and Moral Complexity 
Rarely is good philosophy merely about proving a conclusion. More often, it is about a broader 
perspective to take towards a range of issues. For the best understanding of the world, we need 
more than truths. We need to know the best ways to articulate truths, how to connect them, 
and which are most significant.  More than any particular conclusion, I want this dissertation 
to show a particular perspective towards the social structure and ethical life. I have tried to 
construct this perspective by addressing a number of different issues, arguing for particular 
conclusions and contrasting my view with alternatives. I hope that the broader perspective I 
want to get across has already been revealed across the various arguments, but I want to make 
this broader perspective more apparent in this final note. 
 There are a few motivating ideas that underlie much of this argument. One of the most 
important is an appreciation for social complexity. We act within a network of intertwined 
practices. When practices are stable, they get built upon with additional practices, adding to the 
complexity and making any change more difficult and disruptive. One of the most amazing 
features of human life is how we navigate and manipulate these practices with ease. Yet, the fact 
that we live within this web of practices without much difficulty can also blind us to them. 1  
When theory tries to make an understanding of our actions explicit, however, it goes wrong if it 
fails to recognize the complex of practices that we implicitly act within. Any accurate 
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1 In a commencement speech to Kenyon College, David Foster Wallace told the simple parable of two young fish 
swimming along one day and are passed by an older fish going the other direction.  In passing, the older fish says, 
“Morning, boys. How’s the water?” Long after the older fish has passed, one younger fish turns to the other and 
asks, “what the hell is water?” My point is that social practices are our water; no adequate account of our ethical 
life can neglect the role that practices play even if it is so easy for us to ignore them. This point has been much 
insisted by figures from Hume to Wittgenstein and beyond, but “the most obvious, important realities are often the 
ones that are hardest to see and talk about.” (David Foster Wallace, Convocation to Kenyon College,  <http://
moreintelligentlife.com/story/david-foster-wallace-in-his-own-words>)
understanding of our actions and values needs to see them as within a moral context 
established by our practices.
 It is in the theorist’s search for a simple way of understanding morality and ethics that 
we come to ignore the complexities that our practices give rise to. We try to look past and 
through these practices to identify a moral foundation. Doing this is not problematic in itself, 
but becomes problematic if we do not recognize the ways in which any such foundation only 
matters to us within the practices of our social world. First, any such foundation would be too 
abstract; it would need to be made real to us through our ways of living. Second, any such 
foundation would be alienating if it were not tied into our social life. If morality and ethics is to 
be important to us, it must be important to the people we are as members of our particular 
social world with our particular characters. Our practices are bound to skew the correct moral 
understanding in some ways, but the correct understanding must still be shown to us through 
our ways of living together. The account of ethics that matters for us must be tied to our 
practices. 
 If we appreciate the importance of contingent practices in specifying the content of our 
ethical life and we appreciate social complexity, we can also appreciate both (a) why it is so 
difficult to argue that we should be concerned with the basic structure and (b) why the basic 
structure is so important. The argument is difficult because the basic structure is just one 
particular set of social practices in our complex social world. What would make it any more 
deserving of our attention than other practices or the whole of society? One cannot merely 
distinguish the assessment of practices or institutions from the assessment of individual action 
and then claim that they have vindicated the focus on the basic structure. One must give an 
argument for what makes the basic structure a particularly important ethical subject. 
 What I have tried to argue throughout is that what makes the basic structure a 
particularly important more subject is the way in which it establishes our obligations, rights, 
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and powers as members of society. We can understand what the basic structure is--it’s 
identity--as the set of institutions that together specify our role as member of society. It is 
because these institutions together form a system that we need to assess the basic structure as a 
single subject; to properly assess any major social institution we need to assess it as part of the 
basic structure and this means that we need evaluate the basic structure as a whole. Finally, it is 
the way in which the basic structure establishes an institutional context for both practices and 
individual actions that explains the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure. The 
particularities of the major social institutions are relevant for assessing the actions and 
practices within a society, but these particularities are not relevant for assessing the major 
social institutions themselves. 
 Recall that I understand social cooperation in a particular way. Rather than being 
focused on production or a lack of conflict, I understand it as the unique cooperative 
relationship between members of society. I have argued that this cooperative relationship 
consists in following the rules of our major social institutions. We coordinate with one another 
in mutually following these rules, and this coordination counts as cooperation when it is done 
with deference (rather than exploitation) towards those we coordinate with. This provides a 
tight link between the terms of social cooperation and the major social institutions because it is 
by following the rules of the major institutions that persons in society cooperate in the way 
specific to members of society. 
 When members of society cooperate in this way--that is, when they follow the rules of 
the major social institutions--they establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals 
background as members of society. Persons have a level of surety that others will act in 
accordance with the rules of the major social institutions, so they can plan on the basis of what 
these rules are. They can rely on their property claims, on an authority to settle conflicts, on 
protection from threats, on an economic system, on certain relationships, and on a form of 
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political power. At a fundamental level, this surety only comes from persons mutually following 
the rules of social practices. The basic structure consists of the ways in which these major 
institutions together establish background security. Accordingly, social cooperation consists in 
following the rules of the basic structure institutions, and we assess the terms of social 
cooperation by assessing the basic structure.
 What should be obvious at this stage is that these ideas together form a kind of 
conceptual circle. I have defined major social institutions, social cooperation, and member of 
society in inter-reliant ways. This is no problem because these ideas are meant to make explicit 
an implicit understanding of social practices. Since these practices are already up and running, 
and we find ourselves in the midst of them, it is no problem that their explication does not 
build up from primary ideas with the theoretical beauty of Leviathan’s Part I. There is no 
problem with circularity in this reconstruction, so long as it accurately reconstructs our 
practices. 
 This is the core argument that takes us from the complexity of social life to the central 
importance of the basic structure as an ethical subject. Our social practices influence much of 
the content of ethical life; they establish new obligations, shape our values, determine our 
virtues and set the terms of our relationships. Not only our basic structure, but also our social 
practices generally, have profound and pervasive effects on ethical life. However, what makes 
the basic structure such a centrally important ethical subject is the particular role it has in 
social and ethical life. In establishing obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as 
members of society, it is distinct from the rest of the social structure. It sets the moral context 
for the assessment of individual actions and many of our other social practices. Accordingly, if 
our moral theory is to appropriately appreciate the complexity of the social world, moral theory 
should treat the basic structure as a distinct and centrally important subject. 
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 From the perspective of a moral theory that has tried to look past our particular 
practices, I have little doubt that this method will seem odd. If we think that morality is 
fundamentally about first principles directly applied to solve our problems, we will think it odd 
that our practices can generate moral and ethical considerations. If we think of justice as a 
single, unified ethical demand, we will think it odd to be less concerned with articulating that 
demand. That is why I used the fourth and fifth chapters to argue against these views. Not only 
do they motivate some of the most discussed objections to a Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure, they also represent two of the deeper convictions that can lead to a philosophical 
impasse. 
 In both responses, I want to advocate a view of moral theory that appreciates the 
complexity of our social world. First, to rely on fully general first principles to settle all our 
moral conflicts ignores the ways in which we are social creatures, living lives bound up in our 
particular practices. The fact that we live together with others according to these practices 
generates new and specific moral and ethical considerations that first principles alone cannot 
adequately respect. Since the major arguments that advocate such principle all fail, one cannot 
assume such a view of moral theory against the view I defend. Second, one should not assume 
that justice must be a single unified ethical idea. To do so necessarily limits its importance in 
our complex world. Any single articulated moral demand is unlikely to be sensitive to all the 
nuances of ethical life, so a view of justice that takes that role is bound to be limited. It relegates 
justice to one concern among many, and an argument about justice would not settle the 
difficult questions of what we ought to do. Instead, we should recognize that in arguing about 
justice, we argue about how things should be. If there is no easy answer to determining how all 
things ought to be, then we should not represent justice as a single unified ethical demand. 
 Undoubtedly, some of the claims I make in this dissertation will raise new questions and 
concerns. I know, for instance, that much more needs to be said about exactly how our 
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practices influence the content of ethical life. How exactly can we make sense of values, virtues, 
relationships and obligations being influenced by social practices while denying strong forms of 
ethical relativism? I hope to better address these questions in time, but even if I have muddied 
the waters, I hope they are clear enough to see my core point. The focus on the basic structure 
of society is not justified merely by a particular view of the nature of justice. Those who doubt 
some view of justice do not adequately show that we should not be concerned with the basic 
structure. The basic structure is a distinct moral subject that figures centrally in ethical life. 
Once we recognize that we act within a particular moral context that is partly established by 
our social practices, we should see the basic structure as a centrally important and distinct 
moral subject.  
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